Race and politics in Fiji by Norton, Robert Edward.
ROBERT 
NORTON 
RACE AND 
POLITICS 
IN 
RACE AND POLITICS IN FIJI 
Robert Norton is a senior lecturer in Anthropology and 
Comparative Sociology in the School of Behavioural 
Sciences at Macquarie University. He has been a student 
of Fiji's political development since 1966. Dr Norton 
has also researched social change and leadership at the 
village level in Western Samoa and the social conse-
quences of industrial employment in the Kingdom of 
Tonga. His theoretical interests include especially the 
politics of ethnicity and the comparative study of power 
and inequality. 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
RACE AND 
POLITICS 
IN FIJI 
2nd Edition 
Robert Norton 
University of Queensland Press 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
UriiV^^'^'^^^T' O'- ' • - •-' 'y-^' -'3'n.-.-*'i^ 
LerJ 
First published 1977 
This edition published 1990 by University of Queensland Press 
Box 42, St Lucia, Queensland 4067 Australia 
fc Robert Norton 1977, 1990 
This book is copyright. Apart from any fair dealing 
for the purposes of private study, research, criticism 
or review, as permitted under the Copyright Act, no 
part may be reproduced by any process without written 
permission. Enquiries should be made to the publisher. 
The typeset text for this book was supplied by the author in camera-ready form 
Printed in Australia by The Book Printer, Maryborough 
Distributed in the USA and Canada by 
International Specialized Book Services, Inc., 
5602 N.E. Hassalo Street, Portland, Oregon 97213-3640 
Cataloguing in Publication Data 
National Library of Australia 
Norton, Robert, 1944 Jan. 10-
Race and politics in Fiji. 
2nd ed. 
Bibliography. 
Includes index. 
1. Fiji — Politics and government. 2. Fiji — Race 
relations. I. Title. 
320.99611 
ISBN 07022 2215 1. 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
For my sons David, Rhys, Gregory, and Piers 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Contents 
Illustrations viii 
Charts ix 
Maps ix 
Tables ix 
Preface xi 
Acknowledgments xvi 
1 Fiji in Comparative Perspective 1 
2 The Making of a Multi-Ethnic Society 15 
3 Ethnic Relations in the Colonial Political Economy 35 
4 Regional Differences in Society and Politics 53 
5 Party Politics and the End of Colonial Rule 75 
6 The Contradictions of Independent Fiji 707 
7 Coup D'Etat and the Quest for Fijian Supremacy 
— Events and Structure in the Crisis of 1987 133 
Notes to Text 153 
Glossary 175 
Appendix: Tables 179 
Bibliography 195 
Index 209 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Illustrations 
Following page 100 
A village rally of the Fijian Association 
Presenting Kava to the candidates 
Alliance Party campaign team in a village 
A city politician woos the rural vote 
A Fijian rebel confronts the colonial policeman 
A.D. Patel 
Singing praises to the NFP 
Country voters 
Segregated audiences at a city rally 
Rallying the farmers 
Multiracial campaign team — Alliance Party 
How to vote 
In the sugar cane fields 
Fijian elder at meeting of Indians 
Fijian voters in Suva 
At the polling stations 
Fijian women wait to vote 
Irene Jai Narayan, past president of NFP 
Election poster before the coup 
Colonel Rabuka 
Indian woman weeps after the coup 
Soldier and Taukei supporters 
The Kava presented to Dr Bavadra 
Sydney Fijians greet the Bavadras, 1988 
Timoci and Adi Kuini Bavadra and friends 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Illustrations ix 
Charts 
Racial inequalities in education 25 
Pre-coup electoral system 32 
Support for political parties 1972 108 
Support for political parties 1977(1) 117 
Support for poHtical parties 1977(2) 119 
Support for political parties 1982 121 
Support for poHtical parties 1987 136 
Maps 
Fiji Islands: principal islands and towns 17 
Fiji Islands: provinces 19 
Tables 
1 Population of Fiji 1946-1986 179 
2 Regional distribution of ethnic groups 779 
3 Ethnic composition of provinces 750 
4a Inequalities in educational achievement 757 
4b Urban unemployed as percentage of economically-
active 752 
5 Provinces of Fijians in civil service 755 
6 Racial polarisation in party politics 757 
7 Ethnic composition of parliament 75P 
8 Ethnic composition of Alliance cabinet 790 
9 Provinces of Fijians nominated by Council of Chiefs 
for parliament 797 
10 Provinces of Fijians appointed to parliament from 
Chiefs' nominees 797 
11 Elected Fijian Members of Parliament by province 
of origin 792 
12 Elected Fijian Members of Parliament by region of 
origin 79i 
13 Ethnic composition of post-coup councils 79i 
14 Provinces of Fijian members of post-coup 
councils 79-^  
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Preface 
The central arguments of Race and Politics in Fiji were confirmed a 
decade after publication by the events of 1985-87.1 had focused on 
how the indigenous Fijians' concern for their political power might 
be separated from political action on economic and social interests 
common to many people of both major ethnic populations. I was 
concerned with the conditions in which class might become impor-
tant in political competition. The Labour Party experiment, its 
initial successes, and its failure after the toppling of Ratu Mara 
dramatically underlined the importance of this issue. I had sug-
gested that a strongly inter-ethnic political organisation would suc-
ceed only by accommodating general economic and social welfare 
issues with the more politically potent ethnic concerns and not by 
seeking to submerge the latter as some political activists and 
Marxist writers have proposed. 
My interest in the problem grew from an understanding of Fiji as 
a society in which a variety of factors actually or potentially con-
dition political consciousness and solidarities: Fiji as a sort of 
"force field" of different action potentials in mutual tension. In 
addition to race and class there is region. The emphasis I gave to 
regional differences and inequalities was to some extent vindicated 
by the significance of old resentments of Fijians of western Viti 
Levu toward Fijians of the east during the election and the military 
coups of 1987. Indeed one of the main consequences of the mihtary 
intervention has been the strengthening of an eastern Fijian 
hegemony that has its roots in pre-colonial times and was con-
soHdated under colonial rule. The regional divisions and jealousies 
continue to be a powerful force in the present crisis, not just bet-
ween west and east but perhaps more importantly now between the 
main island Viti Levu and the eastern islands. 
I have tried in the introductory and concluding chapters to 
advance an interpretation of aspects of the contemporary situation 
in terms of some ideas about the nature of ethnic relations in Fiji 
which I put forward in the first edition of the book and developed 
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since in my thinking about ethnic conflicts and poHtics in other 
post-colonial societies such as Sri Lanka, Malaysia, and Guyana. 
In developing comparisons in the earlier work I argued that several 
features have distinguished the control of ethnic conflict in Fiji: an 
institutionalisation of the division, the negotiability of the ever-
present issue of land, and factors sustaining the unity of Fijian 
political leadership. My new examination in Chapter 1 of the case 
of Sri Lanka and its implications for our understanding of Fiji 
builds on this perspective. The analysis has been influenced par-
ticularly by the work of the late Chandra Jayawardena and by some 
of the writings of Pierre Bourdieu in addition to my own theorisa-
tion about the politics of ethnic relations over a period of twenty 
years. 
The argument is developed with reference to some general ques-
tions about the nature of cultural constructions of ethnic identity. 
How is the process connected with routine life? Is identity regularly 
affirmed and bounded by the ideals and symbols of everyday social 
relationships and practices? Or does it have a volatile form ener-
gised by a tension with the frustrations, disjunctions, and am-
biguities of social experience and more productive of militancy 
toward other groups? A related question concerns the impact 
poHtical rivalry itself has on the cultural construction of identity, 
on the volatility of this process and its effects on inter-ethnic rela-
tions. To what extent is there a contest within an ethnic group to 
control the manipulation of cultural resources or "capital" as the 
foundation of political dominance? What are the impHcations of 
such instabiHty or fluidity for the state of inter-ethnic conflict? 
These questions have influenced my thinking about the nature of 
Fijian ethnic consciousness and organisation in the current political 
crisis. I contrast Fiji with Sri Lanka to elucidate the issues. The 
essential idea is that the potential for a volatile antagonistic Fijian 
ethnicity has been limited and offset by the continuing function of 
estabHshed social and political institutions, particularly those of 
chiefship, in sustaining for Fijians convictions of identity, worth, 
and strength. The estabHshed structures, cultural discourse, and 
symbolism have been a force for stabiHty by routinising expressions 
of ethnic identity and opposition. Processes of acrimonious eth-
nicity that have precipitated devastating violence elsewhere have 
had in Fiji a certain redundancy, to the extent that they have ap-
peared at all. Furthermore, the old social and poHtical structures in 
which Fijian ethnic identity has been secured were tied in with the 
process of accommodation with Indians, particularly in connection 
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with managing the chronic problem of land. These issues, explored 
mainly in chapters 1,3, and 7, ultimately concern the "deep struc-
ture" of society and poHtics in Fiji. 
For the most part, however, the book retains an empirical 
emphasis. My original project was something quite new in the study 
of Fiji: an analysis of the society as a whole, its distinctive processes 
and structures as these conditioned political life, and as political 
events in turn conditioned them. Until then all scholarly works had 
focused on one or other of the main racial groups. Indeed at the 
time of writing Race and Politics was still the only published study 
of Fiji as a national society. 
Readers might be irritated by a seemingly erratic use of the terms 
"race" and "ethnic" throughout the book. My preference is to use 
only "ethnic" as this refers to cultural distinctions which are pro-
foundly important in Fiji. As well I have a moral objection to the 
concept of the sort of immutable human division that the term 
"race" signifies. But the prevaiHng convention in Fiji, in poHtics, 
social relations, education, and media is to talk of "race". The 
word refers to an important idea in the general culture of the 
country, so it is hard to write realistically about Fiji without using 
it. Yet to have employed only this term would have presented pro-
blems in the comparative treatment of Fiji in terms of key issues in 
social theory. I have tended to use the terms interchangeably. 
Some readers will doubtless also be perturbed that my account of 
the coup and its aftermath gives little attention to violence and 
intimidation by the soldiers. By definition an army intervention 
rests upon violence or threat of violence. Reports in the media and 
from other sources such as Amnesty International and the 
Australian Labor Party's fact-finding mission early in 1988 
documented some incidents of brutality and terror directed mainly 
against Indians over a period of nearly a year following the coup of 
May 1987. In addition there were numerous incidents of violent 
rampage and assault by young Fijian men. But deaths and severe 
injuries were rare, either from the army or from the hoodlums. As 
coups and ethnic confrontations tend to go Fiji's experience has 
been relatively mild, scarcely comparing with the murderous 
brutality of such episodes in parts of Africa and Latin America. My 
concern in Chapter 7 is more with the limitations on violence, than 
with the occasional excesses. From the perspective of comparative 
sociology this is one of the most significant features of the Fiji case. 
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I must also stress that my treatment of the coup and aftermath 
does not claim to be at all comprehensive. In particular it gives little 
attention to the pHght of the Indians and very many indigenous Fi-
jians whose Hves have been repressed and impoverished. These con-
sequences have been well treated in other studies. I would par-
ticularly recommend Brij Lai's Power and Prejudice, and S. Prasad 
et al Coup and Crisis. My own concern in this book has been a 
limited academic one: to consider how the unprecedented events 
have been managed by established structures and cultural codes. In 
doing this I have focused only on the Fijian side of the events, on 
the potential for a volatile Fijian ethnicity and how this has been 
contained. 
Note on Certain Words Used 
My use of points of the compass to describe both local divisions 
within racial groups as well as the regional origins in India of dif-
ferent Indian cultural groups may cause some confusion. When I 
refer to Northerners and Southerners I shall always be describing 
Indians whose forbears came respectively from northern and 
southern India. I also describe social and poHtical differences 
among Fijians and among Indians that correspond to a significant 
extent to a regional difference in Fiji, that between western and 
southeastern Viti Levu. Additionally, I distinguish Fijians in the 
eastern islands of the Group. Unless otherwise indicated, however, 
I describe both these Fijians and those of southeast Viti Levu for 
the sake of brevity as easterners when contrasting them with those 
of west Viti Levu. 
Note on Pronunciation of Fijian Words 
" c " 
"d" 
«(„)> 
(< ~> J 
is pronounced "th" — e.g. Colo West (Tholo West). 
is pronounced "nd" — e.g. Nadi (Na//rfi). 
b" is pronounced "mb" — e.g. Bau (Mftau). 
g" is pronounced "ng" — e.g. Nadroga (Nandronga). 
q" is pronounced "g" as in "gun" when beginning a word, 
and "n . . . g" when within a word as in mataqali and yaqona: 
"matan . . . gaH" and "yan . . . gona". 
The chief's name Cakobau is pronounced Thakombau. The pro-
vince Cakaudrove is pronounced Thakaundrove. 
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Abbreviai 
GSR Co 
FAB 
FNP 
NFP 
NLTB 
WUF 
lions 
Colonial Sugar Refining Company 
Fijian Affairs Board 
Fijian National Party 
National Federation Party 
Native Lands Trust Board 
Western United Front 
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1 Fiji in Comparative 
Perspective 
Cultural, social, and economic differences between the major populations of Fiji 
are perhaps greater than in any comparable society. Special features of colonial rule 
and the capitalist economy encouraged separation and preservation of distinct 
traditions. Of all the overseas Indian populations perhaps Fiji's most strongly 
maintained traditions of the motherland despite the traumatic dislocations of the 
indenture system.^ The system of government of village Fijians through chiefs and 
their commoner allies which prevailed through most of the colonial period had no 
parallel in the colonial world for the thoroughness of its organisation. The social 
and cultural separation is associated with a large degree of inequality in the 
economy. Most Indians depend on leases of Fijian land and most Fijians depend on 
Indian businesses and professional services. 
The conjunction of economic inequalities with pronounced cultural and social 
divisions contains the potential for catastrophic conflict. Yet Fiji presents us with 
something of a paradox on the spectrum of so-called "plural societies". Perhaps 
more than most of them it contains the conditions one might expect to produce 
violent struggle. But the most significant feature of ethnic conflict has been 
constraint, not acrimony and confrontation. What is most notable about Fiji is not 
the potential for catastrophic conflict but the countervailing social and political 
processes that have encouraged accommodation. These processes show the reality 
of a society transcending the ethnic divisions. Dr Bavadra's quietly sustained 
conviction of the validity and strength of his cause long after the army overthrew 
his government was a most persuasive testimony to this reality. 
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In contrast to certain other post-colonial societies, Sri Lanka for example, Fiji 
has not experienced inter-ethnic violence on a major scale and serious issues of 
conflict have sometimes been managed in a way that strengthened cooperation. 
From a comparative point of view a feature of the 1987 coup and its aftermath has 
been the degree of cooperation that continues. The coup introduced provocations 
and aspirations which might be expected to completely shatter the accord achieved 
in Fiji, and certainly great damage has been done. Yet the more remarkable feature 
of the crisis seems to have been the limited extent to which abuse and violence 
have occurred between ordinary Fijians and Indians. Hostile polarisation has not 
developed to the extent we might have expected from an ethnic coup. In retrospect 
a notable feature of the militant Fijians' Taukei Movement was its apparent failure 
to develop much beyond the political initiatives of the leaders. While it is true that 
their demands for Fijian political domination and their assertions of Fijian cultural 
values have wide support, the extremism of these leaders' pronouncements seemed 
all the more stark for the absence of a widespread aggressively active popular 
backing. Though there have been some attempts to encourage Fijian breakaway 
trade unions, for the most part the multiracial labour movement remains intact 
It might be argued that it is the new regime's endorsement of the Taukei goal 
that has constrained ethnic conflict by removing an objective reason for Fijian 
aggression. But equally a case could be made that a tendency to acrimonious 
chauvinism might well be strengthened by a new-found sense of power, especially 
as much economic and educational advantage remains with the politically denied 
Indians. A sociological analysis must question utilitarian assumptions that the 
intensity of conflict in human societies is regulated simply by the measure of 
objective success or failure in achieving specific political goals. These 
assumptions leave social consciousness and action largely unexamined. They fail to 
address as problematic the questions: how are group identities and solidarities 
constituted? what different forms can these processes take? are certain forms more 
conducive to the regulation of conflict than are others? 
In revising this book after the coup I have felt justified in developing further the 
theme of regulation stressed in the first edition. I argue that during the colonial 
period the management of ethnic conflict came to depend on the dual function of 
chiefs whom the British eventually placed in control of the Fijian Administration. 
The duality was their position as the controllers of cultural and legal power over 
most Fijians, and as inter-ethnic mediators in the political economy. They 
facilitated the distribution of leasehold to the thousands of Indian farmers with 
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whose labour the modem economy was built, while always standing for Fijian 
identity and strength in opposition to Indians and other non-Fijians. This second 
function has tended to insulate the leading chiefs and their commoner allies from 
political challenge on economic and social interests that many Fijians share wifli 
Indians, and which engender resentments toward the elites. 
My major concern is with the systemic properties of multi-ethnic societies suc5h 
as Fiji, to understand the ways in which a unitary social system develops even 
when there is comparatively littie social and cultural fusion in everyday life. To 
talk of such features is not to deny the depth of division between the two major 
ethnic populations in Fiji nor the invidious inequality and tension between :a 
powerful elite and the common people. Much academic and journalistic writing on 
Fiji, however, has been blinkered by the dictums of one or other of two opposed 
models of social reality: that of the plural society which overstates the ethnic 
division and that of the equally distorting Euro-centric Marxian analysis whuifa 
understates it and exaggerates the significance of class interests and conflict 
arising from the imposition of imperial capitalism. 
To understand the dynamics of society and politics we must break from these 
simplistic perspectives and consider how a deep division came to be handled ina 
way that promoted the growth of some integrative values and practices. We cm 
learn from such writers as Simmel and Coser to appreciate the paradox that 
division and conflict do not necessarily mean inevitable polarisation but rag^ 
become a matrix of cooperation.^ In Fiji the ethnic division itself, with the 
continuing problem of land, became a basis for this development. The presencexrf 
this unresolvable but always negotiable conflict is a major feature distinguishii|g 
the ethnic opposition in Fiji from ethnic conflicts in comparable societies. T ^ 
long present necessity for communication and compromise on this maj^r 
encouraged accommodation. 
Cooperation was also favoured by certain features of the social and cultux^ 
organisation of the main ethnic groups, particularly the way convictions about 
identity and worth have been sustained. In the upsurge of enthusiasm for Marxist 
theory in Western social science during the 1970s, attempts to address the question 
of identity as an analytical problem were often derided as obscuring the economie 
mainsprings of social and political life. Marxian political economy modds 
myopically misconstrued issues of central importance for social theory: issues 1» 
do with the significance of meanings, values, and symbols, with how peoples' 
subjectivity is constituted by convictions of identity and worth, and how these 
convictions influence the actors' assessments of their life situations and shape their 
actions.^ In the study of political solidarities and conflicts these ideal interests 
must certainly be considered in conjunction with material interests. Yet they 
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cannot be reduced to these and glossed as ideological reinforcement of economic 
power or false consciousness masking economic exploitation. We have to 
recognise the distinctive qualities of ethnic identities and conflicts in terms of the 
imperative of ideal interests before addressing the question of how such conflict 
might be circumscribed in political life. 
Recendy Marxist scholars have at last begun to acknowledge that the concern 
to affirm meanings in social action is a distinctive dimension of the human 
condition to be examined in its own terms, that the socio-cultural process of 
constmcting meaning cannot be analytically subordinated to a study of objectively-
deducible economic interests.^ This is not to deny that material interests and 
conflicts are sources of energy for action. It is simply to say that cultural activities 
involving the manipulation of ideals and symbols have their own imperatives in 
shaping social responses to economic conflicts. What often goes on in this process 
is the affirmation by actors of their being as whole persons imbued with 
convictions of identity, worth, and potency that repudiate experiences of 
inferiority, powerlessness and role fragmentation in economic, social and political 
structures of the wider society. 
The possibilities that available culture affords for making such affirmations of 
being often outweigh any disposition to "rational" collective actions in pursuit of 
specifically economic objectives. This was underlined by the disjunction between 
the militant Fijian ethnicity at the beginning of the present crisis, and the existing 
constitutional safeguards for their political power and the extent to which many 
Fijians do in fact have material interests in common with many Indians. 
The study of political consciousness and action must break from the 
ethnocentric economism that has blinkered conservative and radical Western social 
science alike and recognise as problematic the question of how social action is 
motivated and directed, how social and political solidarities are constituted.^ 
My analysis of ethnic relations in Fiji clarifies a general contrast between modes in 
which consciousness of identity and worth is sustained. The distinction is between 
the aggressive construction of identity in opposition to other groups (the identity 
becoming essentially located in the experience of external conflict), and identity 
sustained mainly in the social routines of the group, in intra-group life more than in 
the frustrations and conflicts experienced in the wider society. I reserve the term 
"ethnicity" to describe the first form. It can be thought of as a tendency or 
propensity present in some degree in all situations of ethnic division and conflict. 
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This ethnicity is not a function of the objective amount of cultural difference 
between the opposed groups. Indeed it seems very often to be associated with an 
increasing convergence of the groups in respect to their values, interests, and 
aspirations. Thus it cannot be understood in terms of the hoary descriptive model 
of the "plural society". It arises in a conjunction of socio-cultural difference with a 
growing competition for achievement in common activities and institutions. 
Ethnicity means the manipulation of culture to affirm identity and worth. The 
process tends to pervade encounters between groups and to feed on conflict. It 
represents culture for identity as distinct from culture as a system of meanings and 
normative practices by which people routinely live their lives. 
The latter form of ethnic division, exemplified by Fiji, mitigates against the 
growth of antagonistic ethnicity by virtue of the regularity and consistency of 
social and cultural activities in which identity and worth are defined apart from 
inter-ethnic encounters. These conditions of routine life within the group limit the 
potency of inter-ethnic relations themselves to shape convictions of identity and 
worth. This allows more freedom for cooperation in the pursuit of common 
interests across the ethnic divide or for negotiation of conflicts. There has been in 
Fiji a "background" of well-established social and political structures and their 
cultural supports that have given action a degree of flexibility by limiting the hold 
that concerns about identity have in the "foreground" of everyday encounters with 
people of other groups.^ 
In the following pages I shall try to clarify the distinction between the two 
modes of ethnic being by examining contrasts between conflicts in Sri Lanka and 
Fiji. The case of Sri Lanka illuminates some general conditions of social structure, 
culture, and political competition that favour aggressive ethnicity. 
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Politics and Ethnicity in Sri Lanka^ 
iki Lanka's colonial history began in the early 16th Century when the Portuguese 
established their power by pitting the Hindu Tamils and Buddhist Sinhalese against 
each other. Under British rule two centuries later Tamil numbers were increased by 
the importation of workers from India for the tea plantations of highland Kandy. 
Many Sinhalese were pushed from their land and outnumbered by the immigrants. 
The highland Sinhalese were fimher pressed by the commercial penetration of the 
region by Sinhalese entrepreneurs from the south. The Kandyan Sinhalese and 
most in the Low Country were excluded in the competition for the best civil service 
jobs and the professions. These positions were monopolised by the very few 
Sinhalese and Tamils who had received an English education in Christian mission 
schools. 
Most people, the minority Tamils and the majority Sinhalese alike, experienced 
colonial rule as an oppressive denigration of traditional culture and exclusion from 
opportunities for advancement in the Westernising economy. The widespread sense 
of cultural and social degeneration under Western rule produced Buddhist 
reformers who preached to Sinhalese about the need to restore religion, language 
and correct social behaviour. There was a similar movement for cultural 
revitalisation among Tamils. 
Though the cultural revivalism engendered some tensions, ethnic relations were 
relatively untroubled in the last decades of British rule. At independence in 1948 
the major antagonism was that of the vemacular-speaking populace of both cultural 
groups toward the politically-dominant Anglicised urban elite who comprised 
Baely eight per cent of the population. Many of the latter were not only literate in 
English but had adopted Christianity and Western dress. They included prosperous 
landowners, businessmen, lawyers, and civil servants. 
The potential for unity among ordinary Sinhalese and Tamils in opposition to 
tfiis elite was dissolved in the early 1950s by the unprecedented political 
mobilisation of the Buddhist monks (the bhikkhu) on the eve of the most important 
jBffiiversary in the history of the religion: the Buddha Jayanti, midpoint in the life 
of Buddhism on earth, 2,500 years since Buddha entered Nirvana after entrusting 
tire Sinhalese to advance the faith. Many monks had earlier aligned with leftist 
political groups, expressing more concern about hardships in the villages than 
about the task of restoring religion and language. Buddhism and Marxism had 
been proclaimed compatible; indeed the first president of the Communist Party was 
a bhikkhu. The monks' cultural concerns submerged their socialism as the Buddha 
feyanti drew near. Sinhalese Marxists who continued to urge unity with Tamil 
workers and peasants were abused as traitors and their meetings were broken up 
By extremists urged on by the monks. 
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The bitikkhu, long deprived of status and power under the British, now sought to 
direct the Sinhalese-dominated govemment. They proclaimed the Sinhalese to be 
the chosen race standing on the threshold of a new era. Political and social life 
must be purified by restoring Buddhism and the Sinhala language to their rightful 
central place. The monks attacked the govemment for betraying the national cause 
by continuing to collaborate with economic and cultural "imperialists". 
Sinhalese members of the urban-based elite were under pressure to support the 
new movement in order to secure their political influence in the countryside. 
Rivalry with one another for this was a major factor in the ethnic polarisation. 
Bandaranaike, soon to become prime minister, abandoned Christianity for 
Buddhism, shed Western dress, and boned up on his Sinhala to strengthen alliances 
with bhikkhu and village notables. The monks' fanatical tirades persuaded him and 
his political colleagues to break a pact with their Tamil counterparts to work for the 
recognition of Tamil as the official language in mainly Tamil districts. This rift in 
the late 1950's triggered the first major ethnic violence of the centiuy, sparked by 
the desecration of Buddhist monuments. 
The Sinhalese cultural revival movement appealed especially to the rural village 
middleclass and intelligentsia: small businessmen and landowners, vernacular 
school teachers, minor govemment officials, and traditional healers. All were 
people in a socially ambiguous position engaged increasingly in the modern 
economy and consumer society and holding aspirations for their children's 
advancement there, but their way blocked by their culture, particularly language. 
The movement had not begun as a challenge against the Tamils. The pact with 
Tamil leaders was cast aside as the struggle intensified within the Sinhalese 
leadership, compelling the rivals to accommodate the growing militancy of the 
bhikkhu as they whipped up popular hysteria about threats to the race. The effect 
was to inflect a populist movement which had seemed potentially able to 
accommodate Tamil demands into an ethnic antagonism which fostered solidarity 
among Sinhalese of diverse socio-economic positions from village labourers to 
wealthy urban businessmen and landlords. These bonds bridged the very division 
in society that had helped to provoke the movement. 
The inter-class ties were reinforced as rival Sinhalese political parties used their 
control of the state to distribute patronage to followers. But the inter-class 
solidarity did not reflect simply this instrumental factor. Initially more important 
was the subjective communicative dimension - the process of identity formation, 
the reconstmction of people as subjects. Pressure for this ideological and symbolic 
process had been built up by changes long underway in economy, culture, and 
social relations, producing not only new economic interests and conflicts but 
ambiguities and contradictions in peoples' conceptions of themselves and their 
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being in the world. The tensions over identity were expressed and resolved in the 
new claims to special honour which the cultural movement promoted. 
Several features of the Sinhalese cultural and political mobilisation of the 1950s 
stand out: Conditions of social structure and culture had long been producing 
ambiguity and contradiction in peoples' sense of identity and worth. These 
conditions disposed people toward cultural and political activities that could 
reconstruct social identities. The organisation of cultural activity as a political 
enterprise enabled an ideological articulation across old class and status divisions. 
A most significant feature of the Sinhalese movement was the way it joined diverse 
social groups and categories - a wide range of classes and castes, different regions, 
and different Buddhist sects. 
( A somewhat comparable pattern of ethnic conflict developed in the 1970s in 
the ex-British colonies of Trinidad in the Caribbean and nearby Guyana on the 
South American mainland. In both countries a broad-based redemptive movement 
to reconstruct an African identity lost in the era of slavery, was galvanised partly 
by an opposition to the descendants of the indentured Indian labourers whom the 
Europeans had imported to replace emancipated slaves. As in Sri Lanka the rivalry 
over claims to special identity and worth was strengthened by competition for jobs 
and economic advancement ). 
In the Sri Lanka case we see ethnicity developing as an antagonistic affirmation of 
identity and worth. In Fiji there has not been a comparable expression of ethnicity 
in that sense until very recentiy, and even then in relatively restrained form. The 
more limited rivalry in Fiji for economic opportunities partly accounts for this. But 
equally important is the way culture and social stractures have in Fiji constracted 
people as subjects apart from contexts of competition and inequality. In striking 
contrast to Sri Lanka British mle encouraged the preservation of traditional culture 
and social institutions among the indigenous Fijians and, to a lesser extent, the 
immigrant Indians. 
Fiji has been characterised by a far greater coherence in the social relations and 
cultural symbols supporting identity within the ethnic populations. This coherence 
has been as yet little disturbed by a strong development of relations of class 
inequality and exploitation within these populations. In Sri Lanka the British 
denigrated traditions and encouraged Anglicisation, and the capitalist economy 
produced more substantial class differences among both Tamils and Sinhalese than 
it did in Fiji. An effect was to intensify rivalries and to create profound 
disjunctions in peoples' experience of their place in society. These disjunctions 
generated the cognitive energy and provided the social and cultural space for a 
reconstruction of identity as political rivalries grew after colonial rule ended. 
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I want to argue that in Fiji a process of this kind would have a certain 
redundancy, tending to be drawn back, so to speak, into existing stractures of social 
and political relationships and their supporting cultural symbols. The aftermath of 
the military coup vividly demonstrated this, as I hope to show in Chapter 7. 
I don't maintain that ethnicity as I define it is wholly absent from Fiji. Though 
disjunctions of social and cultural life have generally been less pronounced than in 
Sri Lanka, inter-ethnic tensions have long reinforced pride in aspects of customary 
life diat set Fijians apart from other peoples. Custom is not always simply a matter 
of the routine conduct of intra-ethnic social and political life, but often engages the 
actors in asserting the superiority of a communalistic and hierarchical way of life to 
the competitive capitalist economy in which most Fijians are so disadvantaged. 
Injunctions about the importance of adhering to customs pertaining to the -vanua 
and chiefship, as the guarantee of security and strength in the face of foreign 
influences, are frequently to be seen in the correspondence columns of the 
vernacular press. Such affirmations, often invoking beliefs and values of Fijian 
Christianity, became a central feature of both the Taukei Movement and army 
propaganda after the coup: "God gave the Fijians their custom and chiefly system 
to distinguish them from other peoples ".^ ^ 
However, I would argue that a factor limiting the potential for such ethnicity has 
been the manner in which Fijian convictions of identity and worth are firmly 
anchored in the social, cultural, and political practices of routine life within Fijian 
groups. In contrast to Sri Lanka the experience of identity has been less dependent 
upon affirmations in the inter-ethnic context, and, particularly, less contingent upon 
political practices in this context. 
Cultural Capital and Political Practice 
The contrast between Fiji and Sri Lanka is sharpened by considering the two cases 
in terms of who controls the cultural resources or the ideological and symbolic 
capital needed for successful political practice, to use Bourdieu's terms.^^ We 
have seen that rivalry among Sinhalese political leaders to publicly represent 
cherished cultural values contributed decisively to the eraption of violent ethnic 
conflict. The absence of such a struggle in Fijian leadership has been a critical 
condition limiting ethnic conflict. (In the first edition of this book I advanced a 
similar argument by drawing a contrast with the rift that developed between the 
established Malay political leadership and a militant Islamic group in Malaysia^^). 
The militant Sinhalese ethnicity in Sri Lanka grew from rivalrous efforts by 
culturally powerless urban-based leaders to forge bonds with rural elites who, 
though denied authority under colonial rale, had retained the most politically potent 
cultural capital in the land: religious ideology and symbolism. With this they 
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controlled access to the political allegiances of especially the village folk, and 
inflamed and manipulated a militant ethnic consciousness in order to exercise 
power over the rival members of the national political elite. 
In Fiji there was no such separation between political and cultural power when 
colonial rale ended. The most politically potent cultural capital was and remains 
securely controlled by traditional autiiorities, the paramount chiefs, who have long 
preserved a political unity. These chiefs, in alliance with commoner colleagues 
and certain Europeans and Indians, dominated the party that took over the state 
when British rule ended. The chiefs had also long controlled several bureaucratic 
stractures tiiat organise Fijian affairs, particularly in die villages. Fijian attitudes to 
tiiese instimtions that blended tradition and modernity differed from area to area. 
The institutions corresponded closely to traditional stractures of authority only in a 
few places and everywhere there were some disjunctions. Moreover for much of 
the colonial period the authorities imposed a closeness of supervision in everyday 
life unknown in pre-colonial times. Yet in the context of political relations with 
Indians when matters of land and the political system are in contention the chiefs 
and the pan-ethnic institutions they control acquired for most Fijians a powerful 
significance as sureties and symbols of identity, honour, and strength. 
In Chapter 3 I show how the organisation of the Fijians as an ethnic group 
within the framework of institutions headed by the paramount chiefs was 
stracturally tied with the management of the political economy of the society as a 
whole. The leading chiefs came to occupy a paradoxical position as both the 
rallying points of unity in opposition to Indians and as mediators of that opposition, 
especially in reconciling the immigrant Indians' need for land, vital for the 
economy, with the Fijians' concern to safeguard their ownership. And for all the 
dissatisfactions that Fijians have felt about the stractures of authority developed 
under British rule these stractures have, by and large, helped to preserve the 
integrity of culture and social organisation.^ '* The profound dissonance in social 
stractural and cultural milieu that characterised Sri Lanka under colonial rale had 
no parallel in Fiji. 
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The Constitutive Efficacy of Political Practice 
Political practices involving the manipulation of ideals and symbols that affirm 
claims to distinctive identity and worth can be compared in terms of their 
constitutive potencv. We can ask: does such practice have impact by 
reconstracting peoples' subjectivity, creating new conceptions of social self and 
new action dispositions expressed in an aggressive ethnicity, or does the practice 
have a redundancv. evoking in actors convictions of identity and worth ah-eady 
routinely expressed in existing social relations and theu- supporting symbolism 
and, to this extent, neutralised or "absorbed" by stracture? (Another way to think 
of this latter situation is in terms of practice tending largely to reproduce long-
established stracture rather than galvanising a process of reformation). 
In Sri Lanka we see very clearly the constitutive efficacy of practice as a highly 
volatile politics of identity produced violently antagonistic relations between ethnic 
groups. The process was energised by a profound dissonance in social and cultural 
milieux and in actors' subjectivity, and by the elite straggles to control the cultural 
resources or capital with which this dissonance was being resolved. The radical 
reconstractive potential of the Sinhalese movement lay in the deep disjunctions 
between cultural resources, prevailing social structures, and competition for 
political power. 
In Fiji there is a sense, even in the present crisis, in which social stracture and 
supporting symbolism among the Fijians have absorbed events of ethnic conflict. 
These events have had less potency to stimulate an aggressive etiinicity than might 
be expected. Certainly this had been a feature up to the time of the coup and I 
think we can still see it in some degree in the present crisis in the way the coup-
maker tried to manage the contradiction between the Taukei leaders, who 
represented the potential for militant ethnicity, and the old conciliatory leadership 
of the high chiefs. 
In my treatment of the coup and its aftermath I shall argue that the recent 
emergence of aggressive ethnicity has been restrained by its subordination to the 
ideals, symbols and stractures that have long sustained Fijian political unity under 
the leadership of the principal chiefs. The impact of the Taukei Movement 
on Fijian consciousness was mitigated by a high degree of redundancy in the 
relation of these events to the stractures and symbols of chiefship. The old 
stractures and symbols have, to an extent, absorbed those events.'^ 
Some academic observers and political leaders alike have quite correctiy seen 
this condition of Fijian political organisation as blocking a potential for joint action 
with non-Fijians on economic and social welfare issues of common concern. But 
the part that the form of Fijian ethnic organisation has played in constraining a 
potential for catastrophic conflict has not been given due recognition. In my 
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account of the political history of Fiji in the following chapters I shall give 
particular attention to the constraints on ethnic conflict. These are, from an 
analytical viewpoint, the most significant features of the case. 
Politics and Society as a "Force Field" 
I find it fruitful to view society and politics in Fiji as a kind of "force field" in 
Lewin's sense: a system of interrelated and sometimes opposed action potentials 
whose relative valences are not fixed. ^ ^ Militant Fijian ethnicity, exemplified most 
recently by the Taukei Movement and fundamentalist Christianity, is one potential 
in the field. It coexists with, and can inflect, another action potential that derives 
from the conflicts and frastrations of the modern market economy and class 
stracture. Organisation for industrial conflict has often brought Fijians, Indians, and 
others together. But sometimes it has instead become a context for the assertion of 
ethnic interests, expressing rivalry within the subordinate class more than 
opposition to bosses. Such splits, always initiated by Fijians, have been 
encouraged by political leaders precisely when a strengthening convergence with 
non-Fijians on class interests seemed likely. In this regard it is most significant that 
the Taukei Movement of 1987 drew some of its strongest support from union 
leaders. 
Regional inequality and jealousy among Fijians is another force in the field of 
society and politics. Its potential to rapture Fijian political solidarity is currentiy 
evidenced by the deepening resentment on the part of many Fijians of the main 
island toward eastern islands people who now predominate in the most powerful 
official posts. 
Working in some degree against the three potentials of ethnicity, class, and 
region is the force to which I give most attention in this book: the macro-stractures 
and symbolism of chiefship which, organised at provincial and national levels, 
continue to be the most coherent and potent expression of Fijian ethnic identity, 
firmly tied in with the cultural practices of routine social life and inhibiting the 
development of an alternative discourse about Fijian being. ( By conttast the 
Sinhalese leaders' manipulation of the cultural resources of language and religion 
was a radical new discourse on ethnic identity, made possible by the more 
pronounced disjunctions of social and cultural experience). 
To stress the strength of the ideology and symbols of chiefship in the 
constitution of Fijian social being is not to deny the widespread ambivalence 
toward chiefs that has deepened with some of the latter's gains in the capitalist 
economy (from rents and shares). In keeping with the "field" concept, we should 
think of the presently dominant cultural and political expression of Fijian ethnic 
consciousness as prevailing in tension with the other potentialities. We have to ask 
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why certain ideologies and stractures of ethnic political organisation have prevailed 
in the face of other possibilities. 
I have noted that the ethnic opposition itself became an important support for 
the strength of chiefship in national politics. But the more critical factor is the deep 
ideological and symbolic belonging of chiefship in much of Fijian social and 
cultural life. This significance is summed up in the word vakaturaga ("in the 
chiefly manner") which the Fijian anthropologist Asesela Ravuvu describes as "the 
most important concept depicting ideal behaviour among indigenous Fijians". 
Vakaturaga refers most particularly to values of respect, dignity, service, and 
reciprocity in social and political relations, from the smallest kinship groups to the 
widest political units. That chiefs are seen to sometimes violate the ideals does not 
negate those chiefs' legitimacy as the most potent representations of the identity, 
prestige, and strength of their groups. ^ ^ 
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2 The Making of a 
Multi-Ethnic Society 
The Fiji archipelago lies in the Southwest Pacific Ocean at the junction of 
Melanesia and Polynesia. The three hundred islands have a total area of 18,(X)0 
square kilometers of which Viti Levu and Vanua Levu make up 87 per cent. 
Before the military coup of 1987 the indigenous Fijians comprised only 46 per cent 
of the 715,000 citizens and the descendants of the immigrant Indians nearly 49 per 
cent. The rest are people of mixed race (predominantly Fijian and European 
ancestry), Europeans, Chinese, and settiers from Rotuma (a dependency of Fiji) 
and other Pacific islands. Three-quarters of the population live on Viti Levu, the 
largest island, where the major economic enterprises and political institutions are 
based. Nadi, in the west, is Fiji's tourist gateway and a refuelling stop for 
international airliners. Suva, in the southeast, is the capital and the major trans-
shipment port of the region with facilities for relaying to smaller island states goods 
from Australia, Europe, Japan, and U.S.A. The most popular tourist resorts are 
along the southern coast road linking Suva with Nadi. From Nadi the road 
continues north through several sugar towns, past the gold mine, and then south 
along the east coast back to Suva. 
The largest islands have mountainous interiors fringed by coastal slopes and 
plains to which settiement, agriculture, and industry are largely confined. Only a 
small proportion of the land is suitable for permanent arable farming. On Viti 
Levu and Vanua Levu two climates and their corresponding vegetation patterns are 
sharply distinguished. To the north and west of the ragged interior the winters are 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
16 Race and Politics in Fiji 
dry and the summers wet. Hilly savanna is the typical landform and vegetation. 
To die south and east of the divides a tropical wet climate prevails through the year 
and lush vegetation covers the slopes and lowlands. 
On Viti Levu we accordingly find two regions with contrasting economic, 
social, and political characteristics: the western and northern sugar cane and pine 
forest areas; and the south-eastem mixed agricultural, pastoral, and timber districts 
with industrialising Suva at the center. These regions, which I shall refer to as the 
"west" and the "soutiieast", were not linked by road until 1938. The mainly copra-
growing islands in die far east of the Group make up a tiiird major region which I 
shall call the "eastern islands"; it includes the sugar districts of Vanua Levu. 
Differences between these regions have contributed to social and political divisions 
within die ethnic groups and to ties between them. 
The three regions correspond roughly to the largest administrative divisions 
established by the British colonial rulers: Western, Central, and Eastem. The 
distribution of the twelve Fijian provinces among the regions is shown in the map 
opposite page 18. The west contains 40 per cent of the population, the southeast 36 
per cent, the eastern islands 24 per cent. In western Viti Levu there are almost 
twice as many Indians as Fijians. The groups are nearly balanced in the southeast. 
Fijians well outnumber Indians in the eastem islands. There has been considerable 
migration of Fijians from the eastern islands to Viti Levu, particularly from the 
provinces of Lau and Kadavu. Nearly 24 per cent of Fijians enumerated in the most 
urbanised provinces of southeastern Viti Levu in the 1986 census stated their natal 
provinces to be in the east. 
Fiji is the most urbanised of the Pacific Island states. Nearly 39 per cent of its 
citizens live in the towns; in the west 28 per cent, 67 per cent in the southeast, and 
13 per cent in the eastem islands. Though Indians and Fijians predominate among 
the town dwellers the vast majority of these peoples still live in the countryside. 
Rural to urban movement has been stimulated much more by the atttactions of 
town life than by economic pressures in the countryside. There has been greater 
movement of Fijians from rural areas to the towns and industrial centres in recent 
decades. The mean proportion of raral-bom people among Fijians enumerated in 
urban centres by the 1986 census was 49.5 per cent; the comparable figure for 
Indians was 40 per cent. On average 36.5 per cent of Fijians but only 29.3 per cent 
of Indians enumerated in the towns stated that five years before they had lived in 
rural areas; in the case of Suva the ethnic difference was much greater than 
average. One consequence of this difference in the rate of urbanisation, in 
conjunction with inequalities in educational attainment and job opportunities, has 
been a high level of violent crime by young Fijian males. 
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Fiji has long stood out among post-colonial countries of the Third World for its 
prosperous economy characterised by a complementary growth of productivity and 
employment opportunities in town and countryside. Capacity to supply the basic 
needs of the vast majority of die population has depended largely upon smallholder 
agriculture in which family ran labour-intensive farms produce for overseas and 
domestic markets.^  The most important element in export production is the sugar 
industry developed by the Australia-based Colonial Sugar Refining Company 
(CSR) with Indian labour and nationalised when the company withdrew in 1973. 
The presence of a large immigrant work force wholly dependent on money 
income distinguishes Fiji's modem economic history from other island groups in 
the western Pacific. Not only did the Indian immigrants provide the disciplmed 
labour needed for the expansion of sugar production, but also a domestic market, 
exceptionally strong in die Pacific islands, which stimulated a diversification of 
economic and service enterprises. The strength of the local market derived partly 
from the successes of farmers' and workers' unions in securing wider distribution 
of the profits of the sugar and other industries. A dependence on the labour of 
indigenous Fijians, supported by subsistence village farming, would have limited 
the growth of the domestic market and diversification of enterprise. 
The Fijians diemselves benefitted enormously from the economic growth that 
Indian settlement made possible. They gained from employment opportunities and 
from the victories of a labour movement pioneered by Indians whose determination 
was strengthened not only by dependence on cash incomes but also by their 
identification with the anti-colonial challenge in India. While Indians gained 
advantages in business and the independent professions Fijians enjoyed widening 
opportunities for salaried govemment jobs and, with the Indians' approval, were 
given a constitutionally-protected political advantage at Independence by the veto 
power of the Council of Chiefs in an upper house of parliament, the Senate. 
History of Settlement 
(1) Fijians 
The first setders were Austronesian peoples voyaging east about 3,500 years ago, 
probably from the island groups of New Caledonia and Vanuatu. They brought 
some cultural and physical traits of the pre-Austronesian peoples of western 
Melanesia with whom Austronesian populations had long been in contact.This 
heritage accounts for certain "Melanesian" attributes of many Fijian communities 
today, especially on Viti Levu and islands fimher west.'* 
Fiji appears to have been the main source of migration east to the widely-
scattered islands we call Polynesia. The migrants sailed first to Samoa and Tonga 
where, removed from contacts with peoples of the far west, they developed 
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distinctive patterns of social and political organisation marked by divine chiefs 
with large political domains. Within the last few hundred years, and perhaps 
before, Tongan chiefly families began to engage in economic exchange, marriage, 
and political relations with the chiefs of the eastern islands of Fiji and soutiieastem 
Viti Levu.^ Tongan chiefs sent emissaries and warriors to establish ties with Fijian 
leaders, to fight as mercenaries in the latters' wars, and to trade. Especially 
important to the Tongans with widely scattered islands to rale was the Fijian timber 
needed for building ocean-going boats. Evidence is coming to light of Tongan 
domination of some parts of Fiji centuries before the ascendancy of the Tongan 
chief Maafu in the Lau Islands in the mid nineteenth century.^ There are still close 
links between some of the chiefly families of eastem Fiji and the royals of Tonga. 
Economically, culturally, socially, and politically, Fiji's eastem islands together 
with eastern and southern Viti Levu had become part of a regional system long 
before the Europeans arrived. Consequentiy the Fijians exhibit a striking range of 
differences in language, social and political organisation, and physical features, 
conventionally glossed in anthropology as a division between "Melanesian" and 
"Polynesian" areas. Links with "Melanesia" are most pronounced in westem and 
interior Viti Levu and the Yasawa Islands to the west. In the eastern islands of 
Vanua Levu and especially in the Lau group "Polynesian" physical traits and 
cultural influences are clearly in evidence. The southem and eastem areas of Viti 
Levu and nearby islands exhibit a mixture of the two influences though Polynesian 
social and political traditions are stronger, manifested particularly in the large 
chiefdoms in southeastern Viti Levu. 
As we shall see, the division between the peoples of western Viti Levu and 
those of southeastem Viti Levu and the eastem islands has long been significant in 
Fijian politics, perhaps never more clearly than in 1987 with the election of a 
govemment headed by a westemer of intermediate traditional rank. This affront to 
the long-established supremacy of eastem high chiefs was a major factor in the 
military overthrow of the new govemment. 
(2) Europeans 
Europeans began to arrive early in the nineteenth century. They came mainly 
from Australia, first to collect sandalwood and beche de mer (sea slug) for trade 
with China, and later to win converts to Christianity. By the 1860s many more 
were coming to start plantations of cotton, sugar cane, and copra. Political rivalries 
among Fijians facilitated the European evangelical and economic enterprises, 
especially in southeastem Viti Levu and the eastem islands where, backed by guns, 
powerful chiefdoms were established before 1850. Settiers and chiefs formed 
alliances and several times tried to set up a unitary govemment for the islands. 
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Cakobau, war chief of Bau island just off Viti Levu, and Maafu, the Tongan chief 
of the Lau Islands, became contenders for rale in the 1860s. Each had European 
champions and aides and the islands were briefly divided under separate 
administrations. Cakobau won shaky supremacy as head of a Fiji-wide 
govemment in the early 1870s but his rivalry with Maafu continued. This threat 
together with a debt claimed by the U.S. government induced him, with 
encoiu-agement from European setders, to renew earlier offers to give the islands to 
the British Crown. In 1874 Cakobau and other high chiefs, including Maafu, signed 
the Deed of Cession in which Britain promised to pay Cakobau's debts and to 
recognise "the rights and interests of the ceding parties so far as shall be consistent 
with British sovereignty". 
Colonial rule began inauspiciously during a European-introduced measles 
epidemic that killed 40 per cent of the Fijian population. Substantial portions of the 
best agricultural land had been "sold" by chiefs to settiers in the decade before 
Cession and chiefs were supplying war captives as labour to the planters. The. 
British ralers viewed the plantation economy as a threat to Fijian society^ Yet they 
had to promote it to finance the colony and to lay the foundations for a gradual 
modemisation of Fijian life. They resolved to preserve the integrity of the villages 
as subsistence communities by prohibiting further alienation of land and 
discouraging Fijians from seeking wage employment. 
The new Native Adminisfration grouped villages into provinces. Most were 
initially placed in the charge of a Fijian govemor, Roko Tui, who was usually an 
eminent local chief. The Buli administered Native Regulations in districts 
comprising a province and the Twaga-ni-koro admiiustered them in the villages of 
a district. Provincial and district councils framed programs for the implementation 
of regulations including tax collection, administration of finance, and village 
maintenance. Special police and magistrates enforced the regulations. The 
authority restricted settiement and work outside villages^ required everyorie to 
produce prescribed quantitie^f crops, and obliged parents to send diejrchUdren to 
schools staffed by teachers in the pay of provincial councils.»The system gave 
legal sanction to customary services rendered by commoners to chiefs such as 
provision of food for ceremonial feasts and labour for public works. The British 
managedflhiSjSystem of indirect rale in consultation with a Great Council of Chiefs 
drawn from among the leading traditional chiefs and from officials in the Native 
Administration. Fijians were encouraged to meet their tax obligations not by 
selling-their labour to the planters ^ iirijygtVTngiip-Sbme of their own cropytor 
sale.' 
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(3) Indians 
The govemment met the planters' aggressive demands for labour by indenturing 
workers from India through a system that had served several other European 
colonies since the abolition of African slavery." Recraiters in India drew on the 
urban migration of people displaced by the commercialisation of agriculture. They 
used deception and sometimes intimidation to secure contracts with individuals of 
diverse castes. These Indians were introduced to Fiji as an essential part of the 
colonial ralers' program to limit the capitalist exploitation of Fijian labour. The 
first shipload arrived in 1879 and the flow continued until 1916 when the 
Govemment of India prohibited further recraitment on humanitarian grounds. The 
Indians were assigned to European-owned estates on Viti Levu and Vanua Levu. 
The Colonial Sugar Refining Company (CSR Co) extended its operations to Fiji in 
1880 and soon became the largest employer of the indentured labour, squeezing out 
other European cane planters and ending Fiji's prospects for development as a 
European setfler colony like neighbouring New Zealand and New Caledonia. The 
European planter families diminished to a tiny minority in the copra areas of Vanua 
Levu in the east. 
On completing their five year contracts the workers were offered the choice of 
retuming to India at their own expense or a further five year indenture, then free 
passage home. Most stayed on and few ever sought the retum trip. They opted to 
work as wage labour for the CSR Co or the government. Some became 
shopkeepers or started other small enterprises or were recruited into the civil 
service. By 1921 they numbered about 61,000, nearly 40^per cent of the 
population. By the 1930s most were small farmers leasing land either from the 
company or Fijian clans and supplying cane on contract to the company's mills or 
produce for local markets. By 1946 they had outnumbered Fijians and at 
Independence in 1970 comprised about 51 per cent of the population, 95 per cent 
of them Fiji-bom. 
Social, Cultural, and Economic Differences 
In the earlie(st years of the indenture system Fijians sometimes lived near Indians 
on the same estates. But conflict soon prompted employers and govemmentto 
separate them.^ Fijians were excluded from the sugar plantations and Indians were 
forbidden to live in the villages or to settie in certain areas of Viti Levu and the 
eastern islands. The Education Board was empowered to direct a school to be 
registered for children of a particular race and to prohibit an Indian from attending 
a Fijian school and vice versa. As late as 1960 still only six per cent of schools 
were officially described as mixed. The strongest opposition to integration came 
from the Fijian school managers. Today most secondary schools are not 
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exclusively racial but some continue to be reserved for Fijians and others are 
predominantly Indian. Primary schools are still mostly racial. ^ ^ Nonetheless 
interracial school experiences have often been important in shaping liberal outlooks 
and lasting friendships. 
A profound cultural division continues to limit social relations and to reinforce 
consciousness of economic inequalities. Day-to-day association is inhibited by 
linguistic, religious, and dietary differences. The rarity of intermarriage is largely 
due to these and in turn helps to perpetuate them. Virtiially all Fijians are 
Christians; 78 per cent of Indians are Hindus and 16 per cent are Muslims. While 
English is almost universally used, most people prefer their own language. There 
are vernacular as well as English newspapers and English, Fijian, and Hindi radio 
programs. Films and music help to sustain the Indians' cultuial identification with 
the land of their forbears. 
But the differences have not precluded inter-ethnic associations. Though Fijian 
villages and Indian farming settlements are segregated, ties of cooperation and 
friendship are common. Fijians are sometimes both the landlords and seasonal 
labourers of their Indian neighbours and as growers they often collaborate in cane 
harvesting and lend one another farm implements. Fijian villagers sometimes 
depend on local Indian shopkeepers for credit and on Indian vehicle owners for 
transport. Friendships are expressed in reciprocal attendance at social functions 
such as weddings and funerals and, among the men, at casual sessions of yaqona 
Ocava) drinking; the sharing of a bowl of the Fijian ceremonial drink became an 
important symbolic affirmation of inter-ethnic goodwill. In some rural areas it is 
not unusual to hear Indians conversing with Fijians in both Fijian and Hindi. 
In the towns inter-ethnic relations developed among employees of government 
departments and private companies, in workgangs. in trade unions, in social clubs, 
community-service and sporting organisations, and in municipal government and 
official boards and conimittees. But in. some of the main areas of Fijian settlement, 
especially in those eastern islands where no sugar cane is grown and there are few 
towns, contact with Indians is infrequent. 
The separate system of administration was set up on the preiiuse that the Fijian 
should remain a villager and that economic development should l>e encouraged 
within the framework of traditional social organisation. This protectionist policy 
reinforced the very social differences and inequalities that had inspired it: there was 
much segregation and confinement but little sustained effort to encourage 
participation in the commercial economy. ^ ^ 
Decades of confinement to primarily subsistence communities under the 
paternalistic aiithority of chiefs and officials kept most Fijians behind the majority 
of Indians as cash earners. Villagers engaged predominantly in subsistence 
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cultivation on traditional family lands still form a large proportion of the Fijian 
work force. In 1986 over 35 per cent of "economically-active" rural Fijians were 
still engaged mainly in subsistence farming; the comparable figure for Indians was 
a mere 1.6 per cent. ^ ^ But Fijians have increasingly taken up wage employment or 
set up as cash farmers on land leased from other Fijians often far from their native 
villages. Indeed at least twenty-five per cent of tiie tenants on Fijian land are now 
other Fijians. ^ ^ The trend is reflected in movement away from villages over the 
last few decades. In 1921 only five per cent of Fijians were enumerated as living 
outside their villages. By 1936 17 per cent were and the 1966 census reported 26 
per cent as living outside their natal provinces. In 1976 only 50 per cent were 
classified as villagers. 
While Fijians and Indians have increasingly shared occupations in govemment 
and company offices, in wage labour and in farming, a separation persists in much 
of the economy. Most wage employment in the gold mine and on the wharves has 
been reserved for Fijians or other Pacific islanders. Copra is their chief cash crop 
whereas most sugar-cane producers are Indians. Fijians have succeeded in 
commercial enterprise mainly as farmers. There are few Fijian-owned shops or 
other enterprises in the towns and successful Fijian businessmen in any field are 
uncommon as are Fijians in the independent professions. The inferiority in business 
and professional enterprise has been offset by strength in govemment employment 
including a monopoly of the army. The Fijian middleclass is made up principally 
of civil servants including teachers, medical officers, administrators, army officers, 
clerks, and church ministers. In addition some Fijians have been made directors on 
the boards of companies owned by foreigners or local Indians and many more are 
employed in white collar and supervisory positions in these businesses. The Indian 
middleclass is larger and has a wider occupational range represented in the civil 
service, commerce, industry, and the independent professions (doctors, lawyers, 
accountants). 
The Fijians' dependence on the civil service to enter the middleclass has 
intensified ethnic competition for jobs. After independence the Fijian-dominated 
Alliance Party govemment favoured Fijians in awarding scholarships for tertiary 
studies in an attempt to create a balanced distribution of posts. But the Indians' 
superiority in educational achievement made the principle difficult to implement 
without sacrificing standards of efficiency. Indians continue to predominate among 
senior high school and university graduates and are ahead particularly in technical 
and mathematical subjects. The issue of educational inequality and affirmative 
action for Fijians grew more contentious as jobs became scarcer in the 1980s. 
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Racial Inequalities in Formal Educational Attainment 
Scurce: 1986 Census, VoLl, p.ll2. 
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Land 
Disadvantages in die competition for white collar jobs and inability to compete 
with other groups in business have strengthened the Fijians' concem for their land. 
Their leaders' warnings tiiat Indians will try to take control of the land if political 
opportunity allows was the main inducement for the vast majority of Fijians to 
support the Alliance Party from its formation in 1966 to its defeat in 1987. Though 
their legal titles embrace 83 per cent of the total area, most is unsuitable for 
commercial development, and much of the best is under lease to Indians and 
others. 
Fijian lands, held by registered descent groups called mataqali, may be leased 
out but not sold. The Suva-based Native Lands Trast Board(NLTB) supervises the 
leasing and after deducting a hefty fee distributes the rents to members of the 
mataqali according to hereditary rank. Inequalities among Fijians in income from 
land also arise from differences in the size of the group and its holding, in the 
demand for leases, and the quality of the land. The tenants of most mataqali are 
small Indian or Fijian farmers. Only a few groups draw shares and rents from the 
tourist resorts or town businesses. In any case rent income has been a lucrative 
source of wealth for only a tiny minority of high ranking individuals. '^ 
Land has been a major politicd issue since the 1930s when Fijians first became 
jealous of Indian successes in commercial farming and began to resist requests for 
leases. Demarcation of reserves for exclusively Fijian use continued to displace 
Indians from their farms into the 1960s and since independence new leases have 
been increasingly difficult to secure. The Fijians' advantage in land holding is 
perhaps a factor in their generally superior nutrition and life expectancy. ^ ^ 
However, increasing numbers of Fijians themselves now have difficulty in 
obtaining sufficient arable land merely for family subsistence as fellow clansfolk 
and neighbours expand successful enterprises in commercial agriculture.^^ 
Inequalities between Fijians and Indians led to demands for legal guarantees that 
ethnic interests be protected. Fijians invoked the Deed of Cession as a charter of 
their rights and when preparations for self-government began in the early 1960s the 
govemor affirmed that he had "special obligations to the Fijians by virtue of the 
Deed and the promises made by successive governors about the ownership of 
land".*^ Most Fijians had come to regard colonial rale as a defence against a threat 
of economic and political domination by Indians and their leaders initially opposed 
plans for self-govemment on the grounds that the change would remove the old 
safeguards: 
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Is the Deed of Cession now just a scrap of paper?...ff so why have 
we never been told?...The Fijians rightly regard the Deed as a 
contract which can only be revoked by mutual agreement of the 
contracting parties. There can be no question of unilateral 
revocation. 
We do not want the interests of other people put before our own. 
This is our country. The Indians can always go away to India just 
as the New 2fealanders can always go back to New Zealand, and the 
UK people go to the UK. We are kai vitis and this is our home. We 
would like our interests...always given top priority. It is not an 
unreasonable demand. ^ ^ 
Indians have generally accepted that Fijians have special rights to land and political 
power. But until independence their principal leaders sought the abolition of ethnic 
separation in political institutions as a constitutional guarantee of equality of 
citizenship, sometimes invoking a document known as the Salisbury Despatch. In 
1875 Lord Salisbury, as the British Secretary of State for India, proposed to the 
Indian govemment that it encourage its citizens to migrate to the colonies as 
labourers in retum for "privileges no whit inferior to those of any other class of Her 
Majesty's subjects". Though Salisbury's proposal did not create a legal charter of 
Indian rights it was occasionally acknowledged by colonial officials.^^ More 
importandy, the independence constitution gave the law protecting the agricultural 
tenant the same guarantee as the one securing Fijian ownership and required that 
the tribunal arbitrating disputes between landlord and tenant must be appointed 
with the agreement of both the prime minister and the leader of the opposition.^^ 
Foreign Ownership in the Economy 
After independence European companies continued to dominate commerce, 
finance, and industry, and because of their skills and capital they were favoured 
when official financial assistance was given. They were, next to the govemment, 
the largest employers. Foreign companies controlled all the major industries until 
1973 when the CSR Co sold its mills to the govemment. Copra marketing and 
gold mining and the major share in tourism and forestry remain under foreign 
control. Foreigners with large capital resources are attracted by govemment 
allowances for accelerated depreciation and tax holidays. The 1960s situation of 
dominance by a handful of Australia-based companies gave way after 
independence to a more diversified foreign penetration including British and US 
corporations.^'^ The continuing power of foreign ownership means that much of 
the wealth produced in Fiji is still syphoned abroad via repatriated profits and 
payments for imported goods. 
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The profits of foreign enterprises have flowed on to some Indian businesses. 
Contractors build the hotels and commercial and industrial establishments and 
transport owners and duty-free merchants have benefitted from tourism. The most 
successful Indian businessmen favoured the Alliance Party from die start and many 
of the Gujarati merchants who were firmly with the more radical Indian-dominated 
National Federation Party at first, switched to the Alliance on the eve of 
independence. 
Through rent incomes some Fijians have also gained directly from foreign 
business enterprise. But areas where the investors want leases are limited and the 
land-owning groups are often small. The Native Lands Trast Board tries to secure 
Fijian participation in the enterprise in addition to rent: a free issue of shares, a 
percentage of gross annual receipts, and representation of the landowners in 
management Some prominent chiefs, their families and communities, have done 
well from tiiese arrangements. But dealings witii the wealtiiy firms have improved 
the standard of living of only a few. The main effect has been to widen the wealth 
gap among Fijians. In tiiis connection it should be noted that in recent years Fijian 
protests about land have been directed more often against their own NLTB's 
management of deals with foreign investors than against the pressures from Indian 
farmers. 
In the early years of independence Fiji began to display some characteristic 
pattems of the post-colonial society. There was the rating coalition of a variety of 
elites from traditional political stractures and the upper reaches of die civU service, 
the legal and financial professions, the most successful business enterprises, and 
from union leadership. Fijians who dominated in this rating stratum began to use 
their power in the state to accumulate wealth partly through privileged connections 
with foreign and local businesses and investors. The loss of political access to 
economic opportunity was one factor that induced some Fijian elites to encourage 
or support the military coup after their defeat in the elections of 1987. 
Class and the Union Movement 
While racial interests have always prevailed in national politics at election time, 
Fijians and Indians have sometimes united on shared economic and status interests 
arising from common conditions of employment. The strong union movement 
originated in the opposition of Indians and Fijians to European dominance during 
the colonial period. This common antagonism toward a powerful white minority 
balanced the divisions and conflicts among the non-Europeans and sometimes 
brought them together in militant action, as dramatically illustrated in the strike 
and riot in Suva in 1959.^^ The largest unions are multi-ethnic, recraited mainly 
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from Fijians and Indians employed by the govemment and the sugar mills. Union 
demands have long been influenced by awareness of the advanced Uving standards 
in neighbouring Australia and New Zealand. Labour leaders have often attended 
conferences there and formed ties with their counterparts. Australian newspapers 
are on sale and a constant stream of free-spending tourists has long highlighted the 
discrepancies of wealth. 
Though the union movement became the largest and most effective in the 
Pacific islands the poUtical impact of class consciousness has been limited by the 
relatively small wage labour force and by the continuing strength of the ethnic 
division in economy and society. Union organisation is, in some cases, ethnically 
split by die conventional reservation of certain occupations for Fijians. And while 
convergence in common jobs has provided a basis for inter-ethnic cooperation it 
has also sometimes strengthened a consciousness of difference and rivalry. An 
early instance was the creation in the 1930s of the Fijian Teachers' Association 
after a multi-ethnic union had been formed, though the division existed partly by 
virtue of cultural differences and segregated schooling. The Fijian organisation 
survives despite occasional proposals for amalgamation with the predominantiy 
Indian Fiji Teachers' Union. The leaders of the two unions have formatised their 
cooperation in a Confederation of Teachers' unions, however, and this 
collaboration was an important element in the formation of the Labour Party in 
1985. Paradoxically one interest that brought the associations together was their 
common opposition to a govemment minister's initiative to speed up the racial 
integration of schools! 
In the colonial days inequalities between Europeans and non-Europeans were 
maintained by the preference of the govemment and foreign businesses to recrait 
staff from Britain, Australia, and New Zealand. This encouraged a sense of unity 
on colour grounds among Fijians and Indians in the Public Servants' Association. 
But when localisation of staffing was accelerated in the 1960s many Fijians feared 
the Indians' educational advantage in the competition for jobs and promotions. 
The Indians' aggressive encouragement of the new policy contributed to a political 
division within the union between Indian supporters of the Federation Party and 
Fijian and Part-European supporters of the Alliance. Localisation also aggravated 
old provincial and regional jealousies among the Fijians. With eastern islands 
chiefs heading the Alliance govemment from 1966 to 1987 Fijians from Lau and 
Cakaudrove were frequently preferred in appointments to senior posts and this 
trend has strengthened since the military coup. 
In the 1960s and 70s ethnic splits in union organisation were initiated by Fijians 
in the context of increased competition for jobs and sugar cane contracts and 
rivalry for union leadership, and sometimes with the encouragement of political 
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leaders. Some rifts were eventually healed but the potential for ethnic polaris-
ation reappeared after the coup with the formation of a small Fijian and Rotuman 
breakaway group from the Public Servants' Association, and subsequent attempts 
to create other Fijian unions. 
The largest unions now oppose workers to managers of government 
departments and enterprises and foreign-owned companies. Unions are smaller in 
Indian-controlled enterprises such as transport and building, and because 
ownership here is fragmented union organisation tends to be more difficult. 
Fragmentation is even greater in the retail and manufacturing enterprises controlled 
by Indians. Most employers are small shopkeepers, artisans, or tailors, often 
assisted by relatives. In recent years a proliferation of Indian industrial 
establishments paying relatively low wages has expanded the non-unionised labour 
force. Some of the harshest work conditions and lowest pay are presently 
experienced by women in the garments' industry which has grown in response to 
markets in Australia and New Zealand. 
Political Institutions 
While Fiji was a Crown Colony its parliament was controlled by an executive 
responsible to the imperial govemment. The winning of independence as a nation 
state was preceded by the dissolution of diese relationships: the transformation of 
the parliament into a council answerable to a popular electorate and the executive 
into a body controlled by groups from the parliament. 
In the early decades the govemor appointed the entire parliament, all Europeans. 
From 1904 European settlers elected some of their representatives and the govemor 
appointed two Fijians. Indians were denied elected representation until 1929 and 
Fijians did not elect their national leaders until 1963. Till then die govemor chose 
political leaders for them from nominees of the Great Council of Chiefs. 
The official side, made up of senior civil servants, dominated until 1966. They 
were almost invariably Europeans, mostly British. With the govemor and a few 
representatives of the non-official side they formed the Executive Council. The 
governor's control was ended by the resolutions of Fiji's first constitutional 
conference: thirty-six elected members now sat with only four officials, and elected 
members formed the Executive Council. The 1966 elections placed the mainly 
Fijian-based Alliance Party in control of parliament. 
After three years of acrimonious conflict Alliance principals agreed with 
leaders of the Indians' National Federation Party to set aside some of their 
differences and jointiy ask Britain for independence. This was an astonishing 
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tum of events for Fijian leaders had been deeply apprehensive about preparations 
for self-govemment when the colonial office initiated them just a few years before. 
Fiji became a dominion of die Commonwealth in 1970. 
The new parliament comprised the elected House of Representatives and the 
appointed Senate. The first contained seats reserved for representatives of electoral 
communities - 22 Fijian seats, 22 Indian seats, and eight for General Electors 
(Europeans, Part-Europeans, and Chinese). Most were filled by elections in 
"Communal" (ethnic) constituencies but some belonged to "National" (multiethnic) 
constituencies made up of the same voters who comprise the ethnic electorates. 
This arrangement allowed each person four votes: one for their ethnic constituency 
(an Indian voted for an Indian, a Fijian for a Fijian, a General for a General), two 
votes for the Fijian and the Indian seat of a National constituency, and one vote for 
a General candidate in another even larger National constituency. (There were 
twelve Fijian, twelve Indian and three General seats filled by elections from 
communal constituencies, and ten Fijian, ten Indian and five General seats filled by 
elections from national constituencies.) 
To visualise the system think of three levels of constituency membership in 
ascending demographic and territorial scale: (l)Ethnic or "Communal", (2)National 
constituencies each with a Fijian and an Indian seat, and (3)National constituencies 
each with a General seat. The three electoral populations were segregated at the 
first level but together at the second and third. 
This cumbersome stracture was introduced as a compromise between the 
Indian demand for common roll elections and the Fijian and European insistence 
diat edmic constituencies and seats be retained. It kept the reservation of seats and 
so precluded competition between candidates of different ethnic group while 
encouraging the formation of multi-ethnic campaign teams seeking support from 
the same voters. An Indian contesting a National seat, for example, relied on 
support in the field from Fijian and General candidates as well as other Indian 
candidates going for seats in the several Communal constimencies that made up the 
National. These candidates promoted her as they canvassed their own votes in 
ethnic constituencies. Thus side by side at political ralUes were Fijian, Indian, and 
General candidates from Communal and National constituencies. Though the 
elector need only tick one name most used all four votes. 
The cracial point is that the way people voted could never alter the relative 
strength of the ethnic groups in parliament. Indians could never compete with 
Fijians to control a majority of seats because the constitution fixed a constant 
number of Fijian and Indian deputies. Therefore any political party would always 
depend on inter-ethnic alliances to control parliament. Actually the constitution 
gave die balance of power to the Fijians for the Senate was a house of review 
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Schematic Representation of the Pre-Coup 
Electoral System 
National Constituencies 
Fijian Indian General 
Communal Constituencies 
The diagram is greatiy simplified for clarity. It 
does not depict the actual boundaries on Viti Levu 
island. In fact, the whole of the Fiji islands were 
segmented by two sets of National electorates 
composed from the same communal electorates: 
there were ten National constituencies each with 
a Fijian and an Indian representative, and five 
national constituencies each with a General 
representative. 
Diagram by Ian Farquhar 
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Every National constituency is composed of all Fiiian, Indian, 
and General electors living within its boundaries 
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and veto in which they had final say on some of the most important matters. It 
comprised eight members nominated by the Great Council of Chiefs, seven chosen 
by the prime minister, six by the leader of the opposition, and one by the council of 
Rotuma. Approval by the Council of Chiefs senators was necessary for any 
legislation in the House of Representatives concerning Fijian land, Fijian 
Administration, and the Fijian Development Fund Board. It should be noted, 
however, that the constitutional safeguards for the Fijians did not ensure that 
leaders favoured by the majority of Fijians would always share in the initiation of 
policy. The Council of Chiefs power in the Senate was purely one of veto. (The 
ethnic composition of the Senate from 1971 to 1984 is shown in Appendix Table 
7). 
Theimportanceof the safeguards was frequently emphasised by Fijian leaders. 
During an upsurge of racial tension after the elections of 1982, Ratu WiUiam 
Toganivalu, an Alliance minister, opposed demands by some Fijians for more 
powers: 
I consider that we Fijian people have come out better under the 
terms and conditions of this constitution than the other races...I 
would refer members to the entrenched clauses in the constitution 
wherein is embedded and safeguarded the very things that are dear 
to us. The constitution is perhaps the best in the world when you 
consider it in the context of the multiracial society we have here. " 
The military coup of 1987 was widely supported by Fijians as a defence against 
perceived threats to their position by Indians. Yet the change of govemment that 
precipitated the coup had not increased Indian voting strength in parliament nor 
weakened the veto power of the Council of Chiefs in the Senate. 
Throughout its rale the AUiance Party depended mosfly on the votes of Fijians 
and General Electors and a small proportion of the Indian voters mainly in westem 
Viti Levu where there are old divisions in the leadership of the farmers. By contrast 
the National Federation Party never attracted significant support among Fijian 
voters. It was always far more a racially-based party than the Alliance (See 
Appendix Table 6). 
Yet it would be wrong to infer from this division in national politics that the 
society of Fiji is to be understood simply in terms of race or ethnicity. The label 
"plural society" clouds economic and social differences of interest that developed 
within the ethnic populations and the growth of ties of interest, fiiendship, and 
ideology across the ethnic division. Moreover it is not so much the fact of ethnic 
division in politics that is so significant as the special features that the opposition 
acquired in Fiji, features of constraint that I have examined in earlier works. I 
suggest that these features have continued to be prominent in the present crisis and 
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shall argue this case in the final chapter. In the next chapter I will show how the 
foundations for a regulation of the conflict were laid in the evolution of the colonial 
political economy centring on linking Fijian political leadership with the 
management of the leasing of Fijian land to Indian farmers. 
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the Colonial Political 
Economy 
In most research the indigenous Fijians and the immigrant Indians have been 
treated separately. Yet the characteristics of these peoples and of the relations 
between them are to an imp6rtant extent products of the way colonial rulers 
organised them within one political economy. The very names "Indian" and 
"Fijian" are artifices of colonial rale expressing a legal creation of status groups 
with codified rights and obligations within a society constracted by the colonial 
state. This legal constract masks social, cultural, and economic divisions among 
Fijians and among Indians. I want to move away from the conventional idea of a 
plural society, a purely descriptive term which oversimplifies and distorts social 
realities, to consider the development of a unitary societal system under colonial 
rale. 
Of central importance in this story is the way in which the colonial state 
managed the development of the modem economy. By the 1920s the Colonial 
Sugar Refining Company (CSR Co) enjoyed enormous influence. Indeed colonial 
officials were inclined to leave the sugar districts to the company's control and 
many people came to regard it as the de facto raler there.' Yet the colonial state 
was not just the instrament of the CSR Co and odier Australian businesses. There 
was tension between the British holders of political power and the Australian 
wielders of economic power.^  The Deed of Cession had become the charter for the 
colonial state's claim to autonomy from control by class interests: the officials 
frequently insisted that their first responsibility was to safeguard the Fijians and 
their land. There was thus a contradiction in the colonial society between the 
European-dominated capitalist economy and a Fijian social system perpetuated on 
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the basis of subsistence cultivation. The preservation of village society obstracted 
the expansion of capitalist enterprise by restricting access to labour and land. 
The colonial ralers attempted to resolve the contradiction by importing Indian 
labour. As the Indians multiplied and formed a class of small farmers their 
presence created new economic and political demands. The Indians increasingly 
needed land outside the company's plantations on which they initially worked. But 
we must see this Indian pressure on Fijian land as an aspect of the contradiction 
between a Fijian social system and the capitalist economy. The Indian farmers 
were the "frontiine troops" of European capital. It was the European-dominated 
capitalist economy that stood in conflict with Fijian society. And it was this that 
produced the class tensions which were a major force behind Indian political 
demands that began in the second decade of this century.^ 
In the early decades of the century most Fijians remained largely superfluous to 
the capitalist economy and an impediment to it. European leaders continued to 
oppose the government's protectionist policy urging that the Native 
Administration be abolished, that Fijians be encouraged to work for wages, and 
that their lands be opened up. In pursuing diese objectives they professed a new 
concem for the Indians' welfare arguing that after the abolition of the indenture 
system further Indian labourers would have to be attracted as free settiers. They 
insisted that "the easy acquisition of land would be essential to the continuance of 
Indian immigration": 
Unless we can give the immigrants every facility by effecting a 
survey, subdivision, and classification of the land, the colony will 
lose its Indian population...We must rely on the Indians to populate 
the waste places...We can never hope to see the Fijian population 
increase to a great extent...The colony will remain empty unless it is 
populated with Indians...So we should do everytiiing we can to raise 
their status to make them better citizens.^ 
Of course this concern for the Indian settiers was a concern for the future of 
European profits. The Europeans expected the Indians to remain dieir toilers. But 
the Indians quickly diversified their positions in the economy. They began to 
displace Europeans as small planters, in retailing and petty service enterprises, and 
some even began to buy land from tiiem.^ A steady trickle of free settlers from 
Gujarat and the Punjab boosted the growtii of an urban middleclass of shopkeepers, 
artisans, lawyers and civil servants. These upwardly-mobile Indians led a 
campaign for political and social equality witii the whites. Some played a part in 
the strikes of 1920 and 1921, the most important turning point in ethnic relations 
and politics in the history of the colony. 
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The Indian Strikes of 1920-21^ 
Indian labourers employed by the govemment in Suva stopped work for higher pay 
complaining about the rising prices of basic commodities. The govemment had 
imposed import duties to take from the people the revenue it could not extract from 
the CSR Co. The hostile mood spread through the Indian population causing 
Europeans to fear an uprising. The following year Indians employed by the 
company on the other side of the island from Suva went on strike. In both 
disturbances Fijians had mainly supported the govemment and the company. 
Fijian police helped suppress rioters in Suva. In the sugar districts some villagers 
initially sympathised with the Indian plantation workers and supplied them food. 
But European missionaries and Fijian chiefs soon persuaded them to switch their 
assistance to the company and cut the cane in the Indians' place. The historian 
Cahnan cogentiy summed up the change wrought in European attitudes: 
The picture of the subservient hard-working Indian had been 
shattered beyond repair and a strong alliance formed between Fijian 
and European. Before 1920 many Europeans had advocated that 
the native poUce force be disbanded because 'neath a thin veneer of 
civilisation still beat a savage heart'...The words 'natives' and 
'coloured people' were often used loosely to refer to both Indian 
and Fijian...And many Europeans regarded the Fijian as a lazy 
good-for-nothing who never did an honest day's work and whose 
presence prevented opening up the land. But European and Fijian 
had now stood together against a common enemy. They began to 
regard each other as natural allies against the political and 
economic encroachments of the Indians. 
The Alliance of European Leaders and Fijian Chiefs 
At this time Europeans numbered fewer than 4,000 to the Indians' 60,000. So a 
"European Settlement League" was formed and an inflow of 5000 a year was 
proposed to prevent "Asiatic colonisation": "It was hopeless to think we could go 
on introducing cheap people just as labour. History proves that the people who 
work the soil wiU ultimately own it. Our security lies in our having owners of the 
soil of British origin".^ But, as Caiman observed, it was too late to plan an 
economy based on European settlement. Most white planters had already been 
squeezed out and the Indians made the basis of the sugar industry. 
The Europeans had favoured Indian immigration so long as they regarded the 
Indians as merely a subordinate adjunct to their own economic and political 
leadership. As Indians began to threaten the Europeans' economic position and 
challenge their political privilege, so the latter began to defend the Fijians and 
endorse government policies. They were well placed to assume the role of 
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guardians by cultural and racial affinities with colonial officials and ties initiated 
with Fijians in the nineteenth century. They upheld the Deed of Cession as a 
sacred charter and exalted the chiefs as the source and symbol of the legitimacy of 
the colonial order. 
Alliance widi the leading chiefs was consolidated in the early 1930s against 
renewed Indian demands for equality with Europeans. From 1916 the Indians had 
been represented in parliament by just one member whom the govemor nominated. 
The Europeans had six elected members and Fijians were represented by two chiefs 
appointed by the govemor in consultation with the Great Council of Chiefs. After 
the Govemment of India pressed for Indians to be given equality with Europeans 
on one electoral roll the Fiji Govemment granted three seats for an Indian roll. The 
elected Indians continued to demand a common roll, and when the rest of the 
partiament refused they began a boycott that lasted several years. 
The colonial rulers resisted the Indians' demand as a threat ultimately to the 
Crown's responsibility to the Fijians but also argued that the Europeans' 
leadership of the economy justified their political privilege. The Europeans 
devised a subtier defence for themselves. They claimed to share with the British 
govemment the role of guardian of the Fijian race, maintaining that by the Deed of 
Cession the Fijians had put their trast in the British "race", not merely in the British 
Crown. The possibility of Indians prevailing over Europeans was unthinkable 
because "the Fijians would resent a transfer of authority from the British race to die 
Indian race".'" The colonial officials tacitly endorsed this claim and when Indians 
protested against inequalities between whites and coloureds in the civil service the 
Govemor justified discrimination on the ground that the Fijians had given dieir 
islands in trast to die British "race".'' 
The history of the European alliance with Fijian political leaders illuminates an 
interplay of the Europeans' material interests and ideology that was usually well 
concealed by rhetoric about threats posed by the Indians to Fijian interests. 
Organised European opposition to Indians preceded and inspired that of the Fijians. 
They actively encouraged Fijians to be vigilant and the Fijian chiefs welcomed the 
Europeans' claim to be their protectors. From time to time the chiefs had voiced 
their concem to colonial governors about the possible threat of the Indian presence 
to the Fijians' position and customs.'^ Now, supported by the Europeans, they 
declared that their forbears had ceded the islands to Britain and therefore the 
Indians should not have any part in directing matters affecting Fijians. Indeed die 
leading chief, Ratu Sukuna, protested that the Indian demand was a threat "not only 
to our land interests but to the wider interests of the Europeans who, after all, by 
the Deed of Cession are our hosts in this colony...In any case Fijians regard 
European political ascendancy as essential for their welfare" '^. 
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Fijians were brought up to revere as sacrosanct the union of their leaders with 
the Europeans. The latter praised Fijians for their integrity, loyalty and generosity, 
attributing these qualities to the traditional society as this was said to be preserved 
in colonial institutions. Indians were depicted as crafty, acquisitive and exploiting. 
In trath the Europeans were defensively exaggerating the very qualities diat made 
Indians their rivals in business and politics and lauding Fijians for gracefully 
accepting humble positions as subsistence villagers or docile wage workers 
disinclined to question the status quo. A senior official in the colonial office 
lamented "the tendency among officials to be excessively philo-Fijian and to regard 
the Indians as aliens, interlopers, and in general nuisances who cause most of the 
trouble in the colony".''* 
Europeans and Fijians cooperated in the army during die Pacific war but Indians 
did not serve.'^ The whites mixed more often with Fijians and until 1968 their 
unity was affirmed by the exclusion of Indians from the Defence Club a 
middleclass social organisation in Suva. For several years more the coat of arms of 
the Suva Municipal Council continued to depict the historical partnership between 
Europeans and Fijians; an Indian was not included on the plaque despite protests 
by Indian aldermen. Conservative European lawyers with business connections 
had come to play important roles in Fijian politics and Fijian leaders reaffirmed 
their faith in the Europeans during the preparations for self-govemment. When 
Indians objected to the continued disproportionate representation of Europeans in 
parliament Ratu Mara, soon to be prime minister, denounced the critics for trying 
to drive a wedge between Fijians and their allies: "Remove the buffer of European 
culture and there will be a conflagration because we will have to decide which 
culture dominates - a Fijian culture or an Indian culture."' 
Several features of the social stracture of colonial Fiji were favourable for the 
alliance of the chiefs with European leaders. Firstly, the chiefs held official 
positions which did not oppose them to Europeans as rivals, unlike the lawyers, 
businessmen, and landlords who led the Indians. 
Secondly, die chiefs could hardly identify with the Indians' resentment of the 
Europeans' voting privileges for they were firmly against extending the franchise 
to their own people. They insisted that the Fijian "could never regard the 
possession of the vote as a personal right but rather as an obligation to serve the 
best interests of the state...He visuatises govemment as commands issued in the 
general interest by a hierarchy composed of chiefs, priests, and elders. Authority 
he regards as something chiefs alone are qualified to wield."' 
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Thirdly, die vast majority of Fijians remained subsistence cultivators in village 
communities. This circumstance limited die depth of tiieir grievances about racial 
inequality. Most who were employed by Europeans did not ultimately depend on 
the jobs as they had family lands to fall back on for food and shelter. This 
traditional resource base often supported their wives and children independentiy of 
the wage. The same has been tree of die situation of Fijian growers of commercial 
crops: the prices they would accept from European buyers were minimised by die 
important part the village economy continued to play in supporting the growers and 
their families. Village subsistence cultivation maintained a Fijian labour reserve 
ready to be mobilised according to the needs of capitalist and government 
employers and under the supervision of traditional authorities. The village 
economy together with the part chiefs often played in recraiting and disciplining 
labour provided a cheap and more easily controlled work force. *° 
It was especially the Indians who experienced the colonial order as oppressive. 
For them, more than for the Fijians, colonial rale meant a demeaning subjugation 
to the whites. European dominance was often more immediate to them because 
they depended wholly on money incomes, mosdy as subordinates of whites. More 
Indians than Fijians lived in towns where they daily encountered European racism 
at a time when they were leaming about the successes of Gandhi's anti-colonial 
movement from recent migrants out of India.'^ Indians were disposed to political 
militancy by their class consciousness as tenants and wage workers, or as members 
of the lower middleclass. Class consciousness was less developed among Fijians 
because of the much smaller extent to which they depended on the cash economy. 
Most Fijians experienced European rale through the authority of chiefs. This 
meant that European employers and the govemment could usually rely on Fijians 
to oppose the Indians' militant industrial actions, as in 1921. The Europeans 
encouraged Fijians to see the confrontations in which Indians challenged European 
power as threats to the state and therefore to the chiefs and to the security of Fijian 
land and society. 
The colonial state both limited the opportunities for Fijians to become wage 
workers and secured a conservative elite which endorsed the Europeans' role in the 
economy and government. Fijian leaders encouraged their followers to respect 
Europeans as protectors and to regard Indians as opponents, to view the latter's 
numbers and position in commerce as a challenge to be met by safeguarding land 
ownership, by increasing the participation of Fijians in administration and salaried 
professions, and by preserving political power.^ ^ 
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Land and Ethnic Relations 
There was ultimately a contradiction in the Europeans' alUance with Fijian chiefs 
against Indians because the profits of European enterprise continued to depend 
mosdy on Indian labour. Europeans had inevitably to be concerned for the Indians' 
needs even when tiiese came into conflict with interests of the Fijians. They had to 
qualify their defence of the Fijians, particularly on die issue of how the land should 
be managed. Fiji's prosperity, it was often said, depended on the collaboration of 
European capital, Indian labour, and Fijian land: Fiji as the "three-legged stool". 
The Indians needed lands as the whites had begun to insist before Indians 
embarked on their strikes and poUtical agitation. 
In the 1920s the CSR Co sought to increase output by turning its plantation 
labourers into individual cultivators working their own ten acre leases of company 
land with the assistance of their wives and children. The status of the Indian was 
altered "from that of an employee to a producer with a direct and personal interest 
in his farm". '^ But the company's estates were inadequate to absorb the growing 
Indian population and to fulfill Fiji's potential for sugar production. So with the 
company's encouragement Indian farmers began to acquire leases of Fijian land. At 
first the Indians negotiated directly with landowning groups, the govemment 
exercising littie control. In theory the prospective tenant was supposed to apply to 
the local official of the Lands Department who would then negotiate with the 
owners. But "in practice he would stand littie chance unless he approaches the 
owners first and they usually insist on a premium which is often high when 
competition keen".^^ This arrangement worked well until in the 1930s the 
government and the company encouraged Fijians to grow cane. Company 
management hoped to increase output and to have a supply of reliable producers 
should the Indians stage another strike. It was, too, a period of liberalisation of the 
Native Administration: a weakening of the chiefs' official power and attempts by 
the British to encourage a transition from "communalism" to "individualism". 
Colonial officials aimed to help Fijians catch up with Indians in the cash economy: 
The young men see Indian cultivators settied amongst them leading 
individualistic lives free from the restraints of the communal system 
and winning prosperity from the soil which they themselves have 
leased to them...They make comparisons between the apparent 
freedom of the Indians and the obvious restraints under which they 
live and they realise that their social system does not fit them to 
compete with individualistic races...They feel that they are being 
pushed more and more into the background by the more articulate 
and enterprising peoples who have invaded their country..." 
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Govemor Fletcher argued that "Fijian and Indian interests are tending to overlap 
and intersect" and even proposed merging the departments of Fijian and Indian 
affairs.'^ The tiberal policy led to a new competition for resources and to ethnic 
tension. Fijian leader Ratu Sukuna declared: "The Indian community, having 
shown us the way and given us the example, can hardly expect to continue to hold 
all the agricultural land in the sugar districts where the plough mints money".^ 
By 1937 around 1(K)0 Fijians were cultivating sugar cane away from their villages. 
Some Fijian landowning groups refused to renew Indian leases and others 
exploited their tenants' insecurity by encouraging bribes. But Fijians proved less 
willing cultivators than expected. The company pressed the govemment to take 
charge of the land and threatened to reject cane from Fijians who failed to 
maintain production quotas on lands resumed from Indian farmers: "We cannot 
view with equanimity the disraption of the peasant system which has cost us so 
much patient effort and expenditure to establish...Any question of control of die 
land situation getting into the hands of the original owners must only end in 
calamity for all." ° Government endorsed the Company's concern in 
communications to London: "The development of individualism among the Fijians 
is accompanied by a growing disinclination to part with their land which is often 
provocative of great hardship, especially to small Indian agriculturalists."^' 
The governor warned the Colonial Office about the "need to face the land 
problem while die Fijians still preserve their traditional respect for authority, while 
they still rely upon their chiefs to decide for them, and before the Indian is too 
embittered to listen to reason".^ ^ His resolve on the matter was influenced by his 
wish to subdue the Indians' demand for political equality with Europeans and to 
meet awkward questions the Govemment of India continued to ask about Indian 
welfare. He feared the land problem would soon worsen as leases granted after 
abolition of the indenture system came up for renewal. The growing Indian 
fi^stration was poignantly expressed in a politician's submission to the Colonial 
Office: 
The Indian community in Fiji has entered into die third generation 
but how many of them can say with pride: this is the homestead of 
my father and my grandfather and it shall be die homestead of my 
descendants!...There is nothing that contributes towards sober 
steady development and progress in human beings as the feeUng of 
lineal continuity. But there must be a tangible link to bind a 
generation to another generation and in the case of an agricultural 
population, such as we are in this colony, that link can only be the 
land - the family, the homestead. '^ 
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The decade of the 1930's was a critical watershed. The govemment and the 
company feared die Fijians would increasingly resist Indian requests for land. But 
die govemment was also worried about the possibility of alliance between Fijian 
and Indian malcontents. An exiled Fijian agitator encouraged people in the 
villages and the new sugar farming settiements to ignore white officials and chiefs 
and to prepare for a "new era" when they would achieve wealth and power. Fijians 
were beginning to enter wage employment in large numbers, especially in the sugar 
mills and at the new gold mines. There were soon disturbances at the mines and 
the govemment feared the discontent might become linked with that of Indians 
who were forming unions among farmers and mill workers.^^ 
The officials became more apprehensive when in the late 1930s Fijian chiefs 
themselves frequently united with Indian leaders in parliament to oppose racial 
discrimination in conditions of employment in the civil service. Ratu Sukuna, as 
leader of the Fijian members, was summoned to govemment house to explain the 
rebellion.^' Colonial officials in Suva and London were aghast at the breach of 
what they regarded as a tacit rule of the game: that Fijians should not use their 
political privilege to join in a challenge to the Crown. 
The strengthening anti-colonial movement in India reinforced the fear that 
"disraptive Indian poUtical influences" might spread into Fijian society.^^ The Fiji 
govemment rejected the Govemment of India's proposal to install an "Agent" in 
Fiji. The Secretary for Indian Affairs summed up the anxiety: 
This is a critical time. A tendency has become evident for Fijians to 
interest themselves in Indian affairs. Until recently Fijians have 
sided with Europeans in any controversy between Europeans and 
Indians...The CSR Co's efforts to create a class of Fijian farmers to 
counter-balance the Indians have been based on the assumption that 
Fijians would continue to side with Europeans. The strike at the 
Lautoka sugar miU last year when Fijians united with Indians was a 
dangerous sign, proving that the Fijians may not side with 
Europeans indefinitely.^ 
On the eve of Fiji's engagement in the war with Japan, a new govemor. Sir PhilUp 
MitcheU, detected "an underlying nasty touch of raciaUsm about the place...Fijians 
and Indians are beginning to feel that on colour grounds they ought to make 
common cause against Europeans".^ 
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The concerns of colonial officials in the decade up to the Pacific war were 
several: the land problem, cracial to the questions both of Indian welfare and die 
colony's economy; die perceived danger of Fijian disaffection with colonial rule 
botii among die ordinary people and among the chiefs; and a fear that Fijians might 
even begin to unite with Indians on some issues. These problems were handled by 
two related administrative reforms that were of central importance in the 
management of the economy and ethnic relations after the war: the estabUshment 
of the Native Lands Trust Board and the reorganisation of the Fijian 
Administration. 
Ratu Sukuna and Administrative Reforms 
In the 1930s the British had relied on the leading chief in govemment, Ratu 
Sukuna, to persuade Fijians to agree to central control of land. His success in diis 
was acclaimed in Fiji and London as an enormously important breakdirough for die 
management of the colonial economy. Ratu Sukuna had urged the Council of 
Chiefs: 
It is the bounden duty of landowners to use what they possess for 
the benefit of all...If the Govemment takes charge of the lands we 
cannot use there can be only one result: the leasing will be under 
better control and we will receive more rents for there wiU be no 
waste land. We wiU live peacefully with our neighbours who have 
taken up their homes in this country. We are doing our part here 
and so are they. We wish to live and so do they...Money produces a 
close intertelation of interests. If other communities are poor, we 
too remain poor. If they prosper, we too will prosper. But if we 
obstruct other people from using our lands there will be no 
prosperity...^^ 
The Native Lands Trust Board (NLTB) was set up in 1941 with Sukuna as 
chairman. It was to supervise relations between landowners and tenants by 
arranging lease agreements and collecting rents. By no means did it eliminate 
conflicts about land. In fact Indians soon complained that the Board was doing 
more to demarcate reserves for Fijians than to help tenants secure their leases. 
Yet the reform did help alleviate tensions at the local level by removing to arenas 
of political negotiation and administrative decision, a matter that had begun to 
cause animosity between Fijian and Indian neighbours. The NLTB became 
important in the management of die capitaUst economy and the ethnic conflicts 
associated with its development. 
Reorganisation of the Fijian Administration also facilitated the management of 
land and ethnic relations by encouraging a more powerful and united Fijian 
leadership strongly aUied to die colonial state and exercising close, paternalistic 
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control over the villagers. It did much more than restore the position of the 
principal chiefs. It gave them a collective power they had never enjoyed before, a 
power without parallel in other colonial administrations in the Pacific. Govemor 
Mitchell justified the changes to his superiors in London by insisting they were 
necessary to secure the allegiance of the Fijians: "Fijians have strong political 
representation but not direct responsibiUty or audiority. This is lop-sided and if it 
doesn't produce irresponsible nationalism or racialism it will be surprising".^' (A 
factor in the chiefs' alliance with Indians in parUament just a few years before was 
a resentment of their loss of authority in the Native Administration. By 1940 
most Roko Tui had been replaced by European officials). 
At the apex of the new system was the Fijian Affairs Board empowered to make 
regulations binding on village people and on those who wished to live and work 
away. It advised the governor on the appointment of the provincial heads (Roko 
Tui) and appointed the district heads (Buli), magistrates, and police. Board 
members were the Fijians of the colonial parliament together with the governor, a 
legal adviser, and a financial adviser (invariably Europeans). The Council of 
Chiefs, consisting mainly of delegates from the provincial councils, chose the 
Fijian members of parliament and so controlled the membership of the Fijian 
Affairs Board. It was in effect the Council's legislative and executive arm.^° 
The Council of Chiefs, as a ceremonialised arena of political debate, helped to 
reconcile with parochial sentiments a national Fijian leadership increasingly drawn 
into compromises with non-Fijian demands. It helped institutionalise and 
compartmentalise the forces of ethnic chauvinism and so to inhibit the emergence 
of militant movements of a kind that exacerbated ethnic conflicts in comparable 
societies such as the Sinhalese revivalism in Sri Lanka and militant Islam in 
Malaysia. Increasingly open to Fijians of non-chiefly rank, the Council of Chiefs 
provided a place for the routinised expression of aggressively racial opinions and 
the stem questioning of political leaders who operated at the national level. As part 
of the institutional framework of "the Fijian way of Ufe" it provided experiences 
that enhanced convictions of strength and dignity in relations with other groups 
while encouraging Fijians to accommodate the concessions their leaders regularly 
made to those groups. This controlling function was vividly underlined by Ratu 
Mara when during the talks with Indian leaders on constitutional reform in 1969 he 
explained his difficulties in persuading the Council of Chiefs to accept change: 
Yesterday, because of this foram, we were able to present a view to 
which the reaction was that we were radicals, we were treasonable! 
If we did not have this foram those people who were able to voice 
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their views would probably be starting their own party. This is the 
only forum where there is greater freedom for Fijians to be there 
and to express themselves in the vemacular.^' 
As Secretary for Fijian Affairs and chairman of the Fijian Affairs Board Ratu 
Sukuna became the first Fijian member of the Executive Council, firmly binding 
Fijian political leadership to the colonial state. The first legal adviser to the Fijian 
Affairs Board was Sir Henry Scott, the senior European political leader, Sukuna's 
friend, and the legal adviser to the CSR Co. Through such appointments European 
business and political interests enjoyed direct influence over the chiefs and the 
management of Fijian affairs. Scott was succeeded by his son Morris who in 1956 
called the chiefs together to form the Fijian Association, eventuaUy die backbone 
of the AlUance Party. Morris Scott's successor was John Falvey, another lawyer-
politician who became Ratu Mara's counsellor in the formative years of the 
Alliance Party. 
In planning the Fijian Administration Governor Mitchell and Ratu Sukuna 
rejected the philosophy of "individualism" that guided the management of Fijian 
affairs in the 1930s. They insisted that the village be preserved as the setting for 
economic growth. The Fijian Affairs Board discouraged people from living in the 
towns or becoming independent farmers. Sukuna condemned urban migration as 
leading to unemployment, the breakdown of morality, and neglect of customary 
social obligations. He conceived the Fijian to be "still at heart a subsistence 
cultivator with a simple conception of life: his clan, and the thatched houses of his 
boyhood, his land, and the peace and leisure of the koro (village)".'*^ 
Sukuna invoked this image of rustic contentment to justify the new 
conservatism. He then resolved to enforce confornuty to the simple Ufe by 
appointing police and magistrates to deal with people who did not feel themselves 
to be subsistence farmers at heart, who left their villages without approval, or who 
neglected to cultivate traditional plots, to maintain roads and houses, support 
ceremonial functions, and generally obey and serve officials and chiefs. Children 
were educated in farming and the norms of village life and taught to respect 
traditional and official authority: "The general rale for commoners is that they 
should make themselves as inconspicuous as possible in the presence of the 
chief...District Commissioners and senior officers should be treated with the same 
respect as high chiefs." 
Chiefly and bureaucratic paternalism engendered widespread discontent, 
imposed as it was just after a period when regulations were relaxed to encourage 
Fijians to produce food for the forces and when overseas service and wartime 
organisations cutting across provincial boundaries broadened the oudook of many. 
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An anthropologist who had worked with Fijian soldiers during the war observed 
"growing dissatisfaction witii rale dirough chiefs backed by official position and an 
increasing danger of a rift between people and govemment".'*^ Later surveys by 
social scientists emphasised popular fhistrations and die effects of die new system 
in perpetuating economic disadvantages by discouraging local initiatives in 
commercial enterprise and compelling people to devote much of their wealth and 
energy to serving chiefs and officials. The Fijian anthropologist Rusiate 
Nayacakalou described continuing resentments toward the establishment and its 
policies in the early 1960s: some people complained that the chiefs were 
oppressing them and that they preached the policy of development within the 
framework of traditional social relations in order to keep their privileges.'*^ 
In fact the Fijian Administration corresponded closely to traditional stractures of 
authority only in a few areas. Everywhere there were disjunctions, but especially 
in central and western Viti Levu. For twenty years the system was to restrict 
peoples' freedom to take up commercial farming, or to live and work in the towns 
and industrial centres. Even in areas where it most accorded with custom many 
people referred to it as "the bond".^ 
Yet resentments against its patemaUsm in everyday Ufe were balanced by the 
functions the Administration assumed as symbol and framework for political unity 
in opposition to perceived threats from the demographic and economic advances 
and political demands of the Indians. The revamped Fijian Administration 
affirmed Fijian cultural distinctiveness and poUtical strength in opposition to non-
Fijians and this was a counterforce to the development of a class consciousness as 
many Fijians were drawn into wage employment. For all the dissatisfactions 
Fijians felt with the structures of authority established under British rale these 
stractures helped to secure the integrity of their culture and social organisation.^ 
The bureaucratic instimtions that govem Fijians and manage their land acquired 
dual social functions. They petpemated inequaUties but provided a shield in the 
competition with other races and, in upholding traditional stractures, underpinned 
poUtical solidarity. It is an ironic twist of history that the very impediments the 
Administration placed in the way of the Fijians' economic advancement deepened 
anxieties that then gave the institution value as a framework and symbol of racial 
unity. Its role in organising the political opposition to Indians muted popular 
criticisms. Thus Indian politicians failed to win favour with Fijians by criticising 
the bureaucracy. When one called for the aboUtion of the Department of Fijian 
Affairs a Council of Chiefs delegate to the Senate admonished him, explaining that 
"the Ministry for Fijian Affairs symbolises the vanua which to the Fijian means 
the people, the land, their customs and culture". 
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Yet, paradoxically, tiiese very functions also made die Fijian Administration part 
of a system of inter-ethnic accommodation. It united the principal chiefs in a 
common relationship of authority to tiie villages and in a strengthened allegiance to 
the colonial government. Because it secured these bonds among the chiefs, 
between chiefs and people, and between the chiefs and the colonial state, the new 
system was an important element in the regulation of relations with Indians, a 
function it shared with the Native Lands Trast Board. 
The leading chiefs performed dual functions both as rallying symbols of etiinic 
solidarity and as the managers of inter-ethnic cooperation, particularly in matters of 
land. It is perhaps most of all this duality of the chiefs' political role that 
distinguishes the management of ethnic conflict in Fiji. As agents of die colonial 
state the chiefs endeavoured to reconcile Indian demands with the Fijians' 
jealousies and suspicions, to bridge the edinic divide. It is precisely their central 
place in stractures and symboUsm so cracial in the constitution of Fijian identity 
that has enabled the chiefs and their commoner allies to reconcile these seemingly 
contradictory functions. 
Recurring contention about the terms of lease tenure sustained the importance of 
the chiefs' national role as they debated with Indians in the parliament, conferred 
with colonial officials, and endeavoured to persuade their own people to agree to 
concessions. The strength of understandings and procedures for handUng 
contention about land is evidenced in the unanimous agreement reached among 
political leaders before the constitutional conference of 1965 to exclude this, die 
most important issue of all, from the agenda and in the passage in parliament of a 
major reform just before the first national elections the following year. By common 
consent land was again excluded from debate at the conference which decided the 
terms of Fiji's independence in 1970. 
The establishment of the Native Lands Trast Board and the Fijian Administration 
can thus be partiy understood as the colonial govemment's attempt to handle the 
central dilemma of its rale in Fiji. A function of these institutions was to support 
the dominant capitalist enterprise by facilitating its access to land for use by Indian 
• 
farmers. The chiefs were encouraged to assume pivotal roles in the political 
economy as intermediaries in ethnic relations. Chiefly leadership acquired 
legitimacy not just in the context of Fijian society but also in the process by which 
the colonial state linked Fijian society and resources with the modem economy. 
The principal chiefs came to be honoured as aristocrats not only of Fijian society 
but of the society as a whole: dignified spokesmen and diplomats upon whose 
authority and favour the accommodation of interests depended. To say this about 
their svstemic "role" is not to deny their development as a powerful elite with 
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vested status and economic interests to preserve in alliances with certain non-
Fijians. Indeed their ability to withstand poUtical challenge over such interests has 
been strengthened by precisely those systemic factors in their position I have been 
describing. 
Another way in which the Fijian Administration supported the capitalist 
economy was by providing a means of controlling labour. The Administration 
helped to produce and manage docile workers obedient to authority and more 
accepting of their wages than were Indians because much of their subsistence needs 
could be met in viUage economies. On occasion the leading chiefs assisted in the 
management of traculent workers as, for example, in the strikes at the gold mine 
and during the disturbance in Suva in 1959 and the sugar cane farmers' strike of 
1960. ' These same leaders defended the Administration against non-Fijian critics 
by saying it protected ordinary viUagers from labour exploitation.'*^ 
It should now be clear that the colonial govemment's policies in the administration 
of the Fijians and their land cannot be accounted for simply in terms of the 
peculiarities of Fijian cuUure and the historical commitment made to the chiefs in 
the Deed of Cession. They must be interpreted in the wider context of the 
govemment's problems in managing the economy of the colony as a whole. 
Bases of Ethnic Solidarity 
The stractures of colonial rale helped produce differences in the character of ethnic 
group organisation and also a contrast between ethnic organisation and conflict in 
Fiji and the more antagonistic relations in comparable societies like those I have 
already mentioned: Sri Lanka, Guyana, and Malaysia. 
There is a strong basis for solidarity among Fijians in the separate control of 
many of their affairs and their common position as the principal landowners 
subordinate to a central authority. The legal institutions of the Fijian 
Administration, the Council of Chiefs, and the Native Lands Trast Board have, on 
balance, promoted unity. It is true that there have been significant regional 
differences in social and political organisation, in language, and in access to 
benefits under both the colonial and post-colonial states (See Chapter 4). Yet in 
the context of opposition to Indians similarities of culture and history have usuaUy 
out\yeighed diese differences and inequalities. Fijian identity might be thought of 
as having a segmentary structure comprising different "levels" of division and 
opposition defined by allegiances of descent group, village, vanua, province, 
confederacy, and ethnic group. The different orders of solidarity are activated in 
different contexts. Linking them are values and ceremonies of chiefship that make 
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celebration of rank a celebration of die dignity and strength of die group. A trans-
Fijian edmic identity has been articulated principally by meetings of die Council of 
Chiefs and the Fijian Association. 
AU Fijians are organised in corporate descent groups tiiat link urban dwellers of 
every occupation with villagers. Unity within these groups is expressed in 
common rights to land and the authority of the most senior line. All Fijians, 
whether townsfolk, villagers, commercial farmers, or rural labourers, have a 
common interest as the trae landowners - the taukei. The word has powerful 
connotations of die inseparability of people, land, and ancestors expressed by die 
aphorism "the land is the people, the people are the land". 
The intertelationship between kinship, land, and chiefly autiiority reinforces 
edinic identity. In poUtical dissension with Indians the city white collar worker is 
as Ukely to defend customary institutions as is the subsistence villager. Fijian 
institutions, both traditional and official, have helped to sustain a consciousness of 
collective honour and strength that compensates for economic and educational 
disadvantages in competition with Indians and Europeans. 
There has not been such a compelling ideological and institutional basis for 
unity among Indians. Whereas Fijian social organisation is extensively based on 
hierarchical relations, Indians are organised by voluntary association on the basis 
of specific interests or by ethnic loyalties. They are culturally less homogeneous. 
Customary institutions divide them in religious worship, family and marriage, 
language, education and sociability. The strength of such divisions is underUned 
when political leaders appeal for solidarity among Hindus and Muslims, 
Northerners and Southerners, and between Gujaratis and other Indians during 
elections. 
The social relations of the indenture system and the plantation had eroded 
traditional distinctions. Caste could not be maintained in die plantation barracks 
and in the organisation of work. Religious distinctions also tended to lose 
importance: Hindus and MusUms attended one another's rites and intermarried. 
The religious interests were revived in the 1920s and 30s as the people organised to 
build schools, temples, and mosques, and to decide on languages of instraction in 
schools. Indians formed groups to advance these objectives, often with the 
guidance of missionaries brought from India. The educational and religious 
projects of the Arya Samaj of the Northemers, the TISI Sangam of the Southemers, 
and the Muslim League created a field of leadership and conflict. In the 
countryside differences between Southerners and Northerners, Hindus and 
MusUms, affected marriage, the clustering of households, economic transactions, 
and encouraged divisions among the farmers in the formation of unions for 
disputes widi die CSR Co^' (See Chapter 4). 
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HostiUty grew particularly between Gujarati free setders and other Indians. As 
Gujaratis displaced Northerners in commerce the latter cultivated an image of 
themselves as the Fiji-born Indians more firmly rooted in the colony than the 
recently-arrived traders. The competition in commerce was intensified by social 
distance. The Gujaratis acquired an image as an aloof profiteering community 
always ready to pack their bags and leave. Certainly they continued to preserve 
social ties with their homeland; they required their children to marry in caste, often 
sending them to India for this, and preferred to employ Gujaratis in their 
businesses. Commercial success meant that they were also resented by poor 
farmers bonded in debt to them. Fiji-bom animosity to the India-bom Gujarati 
sometimes affected the outcome of elections for parliament. Nonetheless, Gujarati 
lawyers and businessmen played a decisive part in uniting Indians in the straggle 
for political equaUty with Europeans.' 
Inequalities among Indians were not overlaid by bonds like those that united 
Fijians of widely different economic and social position: ties of paramount 
chiefship, land, and culture. Unity among Indians has depended more direcdy on 
specific issues of poUtical opposition to other groups. Colonial institutions placed 
Indians of different cultural backgrounds in the same situations in regard to land 
and politics, and the government and the CSR Co tended to treat them as a 
homogenous group. Indians acquired a sense of community overriding their 
cultural differences by virtue of a common heritage of migration and colonial 
subjugation. "Ethnic" identity was sustained more by legal status in the wider 
society than by social traditions or unification in pan-ethnic political institutions. 
While it is true that Fijian unity overlaying cultural, political and regional 
differences was also founded by colonial rale, this unity, to the extent it exists, has 
far greater support in shared culture and political institutions. 
But neither for Indians nor Fijians was the colonial experience one of social and 
cultural disintegration. Customary institutions survived intact or were soon 
reconstructed as organisational and ideological supports for day-to-day social 
relations within the group, affirming identity and worth. 
A very important consequence of this is that competition and conflict have not 
been intensified in Fiji by acquiring a function in the reconstraction of identities 
previously suppressed or denigrated as was the case in Sri Lanka and Guyana. The 
events of poUtical life that have underlined conflicts of racial group interest have 
produced less animosity than we might expect in a country of such deep cultural, 
social, and economic divisions.^^ 
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4 Regional Differences 
in Society and 
Politics 
Indian political leadership developed in the militant but largely middleclass 
movement for equality with Europeans in a common roll election system. By the 
mid 1930s this demand had been weakened by the growing importance of 
negotiable issues such as the terms for farmers' leases and by the government's 
efforts to encourage moderate leadership. But the miUtancy soon re-emerged on a 
new foundation, the farmers' unions. 
After the waning of the common roU demand Indian leadership began to divide 
between two main social settings: the conflict of farmers and the CSR Company in 
the sugar districts, particularly westem Viti Levu, and interracial cooperation in the 
urban middle class in the southeast of this island. Conditions in the west favoiuied 
continued radical leadership, those in the southeast encouraged moderatism. A.D. 
Patel advanced his political career by leading farmers' unions while his old 
confrere Vishnu Deo remained in Suva nurturing ties with Fijians and Europeans. 
They were rivals for seniority in parliament and appointment to the Executive 
Council. While Deo tried to weaken Patel's support in the west by encouraging 
colleagues in the Arya Samaj to endorse candidates against him, Patel asked Suva 
Gujaratis to reject Deo. The conflict was followed by enmity between Patel and 
Deo's successor Andrew Deoki, a Christian lawyer with Arya Samaj friends. This 
rivalry, too, focused on competition for seniority in the colonial political councils. 
Deoki, like Deo, centred his career in Suva. The position of Indians remained an 
issue for unity among the rivals occasionaUy expressed at public raUies. But the 
regions became bases from which opponents approached national questions with 
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different tactics. There was a parallel regional differentiation of political attitudes 
and leadership among Fijians which to some extent encouraged different 
directions of cooperation with Indians in westem and southeastem Viti Levu. 
Multiracialism in the Urban Middleclass' 
The colonial regime was based in Suva and it was especially here that the 
government created a status order marked by honours and seats on boards and 
committees for loyal supporters. Particularly after World War II urban society was 
characterised by the cultivation of interracial ties in the middle class. Social clubs 
provided informal settings for nurturing associations initiated in official contexts. 
They were the main place for sustained cross-racial friendships for intertacial 
visiting is uncommon except on formal occasions such as weddings and funerals. 
The clubs are licenced and members play cards and snooker and hold parties and 
celebrations. Their sociability offsets separation in religion, custom, marriage, and 
kinship. Club Ufe is govemed by standard values: an accent on interracial mixing 
that acknowledges die separateness of racial groups and accepts their opposition as 
a major dimension of the society. The very depth of the divisions in culture and 
society paradoxically favoured a certain intensity in these interracial associations: a 
vigorous affirmation of friendly accord despite the differences. The colonial 
officials encouraged this disposition by emphasising both the strength of the racial 
division and the need to bridge it. 
The Union Club was established in Suva in 1946 with the encouragement of 
senior British officials. Founders included businessmen, civil servants, and 
professionals, and members came mainly from the middle class: from clerks and 
taxi operators to wealthy factory owners, lawyers, and doctors. Most were Indians. 
The majority of Europeans preferred another club which was closed to Indians and 
even to all but the highest ranking Fijian leaders. But the conomittee of the Union 
Club usually included representatives of each race. With its objective "to bring the 
races together", the Suva body provided a model for the formation of sister clubs in 
other towns. Though multiracial sociability was most important in southeast Viti 
Levu it spun a web of ties covering the colony. 
The rivalry between Indian leaders from the different regions of Viti Levu 
became an important factor in the development of multiracial ties and political 
ideology in the southeast for it encouraged Indians there to seek allies among 
Europeans and Fijians and to endorse their values. Equally important was 
the continuing opposition between radical Indians in the west and the colonial 
govemment and European and Fijian leaders in Suva, in sugar industry disputes 
and debates about constitutional change. Indian radicalism in the west stimulated 
interracial accommodation in the southeast. 
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As the party struggle began in the 1960s most people in multiracial clubs 
endorsed moderate leaders and criticised radicals. Some radicals denounced the 
clubs as encouraging alcoholism and neglect of the family, or as centres where 
their opponents concocted political schemes detrimental to the people, and as 
"listening posts" where colonial officials could get information about Indian 
poUtics. Members lauded their organisations as proof of the coexistence which 
they alleged the miUtants were undermining by their demands for common roll, 
their intransigence in strikes, and their condemnation of Fijian institutions. 
In the interraciaUsm of the towns Europeans and Fijian chiefs were the patrons of 
social honour and Indians their cUents. The onus tended to be on the Indians to 
take the initiative, and until the advent of the Federation Party Indian civic and 
political leaders relied on the goodwill and patronage of Fijian and European 
notables in advancing their status and influence. Indians sought interracial contact 
for reasons beyond sociability and prestige. Those who valued ties with Fijian and 
European eUtes included some of the wealthiest Indians. They cultivated relations 
with European businessmen and officials partly with a view to acquiring 
commercial advantages such as building contracts and other opportunities. After 
independence a number of Indian business families enjoyed even greater 
advancement under the patronage of Fijians in the Alliance Govemment. 
Indians took pride in their associations with members of other racial groups and 
Indian organisations such as the Fiji Football Association sought the patronage of 
prominent Fijians and Europeans to enhance their prestige in the Indian commuiuty 
and the influence of their leaders in the wider society. Fijians advertised their 
friendships with eminent Europeans but did not take special pride in ties with 
Indians. Nor did Fijian organisations seek their patronage. This asymmetry in race 
relations derived from official values affirming the special position of the Fijians. 
Indians as well as Europeans sometimes defended the Fijian Administration 
against poUtical attack and recognised the aristocratic status of the chiefs. 
Pressure on Indian politicians to endorse the ideal of "Fijian paramountcy" had 
come to a head when on the eve of India's independence it was discovered that 
Indians outnumbered the Fijians. A European leader proposed in parUament that it 
was time "to emphasise die terms of the Deed of Cession to ensure that the interests 
of the Fijian race are safeguarded". The European politicians used the motion to 
reaffirm their claims to privilege as the Fijians' protectors arguing diat the Indians 
had no responsibiUty under the Deed and had shown disloyalty by refusing to join 
in the war effort. The Indians retorted that protection of the Fijian was the British 
govemment's responsibility and that if Europeans were co-trastees so equaUy, as 
British subjects, were the Indians. A.D.Patel declared his people agreed that the 
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interests of the Fijians must remain paramount. The argument ended in an 
atmosphere of accord and unanimous approval of a revised motion that the 
government and the non-Fijians accept the Deed of Cession as a charter of the 
Fijian people. Govemor Grantham remarked in private correspondence that the 
debate had a sobering effect on the Indians: "They made a great show of their 
affection for the Fijians and their recognition of die fact that die interests of die 
Fijian must be paramount".^  To reinforce die point European and Fijian members 
of the new Fijian Affairs Board asked the govemment "to adopt a firm attitude 
towards the Indians in order that the interests of the Fijian race remain 
preeminent".^  
The "Deed of Cession" debate, as it became known, helped develop an 
ideological framework for cooperation in parliament and in the urban middleclass. 
Patel now sympathised with European objections to the idea of introducing 
common-roU elections for local govemment, conceding that it would be possible 
only when aU communities agreed: "We must find a solution whereby none of the 
communities may have reason to feel that any of them is being dominated by 
another." When a young European leader called for abolition of the new Fijian 
Adnainistration, alleging it enabled chiefs to oppress the common people, Vishnu 
Deo declared he would not support such a chaUenge to die chiefs but would help 
them to advance Fijian welfare.'* 
The leading Fijians in multiracial circles were high chiefs linked by kin or affinal 
ties and holding traditional authority in southeast Viti Levu and the eastem islands. 
As members of the colonial parliament chosen by the Council of Chiefs they 
headed the Fijian Administration. In addition some held posts as district officers 
and district commissioners earning the respect and ftiendship of people of all races 
for their leadership in local govemment. In these roles they didn't represent the 
Fijians only but acted as intermediaries in relations between the different groups; 
for example, assisting Indians in disputes with Fijian landlords. Their official 
careers engendered a multiracial outiook that well prepared them for their role as 
centre men in the AlUance Party. Other Fijians prominent in the clubs were lesser-
ranking men including commoners educated overseas and employed in the civil 
service; a couple had formed friendships with Indians on the committee of the 
Public Servants' Association. 
The Fijians' access to official patronage was guaranteed by the govemment's 
concept of its protectionist role and by the privileged position of the Fijian Affairs 
Board in the political system. Economic power and ethnic affinity with colonial 
officials as well as fear of Indian domination gave the Europeans an advantage in 
relations with the govemment. But Indians who sought official favours had 
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typically to disavow radicaUsm by an accommodative style in race relations. The 
very persistence of race confUct that both sides wished to contain helped stimulate 
this cooperation by providing a focus for affirmations of goodwill and 
understanding. Indians continued to stress the need for racial unity in caUing for 
constitutional change and land reform but moderated the demands to make them 
acceptable to multiracial groups. 
Changes in the Indian Association reflected this process. Originating as an 
organ of racial protest, it came to play an important role in conciUation. Militants 
formed it as a raUying point in the campaign for poUtical and social equaUty with 
Europeans. It declined following the dissolution of the radical movement and the 
divergence of Patel and Deo to different poUtical arenas. A new generation revived 
it in Suva after World War 11 with membership restricted mainly to well-to-do 
businessmen and professionals. As well as providing a base for political careers it 
aimed to promote relations with Fijians and Europeans earning wide respect by 
building schools that were well-managed and open to all. Social functions and 
deputations to the govemor on public matters also elevated the respectabiUty of the 
organisation in the wider community. The social gatherings welcomed 
representatives from the govemment of India and were attended by dignitaries of 
all races; subjects of the deputations included constitutional advancement, 
franchise for women, educational progress, immigration, Uquor laws, town rates, 
and land problems. Demands presented against a background of friendly 
intertacial mfxing and rituaUsed in petitions made Indian poUtical assertiveness 
acceptable to non-Indians. It had been domesticated and compartmentalised. 
Indeed, protests institutionalised through the Indian Association supported the 
govemment's ideology: the races were divided and national unity must be secured 
through institutions that acknowledged the division. ConciUation was built on the 
retention of symbols of racial difference and the reciprocal acknowledgement of 
rights and interests. 
The Indian Association had its counterpart in the Fijian Association formed by 
chiefs and commoners in senior official positions. The Fijian body stood in 
opposition to the Indian organisation on various issues yet members of both formed 
friendships in multiracial instimtions. Indeed high chiefs in the Fijian Association 
have been president of the predominantly Indian Union Club. The colonial 
govemment encouraged people to interact as representatives of racial groups and 
this was precisely the kind of interaction that the Indian Association and the Fijian 
Association promoted. 
To the extent that Suva Indians valued the favour of European and Fijian 
notables, Indians who became prominent in multiracial relations acquired the roles 
of middlemen helping to sustain communication between opposed groups. They 
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conveyed Indian demands and mediated die prestige of association widi die eUtes 
to Indians outside multiracial circles and to Indian organisations. But the ties widi 
Europeans and Fijians sometimes strained the Indian leaders' bonds with their 
public. The limited extent to which racial inequalities had been reduced meant diat 
leaders of the Indian Association acted before audiences with contradictory 
expectations: the multiracial groups and die majority of the Indian pubUc who had 
little opportunity to gain prestige and influence by joining them. The latter 
audience expected racial demands to be affirmed whereas in the former were 
Fijians and Europeans who offered recognition in return for moderation. 
Nonetheless oppormnities for status advancement discouraged the emergence of 
radical leadership. Though most middleclass Indians were excluded from the 
society of the multiracial elite many who would not make the grade upheld the 
conservative ideals in the hope of being accepted. 
Perhaps if the hinterland in the southeast had developed as a major sugar cane 
area some Indians outside multiracial groups might have sought leadership of 
farmers' unions and, in elections, opposed the urban eUte on class issues. Sugar 
production in die region was outstripped by that in the west during the first decade 
of the century and ceased altogether in 1959. The absence of a coherent rural class 
basis for political soUdarity among Indians limited the scope for radical leadership. 
Leaders of the farmers' unions in the southeast were more interested in urban 
affairs and people in this region were never important in the sugar disputes that 
became the main arena of leadership rivalry in the west. Furthermore there were 
no large, sharply defined groups or categories among the middle class or wage 
workers in the towns. The middle class was fragmented by occupation and 
gradations of social prestige and wealth. Industrial confUcts involved only a small 
number of Indians and fragmented control of industry obstructed a coherent 
expression of their opposition to employers. Partly for this reason indusOial 
issues were of only marginal concem to estabUshed poUtical leaders. Though diese 
men were sometimes associated with unions - e.g. the Municipal Workers' Union 
or the Public Servants' Association - they did not base their following on them. 
The leaders who took greatest interest in unions did not achieve much pronoinence 
until the arrival of the Federation Party fiom the west in 1965. All Indian leaders 
were moderates in the Suva labour disturbance of 1959 regardless of the strength 
of their association with unions. Bodies like the Football Association provided 
some organised contact with the public but were not a poUtical force comparable 
with the farmers' unions in the west. Parliamentary elections tended to promote 
rivalries within the Indian Asociation, a body that in any case lacked a popular 
base. Indian politicians in the southeast relied mainly on personal followings and 
networks rather than on the support of broadly-based organisations. 
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Indian Radicalism in the West 
Interracial relations developed in the urban middle class with the encouragement 
of the state. Colonial institutions provided the main settings in which the ties were 
cultivated and in tum the multiracial groups upheld the official ideology. This 
stressed the racial division and concealed the nature of the elites who had 
coalesced, in particular their relation to the economy and authority stracture: the 
position of Europeans as dominant capitalists and the power of Fijian chiefs in the 
state. While social stratification provided the govemment with a basis on which to 
recrait people to staff authorities and to promote the official view of the social 
order it was also the source of an alternative definition of society emphasising class 
antagonism and the oppression of the people. 
In westem Viti Levu, away from the seat of govemment, economic and social 
conditions among both Indians and Fijians favoured the development of leadership 
opposed to the ruling groups. The majority in the region are Indians, mostly 
farmers who in the colonial era supplied cane to the CSR Company. Leaders of the 
farmers' unions gained popular support by confronting the company every few 
years over the terms of the contract. The straggles brought them into opposition to 
the govemment and the multiracial political elite in Suva. 
The farmers lived in scattered settlements, the households having their own 
plots and contracts but cooperating in work gangs and in committees concemed 
with schools and religious matters. The farmers were part entrepreneurs seeking 
advancement through control of resources: they possessed leases in theu- own right 
and could in principle choose what to do with them. Yet their lives were 
dominated by a monopoly with which they were obliged to contract. The company 
closely supervised them at several levels: there were the managers of the local 
farming sectors, company field officers and technical specialists, and the central 
management that decided the cane quotas of individuals. Sugar production 
dominated the total field of economic and social organisation such that the relations 
of the industry overshadowed other social influences on political leadership. 
Contestants in elections for parliament were typically leaders of the farmers' 
unions and their conduct in disputes with the company was often die central issue. 
It was possible to sustain confrontations with bosses more effectively in die 
west dian in the urban southeast. In the towns striking workers were encouraged to 
crowd in public places to be harangued by leaders or to picket so that official 
intervention was often inevitable. In the country harvesting boycotts depended 
upon the actions of individuals on their private farms over long periods of time. 
Threats could be made to burn a farmer's cane to persuade him to join a strike and 
the striking farmers were assured of credit with shopkeepers who had an interest in 
helping their customers get higher prices for their cane. In Suva the fear of 
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dismissal by official or private employers was sometimes a compelling deterrent 
against supporting a striking union because labourers were more dependent than 
cane farmers on a regular cash income. 
The farmers' unions were initially based on cultural interests. The principal 
cultural division, between Indians whose forbears came from northern India and 
those who came from the south, sometimes fostered conflict within the settiements. 
But such loyalties also created bonds between people of different localities 
facilitating the formation of regional associations by providing a cultural raUying 
point additional to class interest.^ Northemers formed the first union, the Kisan 
Sangh. Its founder was Ajodhya Prasad, a Punjabi free setfler. After teaching at 
Arya Samaj schools he took up farming and began to unite his fellows to challenge 
the company, attracting a strong foUowing and the support of landlords and busi-
nessmen in the Arya Samaj. The once radical lawyer-politician A.D. Patel refused 
to assist. But when in 1941 the company recognised the union he and a reUgious 
leader Swami Rudranand formed the Maha Sangh among the Southemers. 
Each union benefitted from factionalism in the other. Some Southemers joined 
the Kisan Sangh because of disputes in the Sangam, dieir reUgious and educational 
organisation. The dissension arose from their opposition to policies of the 
managers Patel and Rudranand, the Tamil monk Southemers had brought from 
India to assist the Sangam. Some Telugus left complaiiting the Tamil language 
was favoiu-ed in the estabUshment of schools. Then some Tamils opposed Patel's 
and Rudranand's militancy in a farmers' strike from fear that the govemment and 
the company would cut aid to the schools. There was further friction when the 
managers rejected Tamil plans to use Sangam funds to launch a cooperative store 
to free die farmers from dependence on the merchants. 
The Swami's religious influence and the popularity of he and Patel as 
advocates for die farmers in industrial disputes prevented their challengers from 
gaining wide support. Patel retained a strong Southern following and drew 
additional support from Nordierners dissatisfied with Prasad's leadership. But 
dissident Southemers continued to influence union and poUtical organisation. One 
led a section of the Maha Sangh into alliance with Indian and Fijian moderates in 
the 1960 strike and he and other Southemers were later important in the leadership 
of the multiracial Alliance Party in westem Viti Levu. 
The bond between farmer and merchant was a factor in the union conflicts and 
in related political rivalries. The storekeepers were mostiy Gujaratis more able 
than Northemer traders to extend credit. They favoured the Maha Sangh because 
their poUtical champion Patel formed it and they developed a special bond with 
Southemers who were often less prosperous than Northern farmers and so more 
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dependent on credit. Leaders of the Kisan Sangh continuaUy alleged that the 
merchants pressm-ed indebted farmers to support the Maha Sangh and vote for its 
patrons in parliamentary elections. 
Rival union leaders favoured different approaches to industrial disputes. UsuaUy 
Patel led die radicals and Prasad die moderates. In 1943 Prasad sought an early 
settlement with the company whereas Patel and Rudranand held out and were 
placed under house arrest. In 1960 the governor sent the army to protect cane 
farmers who wished to harvest their crop after Patel urged them to ignore an 
agreement signed by Prasad. The miUtancy of Patel and his foUowers on this 
occasion was the foundation of the Federation Party which was to hold the 
allegiance of most Indians throughout Fiji from 1966 to 1987. 
The development of Indian society and poUtics in westem Viti Levu influenced 
national politics in two ways. Most importantly it created a base for a lasting 
militant opposition to Em-opean dominance that was to inspire some Fijians as well 
as most Indians. Secondly it gave rise to a condition of factional conflict among 
Indians that eventually provided a soiffce of poUtical strength in the west for the 
conservative Suva-based alliance of Fijian chiefs and Europeans (See Appendix 
Table 6). 
Regional Divisions among Fijians 
Western Viti Levu was a seed-bed for radicalism among Fijians as well. The 
sources of discontent and the manner of its expression were mainly quite different 
but there was some overlap in industrial confUcts. In any case the Indians' stubborn 
opposition to European power was an encouragement to Fijian militants in the 
region and some political cooperation developed. 
A major source of the radical disposition among westem Fijians has long been 
their resentment against the power of chiefs of southeast Viti Levu and the eastem 
islands. This political inequaUty has roots in differences in traditional society and 
was reinforced by the establishment of British rale through alUance with chiefs of 
these areas. 
Much has been written about how colonial rale brought rigidities into Fijian 
social, economic, and political organisation.' The attempt to codify laws of land 
tenure and to register ownership imposed a strong patrilineal emphasis in contrast 
to what most probably had been, in pre-colonial times, a flexible reckoning of use 
rights according to cognatic kinship, co-residence, and every-day cooperation. The 
British-sponsored Native Administration secured chiefly authority by removing 
the threat of violent overthrow by popular rivals and aUowed the chiefs a more 
pervasive control over larger populations than they had enjoyed in pre-colonial 
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times. These distortions were introduced diroughout Fiji. But the colonial system 
of indirect rule was more consistent with traditional authority in the east and it 
offered more opportunity for eastemers to build careers. 
Large chiefdoms had evolved in die east, each centralised in a cluster of viUages 
and spanning out to include distant smaller chiefly realms bound by coercive direat 
or political dependence to deliver tribute to the paramount; other more powerful 
chiefdoms were tied to him by military aUiance. Power was extended by war and 
consolidated by marriages between chiefly families. Men of high rank at the centre 
secured wives from daughters and sisters of lesser chiefs in other parts of the 
domain. In this way their off spring and descendants acquired vasM rights to wealth 
and political support from the wife-giving group. Political integration was also 
strengthened by the complementary roles of ranked local groups in service of die 
paramount. There were groups that supplied orators, heralds, and executives, 
others specialised as warriors or priests, and there was a diversity of experts in 
production: canoe-builders, carpenters, gardeners, fishermen. In their 
complementarity they represented a politically constructed ceremonial and 
functional social order, not one constituted by segmentary relations of common 
descent. There were several levels of political organisation on which this principle 
of ranked and complementary groups operated. Several lineages (mataqali) 
combined to form yavusa. Within a yavusa component mataqali are ranked in 
prestige and authority and differentiated by function: one providing the yavusa 
chiefs, another the chief's spokesmen, another the priests, and so on. The several 
yavusa of a particular locality were usually unified as a vanua which held territory 
in common. The yavusa comprising it were ranked and one was acknowledged as 
provider of the chiefs. The vanua were in tum joined, often by conquest, to form 
the widest political units, the matanitu. The senior lineage of the conquering 
vanua provided the chiefs of the matanitu, the so-called "high chiefs".^ 
In pre-colonial times these large chiefly domains of southeast Viti Levu and die 
eastern islands were unstable. Relations with Europeans became an essential 
element in the expansion of the domains. The settiers advanced their objectives by 
forming alliances with powerful chiefs who in tum found the foreigners useful in 
prosecuting their old rivalries. The nineteenth century witnessed the rise and fall of 
several chiefdoms as warfare increased in scale as a result of the acquisition of 
guns and European aides. But at the time of Cession three confederacies had been 
formed: Kubuna led by the chiefs of Bau, Burebasaga under the chiefs of Rewa, 
and Tovata under the chiefs of Cakaudrove and Lau. The leading chiefly families 
developed ties of marriage and kinship which contributed to solidarity among 
leaders in the colonial political institutions. 
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Westemers and die people of interior Viti Levu were relatively isolated from die 
influence of warfare and poUtical expansion that affected eastemers in die second 
half of the nineteentii century.'^ They had less contact with whites and, in some 
areas, were slow to absorb European culture. The hUl tribes especiaUy lacked the 
pervasive missionary influence that in the east was advanced by rivakies between 
high chiefs. In westem and inland Viti Levu war was conducted on a small scale 
and seldom led to lasting conquest. Political units were much smaller and less 
viable than in the east. The chiefs were less powerful and more constrained by 
kinship and local ties with their people in contrast to the raler-subject relations that 
characterised the expansion of chiefly power well beyond kinship and locality in 
the east. 
Westem society was in general less rigidly hierarchical and commoners could 
sometimes achieve influence and prestige comparable to that of hereditary chiefs. 
In Colo West, most now part of the provinces of Nadroga/Navosa, the Land Claims 
Commission was struck by the absence of 'chiefly customs'. There was no 
presentation of first fraits, no respectful greeting, and no ceremonious installation 
of a chief: "The people seem to do nothing for their chiefs except when ordered 
and orders had to be given with discretion". In Ra province the Commission found 
"an extraordinarily large number of scattered tribal divisions living in a state of 
great confusion". The absence of clear pattems of authority and quarrelling over 
land rights made it impracticable to let the people make their own classification of 
land." Much later geographer Frazer found the Ra people "notoriously 
egaUtarian and paying little formal respect to their chiefs".'^ The general 
leadership pattem throughout the region was one of "Uttie" tui, as westem Fijians 
sometimes describe them: chiefs recognised by just a few villages or even only 
one, often including just a few hundred people in contrast to the many thousands 
who deferted, more submissively, to the principal eastem chiefs. Coastal Nadroga, 
an area of relatively strong Polynesian influence, had the most elaborate political 
stracture. Yet by eastem standards the paramount headed a small population and 
the poUtical hierarchies were fluid.'^ 
As Fijians were drawn into a single stracture of authority and given opportunities 
to build careers in colonial institutions antagonisms developed that to a significant 
degree mirrored the regional differences. Qrcumstances of European settiement 
and the Cession led to the dominance of eastemers in the management of Fijian 
affairs. The British relied on the most powerful chiefs who had well-estabUshed 
relations with whites. Colonial rale secured the preeminence of a few chiefly 
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families. The large territorial jurisdictions of diese traditional dynasties and die 
pre-Cession development of the east as the centre of white settiement and alUances 
made this region the most suitable base for colonial power. 
The general features of eastem social sttTicture exemplified by die chiefdom of 
Bau gave the British guidelines for estabUshing indirect rale. ''* The Bauan dialect 
was made the official language of the administration to the disadvantage 
particularly of people in westem and interior Viti Levu. In southeast Viti Levu and 
the eastem islands traditional pattems of authority gave precedent for the power of 
the Roko, the provincial govemors, and for the extent of their jurisdictions, though 
these were now more thorough and secure than in pre-colonial times. The new 
units of govemment tended to correspond with traditional chiefdoms. 
In the west traditional political groups were smaller than the new provinces and 
there was no traditional analogue to the Roko's authority. Appointments of locals 
to the Native Adminisfration often caused jealousies because of the very small 
jurisdictions of the chiefs. So the govemment came to favour outsiders, mainly 
from the southeast, to govem there. On one occasion a leading Fijian member of 
parliament criticised "the policy pursued in taking two of the highest chiefs in Fiji 
away from the people they command and having them pitchforked into the west in 
the midst of other tribes".'^ 
Customary political ties between provinces in southeast Viti Levu and the 
eastem islands were generally more developed than those between these provinces 
and westem Viti Levu. Most expatriate Roko Tui both in the southeast and the west 
were Bauan chiefs descended from the men principally responsible for the 
Cession. The wider ties of these chiefs in the southeast and east made them more 
readily accepted as administrators in these areas. While most communities in 
westem Viti Levu and adjacent islands acknowledged allegiance to one or odier of 
die paramounts of southeast Viti Levu (the Vunivalu of Bau or die Tui Dreketi of 
Rewa) there has long been resentment that in this allegiance they as westemers arc 
not respected, that the people of southeast Viti Levu and the eastem islands look 
down on them. These feelings were most recently expressed in the post-coup 
attempts by some westem chiefs to form a fourth confederacy paralleUng the tiiree 
based in the east. The regional consciousness can be seen as one of the action 
potentials in what I earlier suggested ought be thought of as die "field" of society 
and politics in Fiji. As an action disposition it has variously sfrengthened and 
waned at different historical moments. 
The so-ongest expression of westem disaffection in the colonial period was die 
enthusiasm for the millenarian leader Apolosi Nawai.'^ Apolosi was a commoner 
from Nadi who joined several Europeans in Suva to launch the Viti Company to 
market village produce. He canvassed subscriptions from Fijians but when the 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Regional Differences in Society and Politics 65 
whites rejected his demand for control he turned the campaign against them, 
inciting his followers to ignore officials of the Native Administration and inspiring 
them to look forward to a "new era" when white supremacy would end. He 
appointed agents in the viUages and gathered an entourage of uniformed attendants 
to dissuade people from selling their crops to European middlemen. He estabUshed 
a base in southeast Viti Levu and extended his influence into the eastem islands 
where white planters soon complained that their labourers were deserting to 
Apolosi's company. The Roko Tui urged the government to suppress the 
movement because it was hindering village administration: "It is as though there 
are two govemments" complained one eastem chief." As Apolosi's propaganda 
developed an anti-white theme Europeans called for action and in 1917 he was 
exiled to Rotuma. 
He returned several years later to a smaller foUowing mainly in the west and 
interior of Viti Levu. In defiance of the law large crowds gathered to hear him and 
the govemment again exiled him after reports of uiu-est and talk of an imminent 
uprising against Europeans. His foUowers remained enthusiastic and his lieutenants 
put them on estates where a European missionary and the CSR Company were 
encouraging Fijians to become independent farmers. They farmed cane to raise 
funds for Apolosi to use for the "New Era" when the burdens of taxation, 
enforced communal labour, and rule by chiefs and Europeans would end. Through 
his emissaries Apolosi broadcast plans to set people up as tailors, taxi drivers, and 
shopkeepers. When the Council of Chiefs again asked the govemment to control 
him he maintained that they opposed him because they didn't want the people to 
get rich: they wanted to trample them down and had leased land to Indians against 
the owners' wishes.'^ Before his exile he had come to present himself as the trae 
supreme chief, claiming the most direct descent from the original Fijian chiefs and 
insisting on elaborate symboUc trappings and a retinue at the grand meetings of the 
Viti Kabani. 
Apolosi's strongest following remained in the west and govemment officials 
interpreted this in terms of regional differences in chiefship and economic 
development: in the west where chiefly power was limited more people were 
developing "along individualistic lines".'^ Officials in the west urged that the 
danger from Apolosi had increased because many of his devotees were now wage 
workers. The govemor confined Apolosi in Suva after his second exile and, after 
consultation with the Council of Chiefs, deported him to New Zealand lest in a 
Japanese invasion he endanger security. Fijians continued to venerate him long 
after his deadi in 1946 and some stiU believe he wUl retum to lead diem. (After die 
military coup in 1987 a letter circulated purporting to be his. It urged the govemor-
general to restore the deposed prime minister, a westem Fijian). 
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Enthusiasm for Apolosi's prophecies had been strengthened in the 1930s by a 
loosening of the constraints of bureaucratic and traditional authority. Colonial 
officials encouraged people to seek exemptions from the Native Regulations and 
helped them to develop commercial farms outside the villages, especially in 
westem Viti Levu. In die east dependence on die indigenous crop copra meant less 
disturbance to traditional society. 
The greater disjunction in the west between Native Administration and 
traditional political organisation and the exercise of official authority by men who 
were not the local chiefs doubtiess contributed to dissent. The greater flexibiUty of 
leadership in the west must also have favoured Apolosi's influence there. There 
was less possibility for charismatic leadership in the east where social stracture 
based on hereditary rank was more rigid and extensive in territorial scale. It is trae 
that in southeast Viti Levu and the eastem islands the traditional poUtical stracture 
contained as great a potential for orgamsed resistance to colonial rale as integration 
with it. But the ensconcement of the principal chiefs in official posts limited die 
leadership resources of protest in these areas. 
The Eastern Administrative and Political Elite 
The power of the eastem chiefs was secured by the admiiustrative changes of 1944. 
High chiefs from a few related families in the provinces of Tailevu, Rewa, 
Cakaudrove, and Lau dominated the new Fijian Affairs Board. They formed a 
remarkably cohesive group though there were tensions among them arising from 
shifts in the balance of power. Before 1950 a Lauan chief had not sat in the 
parliament nor even been nominated for this honour by the Council of Chiefs (See 
Appendix Tables 9 and 10). Tailevu chiefs, mainly Bauans, dominated poUtical 
leadership and administration.^^ In die 1960's the Lauan paramount Ratu Mara 
and Ram Penaia Ganilau, an heir to the supreme tide of Cakaudrove, rose to power 
in the Alliance Party. In consequence there was an increasing representation of 
Lau and Cakaudrove in administration marking the beginning of the ascendancy of 
the confederacy of Tovata over that of Kubuna.^' But it is only since die miUtary 
coup of 1987 further strengthened the position of Tovata that provincial jealousies 
in the east have been vociferously expressed. 
The bureaucracy of the Fijian Administration provided a career ladder exclusive 
to Fijians. It became one of the main vocational institutions through which they 
could maintain life styles and participate in pubUc affairs on an equal footing widi 
Indians and Europeans. For many years the Roko Tui were among the best paid 
Fijians and enjoyed honour and influence given by ex officio appointments to town 
boards and other govemment authorities concemed with all races. 
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The Conservative Fijian Middle Class in Southeast Viti Levu 
The Fijian middle class of the late colonial period was drawn mainly from people 
in the provinces of southeast Viti Levu and the eastem islands. Commoners had 
been increasingly represented after the war. Ratu Sukuna, as Secretary for Fijian 
Affairs, advised on their selection for tertiary education overseas and for 
govemment jobs. The war commitment had required a larger officer corps than 
could be filled by chiefs so military leadership became one of die main avenues by 
which commoners could acquire prominence. The Rehabilitation Board helped ex-
servicemen begin administrative or professional careers and a European firm 
awarded scholarships to universities in New Zealand. The growth of govemment 
departments supported the expansion of the middle class and by the 1960s a few 
commoners enjoyed an economic position and social prestige approaching that of 
chiefs in official posts. 
The highest ranking chiefs were a dominant status group diat guided the social 
and political values of the upwardly mobile commoners. The latter were 
advantaged by endorsing the conservative ideology, especially while the Council of 
Chiefs controlled the selection of political leaders. The first commoner in 
parliament declared that he spoke for his social class when he defended the Fijian 
Administration and the leadership of chiefs against criticisms by Europeans: "We 
are coming in, we are holding posts generally held by important chiefs...We want 
to go witii our chiefs, we want to respect them, and the door is open now..."^^ This 
man had been drawn into the poUtical establishment after becoming prominent in 
an organisation of young educated Fijians which govemment viewed as a potential 
radical movement." It was a commoner civil servant and member of the 
parUament who urged Fijians to stop rioting together with Indians and stand behind 
their chiefs during the strike in Suva in 1959.^ An Indian who later criticised the 
Fijian Administration as a divisive and oppressive institution was rebuked in 
parUament by a commoner civil servant for trying to drive a wedge between the 
people and their chiefs.^^ 
The political accommodation between middle class commoners and high chiefs 
was demonsttated by the Fijian and Rotuman Ratepayers' Association formed in 
Suva in 1958. Its leading members were educated commoners with govemment 
jobs and property. Trade unionists joined them to voice urban dissatisfaction with 
the Fijian Administration and political representation. The protests, led by the 
Ratepayers' Association, secured places in the Council of Chiefs for town 
delegates and elected seats for Fijians on the Suva Municipal Council. But the 
urban leaders supported the Fijian Affairs Board as their voice when members of 
die Legislative CouncU argued with Indians about the poUtical future of the colony. 
The cooperation between national and urban leaders was strengthened by their 
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similar social positions. Members of the chiefly estabUshment and die Association 
leaders were typically civil servants who belonged to the same multiracial clubs 
and some in both groups had received govemment-sponsored education overseas. 
The Association did not oppose die high chiefs in parUamentary elections and die 
principals soon joined them in a national political organisation, the Fijian 
Association (See Chapter 5). 
In southeast Viti Levu and the eastern islands opposition to the estabUshed 
leadership was limited by opportunities to join the middle class or by assisted 
economic development. But where such opportunities were marginal, as in 
westem Viti Levu, dissension was more vocal and less constrained by customary 
ties with the poUtical elite. There was both greater objective foundation in die west 
for dissent and less basis in traditional relationships for the legitimacy of official 
authority. Dissent in the southeast and eastem islands was inhibited more widely by 
the tendency for poUtical leadership and official authority to coincide with high 
traditional rank. Resentments against the onerous Fijian Regulations were 
mitigated by the expression of bureaucratic authority in the idiom of customary 
social hierarchy. Senior officials could more effectively invoke principles of 
traditional authority in executing their official roles in the east than in the west. 
The schools at which Fijians could qualify for prestigious jobs were mainly in 
the southeast. The govemment and the Christian missions regarded the west as an 
Indian area and post-primary mission schools there were accordingly for Indians as 
was the only government secondary school. The Queen Victoria School in 
Tailevu, once known as "the school of the chiefs", was the main preparatory 
college for Fijian civil servants. Its pupils were selected from provincial schools 
but the Provincial School Westem was closed during the war and not reopened 
The Development Fund helped eastemers finance their childrens' education but 
westemers usually lacked such aid. At school they had to compete with Indians 
whose families more consistently emphasised individual achievement in education 
and career. In the southeast racial schools established to prepare Fijians for the 
civU service provided shelter from diis competition. The few westemers who made 
it to these schools were often subjected to eastern chauvinism. The regional 
inequalities in educational opportunities are indicated by allocations of Fijian 
Affairs Board scholarships and other awards and reflected in the composition of the 
civil service (See Appendix Table 5). 
Independent farming was one of the principal occupations in which westemers 
could achieve prosperity and prestige. But they faced many obstacles. The 
regulations stipulated income and other qualifications for exemption from 
communal duties. The would-be independent farmer was generally on his own 
lacking official sympathy and aid.^' A further difficulty was that Indian pressures 
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on land were greater than in the southeast where in any case land shortages were 
alleviated by more urban jobs. 
Government-sponsored cooperative societies were most successful in the 
eastern copra areas where the Development Fund Board regulated sales. In 
westem Viti Levu organisation of coops was more difficult. The principal crops 
there were sugar cane, tobacco, and vegetables, and because the Board did not 
supervise their sale the Fijian Administration was less inclined to encourage 
cooperatives. The Board credits its cess on copra to accounts of individuals, 
cooperative producers, or villages. Most of the cess has been contributed by 
provinces in the eastern islands and in turn the fund has financed housing, 
education, and other improvements in tiiese areas.^^ The fund has not generaUy 
been available to Fijians in southeast Viti Levu. But here the proximity of schools 
and the availability of industrial and white collar employment in Suva have 
lessened the need for such aid. In the west a greater reliance upon agriculture and 
the heavier costs of sending children to distant schools were not matched by credit 
faciUties. 
Fijian Radicalism in the West 
Western radicals demanded participation in government and denounced the 
estabUshed leaders for neglecting the region. They opposed European-controUed 
companies in industrial disputes and alleged that the men who led the Fijian 
Association had cooperated with Europeans to break labourers' and farmers' 
strikes. After the disturbance in Suva in 1959 trade unionists there, influenced by 
leading chiefs, encouraged separation from Indians. The unity of a coloured 
working class against white employers was fractured when several unions were 
formed among Fijian, Part-European, and Pacific Island workers as breakaways 
from multiracial bodies often headed by Indians.^^ 
Unionists in westem Viti Levu denounced the splits. The most prominent was 
Apisai Tora, the main Fijian after Apolosi Nawai to oppose the power of chiefs and 
Europeans. Brought up in Nadi where Apolosi had many followers and radical 
Indian leadership was based, he was one of those few westemers admitted to the 
elite Queen Victoria School. He began his union career after brief service in 
government and army. As a ringleader in the Suva strike and founder of the 
Airport Workers' Union he gained a reputation as the colony's most militant 
labour leader. With several Fijian cane farmers he organised the first political 
party, the Western Democratic Party, and contested a seat in the 1963 elections. 
His platform was that the eastem chiefly establishment ignored the west: 
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You have been raled by leaders from other areas who tt-eated you 
widi calculated contempt...Your division is die most important one 
because from it comes the economic lifeblood of the colony...You 
deserve to be treated as first-class citizens...You must confess that 
deep inside you there was a longing to see the day when your 
kinsmen in western Fiji, sons of the soil, speaking your own 
language, valuing the same values as you, would rise to become 
leaders in their own domain and perhaps of die whole Group...The 
party offers your own kinsman who like you comes from the 
humble surroundings of a village, who knows what it is to be 
ignored by officials, to be discouraged by Rokos and chiefs and 
straight-jacketed by the system under which you and I live.^" 
Though Tora was the most popular of the candidates who challenged the 
estabUshment, he poUed only 13 per cent against an eastem chief's 66 per cent. He 
later merged his group with the Fijian National Party led by Isikeli Nadalo, a 
fellow westemer who had formed an association for Fijian cane growers. 
Opposition to the establishment was not confined to elections. When Tora 
organised a cooperative society in his village to promote economic development he 
tried to introduce rules defying the regulations for village life set by the Fijian 
Affairs Board. A kinsman in the Westem Democratic Party made a more dramatic 
stand against official authority. He formed several villages into an organisation and 
announced that its members would dissociate themselves from the Fijian 
Administration. It was to be a "communist state" with laws regulating work and 
rejecting customs. Suva-based bodies of the middleclass - the Fijian Association, 
Fijian Teachers' Association, and the Ratepayers' Association - responded by 
saying the movement would not have responsible following.^ Westem Viti Levu 
later became the area of strongest support for a "Chamber of Commerce", a 
movement with millenarian undertones which aimed to get Fijians into business 
and criticised the chiefly establishment for failing to do so.^^ 
Potentials for Unity between Fijians and Indians in the West 
There was less basis for solidarity among Fijians in the west than in the east as 
traditional loyalties were more fragmented and the absence of important 
govemment boards and councils limited the organised expression of opposition to 
Indians. Indeed there were more opportunities in the west for friendly interaction 
between Fijian villagers and their Indian neighbours. Many Fijians and Indians 
were similarly placed in relation to the main power holders: the colonial officials 
and the CSR Company. The company dominated the lives of most Indians and 
there were comparatively few opportunities for Fijian economic and social 
advancement. 
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The potential for a radical interracial alliance was demonstrated in the cane 
farmers' sttike of 1960. It underlined the division between westem miUtants and 
Suva conservatives and laid the foundations of the major political parties by 
encouraging most Indians to support the radicals and compelUng the moderates to 
seek aUiance with Fijians and Europeans (See Chapter 5). 
The episode began when the Indian farmers' unions federated to negotiate a 
new cono-act with the company. Fijian farmers later joined them At harvest the 
farmers declared they woidd not cut their cane until their terms were met. Their 
unity was broken when the eastem chief Ram Mara, a member of the govemor's 
Executive Council, visited the west and urged Fijians to compromise. The Ba 
Fijian Cane Growers' Association was formed with the assistance of European 
lawyer John Falvey, Mara's adviser on the Fijian Affairs Board. Meanwhile 
Andrew Deoki, Indian politician for the southeast and colleague of Mara and 
Falvey in the Executive Council, travelled the countryside urging Indians to 
harvest and promising to raise their grievances in parliament. 
The Ba union led Fijians to an early settlement with the company and the 
Indians' Kisan Sangh soon joined the agreement. The Council of Chiefs declared 
that the Fijians would help preserve order and protect people who wanted to 
harvest. After the Executive Council sent Fijian troops for this purpose some 
Indian farmers complained that the soldiers were misbehaving and govemment 
warned that race relations were deteriorating.^^ But Patel's threat that the farmers 
would bum their cane and plant food crops was not carried out and the radicals 
eventuaUy compromised with the company. 
While the radicals became the most popular leaders among the Indians their 
Fijian sympathisers gained only small followings. One factor that limited the 
popularity of Fijian miUtants in the west was the persistence of customary loyalties 
in the migration of people from southeastem Viti Levu and the eastem islands. 
The eastem high chiefs were able to strengthen their influence in the west through 
this movement. Easterners dominated the work force at Nadi airport and at the 
Vatukoula gold mine and many stevedores were recraited through the Fijian 
Administration from provinces in the southeast. 
The airport and gold mine were the locations of powerful trade unions and key 
branches of the Fijian Association, the poUtical body formed by the eastem chiefly 
estabUshment. Mineworkers set up one of the first branches of the Association and 
the secretary of their union, an eastem commoner, was elected to parliament on an 
Association ticket in 1966. He gained the Association's highest poU, contesting in 
a constituency with an especially large percentage of "outsiders". Political leaders 
acknowledge that ties between immigrants and the high chiefs affect election 
outcomes in the west and that eastemers influence the poUtical views of locals who 
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sometimes look up to them as more sophisticated and knowledgeable. (About 21 
per cent of Fijians enumerated in westem provinces in the 1986 census stated tiieir 
natal provinces as in southeastem Viti Levu or in the eastem islands). 
Perhaps a more important factor inhibiting unity with Indians on industrial 
issues was that organisation for class action sometimes aroused fears of Indian 
domination, as in competition for union leadership. Conservative leaders played 
on Fijian ambivalence about joining Indians for common economic objectives and 
exploited racial fears as a strike-breaking strategy. 
Conclusion 
The racial division overlays odier aspects of social stracture that have potential to 
influence political organisation. Divisions within the main ethnic populations and 
ties between them have to an extent been associated with regional differences. The 
different pattems of interracial cooperation that came to distinguish politics in die 
regions were related to different domains of power: the colonial govemment and 
pressures to win its favour, and the CSR Co and opportunities and pressures to 
build popularity by challenging it. In the southeast Fijians and Indians sought 
prominence through official appointments and honours. In the west they sought 
fame by leading industrial strikes. 
In southeast Viti Levu were concentrated the institutions of colonial authority; 
the Legislative and Executive Councils and the official boards and committees in 
which Fijians, Indians, and Europeans cooperated in managing agricultural, 
industrial, and other affairs. Though govemment bodies were the major context in 
which a multi-ethnic status group developed their social relations overlapped with 
ties in clubs and voluntary associations. The multi-ethnic stramm of prestige and 
influence comprised a small number of people in the urban middleclass: Fijian civil 
servants and European and Indian businessmen, civil servants, and professionals. 
In the multi-ethnic groups were affirmed the conservative values supporting die 
estabUshed political and economic orders. 
Though Fijians cooperated with Indians in trade unions most often in the 
southeast it was in the west that industrial conflicts had the greatest influence on 
political leadership. Whereas workers in the southeast were split among many 
enterprises, in the west farmers under contract to a monopoly company 
predominated in the work force. Westem Indians built political followings by 
defending these farmers in industrial disputes. They acquired public images as 
opponents of European control and some formed ties with Fijian unionists. The 
west became the main centre of opposition to leaders of government and big 
business. 
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If a populist outlook was to develop it would be likely to find its inspiration 
among westem leaders. Fijian interest in radical leaders derived partly from 
antagonism to the company, or to European bosses generaUy. A wider basis for a 
radical disposition among westem Fijians was their resentment against the poUtical 
and economic ascendancy of eastemers, and the relative weakness of traditional 
bonds with the eastem chiefs. The next chapter on national politics in the last few 
years of colonial rale considers the regional factor further in an account of the 
formation and competition of political parties. 
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5 Party Politics and 
the End of Colonial 
Rule 
Political Competition and Society in Fiji 
The development of party politics in the last decade of colonial rale reflected 
the different dimensions of society and economy outiined in the preceding 
chapters. It highlighted not simply the racial division with its issues of 
conflict over land and security of economic and political position, but 
structures, interests, and values cutting across this conflict, and the manner in 
which the racial conflict itself has been managed. In short, party formation and 
competition in elections Uluminated not just the "ethnic pluralism" of Fiji but the 
reality of inter-ethnic accommodation, indeed the extent to which a degree of 
national social and political integration had evolved. 
The Fiji case also illustrates the general analytic point that a social order is 
affirmed and sustained against tendencies toward other forms and that it is this 
tension that makes the partial resolution of contradiction or ambiguity through 
political rhetoric and ritual an important part of social process. As I suggested in 
Chapter 1 it is illuminating to think of society and politics in Fiji in terms of 
processes occurring in a field of competing action potentials, the same actors often 
being socially constituted by dispositions that are at least in partial contradiction 
with one another. Though racial loyalties have usually prevailed in social and 
poUtical organisation in Fiji, they have sometimes been most strongly affirmed 
when possibilities arose that people might act according to other interests. 
Conservative Fijian leaders have encouraged the racial opposition when some of 
their followers have been influenced by other leaders appealing to material interests 
shared with many non-Fijians. This occurred in the Suva strike and riot of 1959, 
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in the cane farmers' strike the following year, in 1968 in response to Indian 
attempts to attract a Fijian foUowing, and in 1987 after die victory of the Labour -
NFP Coalition. 
It would be myopic to argue that die persistence of the racial division in poUtics 
was mainly a consequence of the strategies of leaders. Yet elite manipulation 
certainly has been an important factor and it reflects the reality of contradictions in 
popular consciousness. Political adversaries have worked on these contradictions 
to amplify certain identities and to play down countervailing interests and 
allegiances. Political rivalry is encouraged by the ambiguity of the actors' interests 
and dispositions, by ambivalent social identifications and loyalties. Thus opponents 
have competed for support by affirming alternative definitions of social reaUty. 
Uncertainties about political change in the last years of colonial rale amplified 
the racial opposition. Constitutional change bringing independence temporarily 
alleviated the tension by safeguarding a balance of poUtical representation. Though 
racial tension was soon amplified again the process of economic development 
continued to strengthen the class dimension of the society, as evidenced in the 
formation of the Labour Party in 1985. The military coup was in part a reaction 
against the potential for class conflicts to shape political life. Thus the question of 
how the class interests and conflicts that cut across the racial division might 
achieve effective expression in political life remains important. 
The Political Parties' 
The formation of political parties was prompted by constitutional changes that 
made it possible for groups to compete to control the govemment and required diat 
they have multiracial support to win. The rival organisations placed different 
ideological constractions on society. Each expounded a foundation for poUtical 
cooperation between racial groups and diverted attention from the social cleavages 
which the other stressed. These ideological appeals reflected die different aspects 
of social stracture I have described. 
The AlUance Party conceived Fiji as a society based on the accommodation of 
antagonistic racial interests by a balance of political power. The Federation Party 
depicted it in terms of an incipient straggle by the people against their poUtical and 
economic overlords. The former view of society was upheld principally by the 
eastern chiefs and the Europeans. The second was affirmed mainly by Indian 
leaders produced by cane farmer politics centred in the west. The extent to which 
both Fijians and Indians have been internally divided between these political 
positions partiy corresponds to regional differences and inequalities. 
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The Federation Party and die AlUance Party's backbone, die Fijian Association, 
developed in opposed institutional settings. The Federation Party grew from the 
straggle of the farmers' unions with European industrial bosses and the colonial 
government. The Fijian Association was created by heads of the Fijian 
Administration in league with European lawyer-politicians and colonial officials. 
The Federation Party enabled a new group of radical leaders to strengthen their 
power through elections. The Fijian Association secured die aristocracy after the 
introduction of a potentially threatening popular franchise. 
The Federation Party 
The Federation Party had its beginning in the farmers' strike of 1960. The conduct 
of the dispute became an issue in parUamentary elections, the measure of audacity 
in face of the company and the govemment. On this the leaders tried to appeal to 
Fijians as weU as Indians. But the more pressing matter was the racial one of land. 
As many Indian leases were reclaimed into the Fijian Reserves the radicals 
wamed farmers they were in danger of becoming landless. In the 1963 elections 
diey campaigned as the "Federation Triumvirate" and took over half the votes in 
the cane districts.^ In parliament they opposed moderates representing Indians in 
southeastem Viti Levu. The Federationists' popularity induced the governor to 
appoint their leader A.D.Patel as the new Indian member of the Executive Council, 
pushing out his Suva rival Andrew Deoki who had worked against him in the 
strike. 
The party was launched in the sugar districts with farmers' unions the 
framework for its local organisation. Most of the founding members of the central 
council lived in the west. They included lawyers, farmers, and merchants. Leaders 
of the farmers tied the party with the influential religious and cultural organisations 
TISI Sangam and the Ramakrishna Mission. Gujarati merchants who had long 
supported Patel as their political champion helped finance the party and were often 
able to control the loyalties of their indebted farmer customers. 
Party leaders extended their influence by promoting objectives that tended to 
oppose Indians to the rest of the population. But they directed their propaganda 
principally against the powers and privileges of the European minority and the 
communal election system that secured them. Their revival of the old demand for 
common-roll elections led them to eventually withdraw from discussions held 
among members of parliament to decide the agenda for the first constitutional 
conference in London. They saw themselves as acting on an intemational stage to 
persuade the United Nations to pressure the British Govemment to accede to the 
demand as the foundation of equality in an independent Fiji. 
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A branch of the party was estabUshed in soutiieast Viti Levu in 1965 on the eve 
of the conference. Patel had moved to Suva to take up his new post as 
Parliamentary Member for Social Services and meetings were held at his house in a 
wealthy predominantly European suburb. The Indian public were hesitant. Their 
elected representative Andrew Deoki had encouraged moderation in the sugar 
sttike and on the Executive CouncU he endorsed the decision to send in troops. His 
attitude to the westem radicals echoed that of the govemment, the Fijians, and die 
Europeans who viewed them as dangerously subversive, a threat to poUtical and 
economic stability. Many people were reluctant to join the party from fear of 
victimisation by their company or govemment employers. Yet within a year there 
was a following from a wide range of occupations and cultural groups. 
Organisers included merchants, landlords, wage workers, professionals, and white 
collar employees of Indian and European firms. Businessmen members differed 
widely in wealth but none of the largest Indian companies publicly supported die 
party. The biggest transport proprietors holding licences for coveted bus routes 
opposed it as did building firms relying on contracts with government or with 
European companies. 
The principals in Suva were initially Gujaratis including several merchants and 
a young lawyer. After preparing the ground they yielded place to others to avoid 
accusations that Gujaratis controlled the party. The post of president went to a 
Northerner who managed a small travel agency, was prominent in sporting 
organisations and represented one of the poorer subiu-bs on the municipal council. 
The main organiser was briUiant young Northemer lawyer Karam Ramrakha who 
achieved political prominence partiy through his father's connections. Ramrakha 
senior had built contacts with poor and UUterate Indians as a court clerk and had 
formed a ftiendship with A.D.Patel while serving in the west. 
The party had links with unions in the southeast. The president of the 
Municipal Workers' Union assisted it and two other supporters, a lawyer and a 
businessman, had been prominent in that union. One of the largest organisations 
with party connections was the Suva-based Fiji Teachers' Union. Federation 
leaders were elected president of this Indian body and other party stalwarts served 
on the committee. Most Indian members of the Public Servants' Association also 
favoured the party because it promised to encourage localisation. 
Party workers in the towns of southeast Viti Levu were typically Indians 
outside multiracial society of modest income and occupational status in the lower 
middle class. The support given by many of the small-time taxi proprietors 
illustrated this. A wealthy Indian company director who opposed the party 
confided that he admired its tactic of attracting support by offering prestige and 
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influence to people who had littie. He maintained that the Alliance Party 
jeopardised its campaign for Indian followers by making its overtures to the most 
prominent. 
The Federationists' emphasis on party discipline was a central feature of their 
popular appeal. Election candidates were required at mass ralUes to swear oatiis of 
loyalty to the party and obedience to its working committee. The party was 
righteously promoted as a stern and highly-principled authority controlling 
rewards and deterrents to induce loyalty and compliance, very much like its 
patemalistic adversary the colonial govemment! 
The Fijian Association 
The Fijian Association became the Federation Party's major opponent. It was 
originally formed in 1956 to counter a challenge to the chiefs by the European 
president of an Indian farmers' union. He had made offensive statements about 
the condition of the Fijians and threatened a strike if his demand that they be 
aUowed to elect their leaders was not met. His political rival, Morris Scott, legal 
adviser to both the Fijian Affairs Board and the CSR Co, caUed a meeting of Fijian 
leaders. Ratu Edward Cakobau, a high chief on the Fijian Affairs Board, was 
appointed chairman. The Association declared that it would resist any attempt to 
stampede the people into change and threatened to reclaim leases if the Indian 
union endangered the colony's prosperity. The plan was to use the Association to 
mobilise Fijians to cut the cane and control the Indians. Scott emphasised the need 
to cooperate with the Company and was confident that his old army ties would 
enable him to persuade the many Fijian ex-servicemen. He organised a veterans' 
march through Suva to the barracks and the chiefs notified the battaUon fighting 
tertorists in Malaya. The Fijian officers, under Ratu Penaia GanUau, promised to 
send troops home if the strike eventuated. The vernacular press called for 
soUdarity against the "Indian Association": 
The time for unity in the yavusa or koro (clan and viUage) is past. 
Now is the time for racial unity...We must make our feelings known 
as the original owners of these islands...These insults will 
consolidate our unity as a race.^  
As die strike was not called littie effort was made to build up the new organisation. 
It remained confined to Suva assisting people with employment problems, 
presenting views on Fiji's poUtical future, and sponsoring candidates for the town 
council. The principals were civil servants and members of parUament. Several 
had served as district administrators in areas of both Fijian and Indian settiement 
and some were former army men. The most active committee men were 
commoners who continued to stress the role of the chiefs. The principal chiefs 
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were "the big four" who together held customary authority in most regions: Ratu 
Kamisese Mara, heir to die paramount chiefship of die Lau Islands and protege and 
favourite of Ratu Sukuna the foremost chief of the colonial era, Ratu George 
Cakobau, Vunivalu of Bau, die leading chief on Viti Levu, Ram Edward Cakobau a 
former nulitary leader and close relative of Ratu George, and Ram Penaia Ganilau, 
former military leader and an heir to the paramount title of the eastem islands 
province of Cakaudrove and the Tovata confederacy. By the early 1960s British 
colonial officials were grooming Ratu Mara, the brightest and most cosmopolitan 
of these chiefs, to become the first prime minister. Ratu George Cakobau was to be 
the first governor-general, succeeded by Ratu Penaia Ganilau who came into 
prominence through his sustained public opposition to the military coup in 1987. 
Extension of the vote to Fijians in 1963 severed the nexus between political 
leadership and the Great CouncU of Chiefs, giving radicals a means to challenge 
the estabUshment. New leaders had emerged as more people moved from a viUage 
society in daily subordination to chiefs and officials to wider class and status 
relations as farmers, labourers, or white-collar workers. Yet the social and 
constitutional changes did not weaken the chiefs' power. They preserved their 
position by developing the Fijian Association as a grass-roots organisation in a 
period when uncertainty about the political future deepened racial anxieties. Some 
union officials, for example, were drawn into the leadership of the Association. 
The mood was expressed by a high ranking candidate in the 1963 elections: 
The first essential is to inculcate in every Fijian mind the fact tiiat 
we are in danger because the Fijian reacts at his best when in 
danger...The Fijian people have lived with danger in the swamps of 
Malaya and the jungles of the Solomons. The danger confronting us 
today is worse...The Fijian people must proclaim within their hearts 
a national state of emergency...But we must not be anti-Indian for 
that would be unmanly and ungodly and would play against us in 
the long ran. We must accept that this race is here to stay and it is 
not their fault they are here...While there are aspects of the Indian 
people we should best leave alone they have two characteristics we 
must emulate: hard work and thrift. These must be our weapons in 
competing with them cleanly with all our might, not to be their 
masters but their economic equals...'* 
Fijians were urged to support the Association as their defence against a threat of 
Indian domination. The racial preoccupation muted resentments against the chiefs 
as a patemalistic eUte. People valued die Fijian Administtation itself as protector 
of the race and proposals by radical Indians for its abolition strengthened racial 
unity. As leaders of the Association controlled the Fijian Affairs Board the 
Association was in effect the Board's political arm. The president, Ratu Mara, 
assured Fijians die Board supported die poUtical body and diat the latter would in 
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tum help to counter proposals that the Administration be abolished.^ Indeed he 
took the view that the Association's role should really be to disseminate decisions 
made by the Council of Chiefs. 
As the Association was revitalised for party politics a confUct grew between the 
estabUshed poUtical leaders and a group of young men fresh from tertiary studies 
in England. The latter were administrative officers mainly of non-chiefly or 
intermediate rank. Their oudook was aggressively racial in contrast to that of their 
seniors whose advocacy of Fijian interests was tempered by years of association 
with leaders of other racial groups and colonial officials. The young men had 
befriended African students with nationalist ideals who were rejoicing at the 
overthrow of colonial rale. Ravuama Vunivalu, a fiercely nationalist leader of the 
Association visiting England, urged the Fijian students to strengthen the 
organisation when they retumed. He had already tried to do this by proposing a 
new name, the Fijian Peoples' United Party, in protest at the colonial office 
rejecting a demand for Fijian dominance of parUament and the civU service: "What 
is needed is a practical demonstration of the Fijian peoples' place in their own 
country"." From England the young men urged the chiefs to strive for a "Fiji for 
the Fijians" and their cry was taken up by the vemacular press: "Fiji's future is 
being discussed. If freedom is achieved it is only right that the country should be 
raled by its indigenous people".' 
At home the chiefs had been insisting that the initiative for change should come 
from Fijians and must not violate the spirit of the Deed of Cession that their 
interests are paramount. The young bloods eventually ousted the old committee but 
continued to support the four leading chiefs and their commoner allies in senior 
leadership. 
The Association's initial submission to the UK Govemment asked for a Fijian 
majority in parUament, a Fijian prime minister, and a "Christian state." Fear about 
the future of land ownership was a major factor behind these demands. Ratu Mara 
wamed delegates to the 1965 convention of the Association: 
We are the poorest in the economy. If the constitution is changed in 
a way that enables our lands to be taken from us it may result in the 
drifting of our future generations. Our race may become extinct, 
and totally forgotten from this world".^ 
Once it was known that land was not to be on die agenda for change die resolve to 
win a political majority was abandoned. In any case the leading chiefs were under 
pressure from colonial officials to accommodate the demands of other groups with 
a view to forming a multiracial political party. Ratu Mara was wamed that when 
the parUament became a fully-elected councU the govemor would have to prepare 
die Federation Party for power if there was no stt-onger group. Fijians must accept 
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the Indians as permanent residents, the officials insisted, but should take die lead 
in forming a party to rale. Ratu Mara and some of his colleagues recognised that 
the UK govemment would reject the demand for domination and insisted that die 
forthcoming conference on constitutional change would require intertacial 
compromise, that Fijians could secure power only tiirough an alliance, and that for 
this they must meet Indian demands for a political voice and more secure leases. 
Remarkably, the Fijian delegates to the London conference accepted a 
settlement that gave them only 14 of the 36 non-official seats in the new 
parliament, and those 14 had also to represent the Rotumans and other Pacific 
islanders. The chiefs could mute the chauvinist demands of their juniors and some 
of the senior commoners not only because of the shared perception of the 
Federation Party as the enemy and the need to combat it through an alliance with 
other groups, but also because of the promise of positions in a govemment based 
on this alliance. The ardent young ethnic nationalists were soon building 
multiracial teams for election campaigning. The abandonment of the goal of 
constitutional entrenchment of Fijian political domination was not to be strongly 
questioned untU after independence. 
The Chiefs as Mediators in Ethnic Relations 
Ratu Mara was the strongest advocate of multiraciaUsm. Ratu George Cakobau, 
with fewer interracial ties, was less responsive to Indian demands. Though older 
than Mara and ttaditionally a more important chief, his official career had been less 
successful. There was an element of rivalry between them as heads of different 
dynasties and provinces. Mara's ascendancy gave an advantage to his Lauan 
people in the recraitment of civil servants whereas the earlier prominence of the 
Cakobau family in colonial govemment had favoured the people of Tailevu. 
But the difference was not just of ttadition, popular backing, and personality. 
Whether they knew it or not the two chiefs came to play complementary roles in 
the politics of conciliation. While Ratu Mara worked toward compromise and 
upheld the ideal of accommodation Ratu George's pronouncements kept public 
attention on the Fijians' claims to inviolable rights. In doing this Ratu George 
counterbalanced overtures to the Indians and helped to restrain their demands. His 
role was symbolically reinforced by his being a direct descendant of the chief 
mainly responsible for the Cession. He was the main anchor of Fijian political 
solidarity: a symbol reinforcing prestigious identity and unity in face of the 
pragmatic concessions the leaders were obliged to make to non-Fijians. 
At the 1966 convention of the Fijian Association Ratu Mara supported and Ratu 
George opposed a proposal that the Association consent to the debate in parliament 
of a bill to improve the security of agricultural tenants, mainly Indians. Most 
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delegates supported Ratu George. Yet both chiefs endorsed the bill when it was 
debated soon after. In fact the Council of Chiefs had itself agreed to the reform 
before the Association's convention! Ratu George's protest had a symbolic value. 
A major concession was to be made: authority to decide the fate of leases was to be 
removed from direct Fijian control. The relinquishment called for a compensating 
and cautionary display of racial patriotism, a reaffirmation of unity both to the 
Fijians and before the non-Fijian public. 
All the leading chiefs, but Ratu George in particular, have acted as boundary 
preservers while working for interracial compromises. It is precisely their secure 
importance as authorities and symbols in Fijian political organisation that enabled 
them to make these overtures without jeopardising their collective political 
position. The concessions were popularly seen as threatening the established 
boundaries in political organisation. The chiefs responded by reaffirming racial 
identity and claims. But in doing this they enacted firmly held roles that actually 
gave them confidence and flexibility to adopt a more accommodative spirit in 
interracial relations than younger, less experienced, or traditionally less eminent 
pretenders to leadership. The most rigidly racialist elements in the Fijian 
Association leadership were commoner civil servants more sensitive to competition 
with non-Rjians and lacking the security of the high traditional rank and seniority 
in the colonial administration their chiefly patrons enjoyed. 
The roles the colonial rulers persuaded the high chiefs to play as interracial 
mediators created a potential for internal power struggles. Ratu Mara was 
vulnerable to challenges from within his own organisation as he played down its 
racial ainos in an effort to enhance its political strength through interracial alliances. 
During the negotiations with the Federation Party in 1969 to prepare for the 
country's independence he was challenged before the Council of Chiefs for 
favouring the Indians and "selling out" his people.^ 
Yet despite their differences the leading chiefs have not publicly opposed one 
another, partly out of recognition that a quarrel at the top could destroy their 
common power base by splitting the rank and file along traditional divisions. 
Federationists tried to exploit this possibility by alleging inequities in the award of 
honours to the chiefs: "Has Ratu George been eclipsed again?...Bauan chiefs are 
offended that Britain did not return power to Fiji by first presenting the new 
independence constitution to the present Vunivalu (Ratu George) since it was a 
Vunivalu who originally gave up power to the British Crown. There has been a 
major breach of protocol...Bauan chiefs want Ram George to be prime minister".*" 
These assertions were countered by reproving editorials in the conservative press 
and publicity to ceremonial occasions affirming the solidarity of the chiefs. 
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The first to chaUenge Ratu Mara's leadership was the president of tiie Fijian 
Teachers' Association, a young Lauan commoner. Earlier a group of commoners 
including a principal of the teachers' organisation had urged Semesa Sikivou, a 
commoner and education officer, to seek election as president of die poUtical body. 
The teaching profession was more open to commoners than were the upper 
echelons of administration and it had become a major path to the middleclass 
lifestyle. Semesa's rise to prominence owed much to the union. It had brought him 
into the Council of Chiefs whence he was appointed to parliament and fellow 
teachers later helped him win election to parUament. One man who encouraged 
him to oppose Mara confided: "We were all commoners and felt that Semesa 
would be more approachable". 
Thus there were several potential sources of struggle within the Fijian 
Association. There were disagreements between a political and administrative 
elite, mostly high chiefs, and young men, mostly commoners or men of 
intermediate rank, who had newly acquired education and social position but 
lacked power. Secondly, customary poUtical divisions in southeast Viti Levu and 
the eastem islands were potential bases of rivalry among the chiefs. A further Une 
of conflict was rank difference that coincided with inequalities in occupational 
status and poUtical power iUustrated in the teachers' efforts to unseat Ratu Mara. 
Yet there were no major struggles until after Fiji achieved independence. The 
young militants who argued with the chiefs about the aims of the Association soon 
abandoned their chauvinist demands in favour of intertacial compromise. The 
traditional differences and rivalries among the high chiefs did not disturb their 
poUtical unity, reinforced by close ties of kinship and marriage. The teachers who 
tried to topple Ratu Mara found they had Uttie popular support. 
The Association was able to exploit a racial identity strengthened by uniformities 
in traditional culture, by Christianity, and by colonial institutions. In contrast die 
Indians were more culturally diverse and, correspondingly, their political 
organisations were less developed as moral authorities. The Fijian Administration 
provided strong links between Association leaders and most Fijian village 
communities; one-third of die first committee were members of the Fijian Affairs 
Board. The hierarchical relationships of the bureaucracy had become valued as a 
basis of racial solidarity and the Association also relied on officials in organising 
meetings in the vUlages. The fact tiiat some administrative personnel opposed die 
Association's candidates in parliamentary elections also suited Association leaders 
who wished to present their organisation not as a political arm of the old 
bureaucracy but as proof that Fijians accepted democratic institutions. The 
national secretary told Fijians that the Association was to replace the 
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Administration as guardian of their racial interests: unlike the Administration it was 
independent of the colonial regime and through it people could criticise the 
government. Moreover, he said, the chiefs wished to bridge the gulf between 
themselves and the people. The Association sought popular allegiance also by 
offering practical services, especially in helping men secure short-term 
employment in New Zealand and acting as guarantor for their air fares. 
The four principal chiefs brought to the Association the support of traditional 
authorities in most areas of Fiji. Ratu Mara and Ratu Penaia together secured the 
allegiance of the great Tovata confederacy of the eastem islands. Ratu George, as 
Vunivalu of Bau, guaranteed support from the confederacy of Kubuna which 
included parts of western and northern Viti Levu as well as much of the southeast. 
Ratu Mara, through his wife as chief of the Burebasaga confederacy, centred in 
Rewa in southeast Viti Levu, could count on the support of most Fijians on Viti 
Levu and neighbouring islands not in Kubuna, including the southwest where Adi 
Lala Mara is a leading member of the principal chiefly family. Fijian 
anthropologist Nayacakalou maintained that "if political decisions affecting all 
Fijians are made by either the high chief of Bau or by him with the high chief of 
Rewa or by them with one or more of the high chiefs of the Tovata, such decisions 
will probably be supported by the whole of the Fijian people".*^ 
Of the sixteen committee members selected when the Fijian Association was 
first organised as a political party only one was from western Viti Levu. There 
were five easterners and ten from southeastern Viti Levu, mainly the province of 
Tailevu. Nearly all of the members were stationed in Suva. Five were high 
ranking chiefs. Thirteen were civil servants or officers on statutory bodies; the 
others included a newspaper editor, a trade unionist, and a farmer. 
The Alliance Party 
The Fijian Association joined several other groups to counter the Federation Party. 
Political leaders had met in Suva to decide the agenda for the London 
constitutional conference. All agreed to exclude questions of land ownership and 
independence. But when discussion turned to the election system the 
Federationists stated their case for common roll elections and left the talks insisting 
that the matter could not be resolved before London. Their boycott drew Fijians, 
Europeans, Chinese, and some Indians together to oppose them as a threat to racial 
harmony. Fijian leaders then met with moderate Indians from Western Viti Levu, 
rivals of the Federationists in the leadership of the cane farmers. As the "National 
Congress" these men had been complaining, like the Federationists, about land 
shortages, the failure of the colonial government to promote economic 
development among the Fijians, and the dominance of foreign companies. But 
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they now proposed an alliance with die Fijian leaders and authorised them to voice 
their opposition to the common-roU demand at the London conference, fareweUing 
diem at a banquet "in Fijian custom so everyone knew we were witii the Fijians". 
The AlUance Party was launched just before the 1966 elections. The Fijian 
Association, die National Congress, the General Electors' Association, and die 
Muslim Political Front were the main partners. General electors were die Part-
Europeans, Europeans and Chinese. Key figures among them were wealthy 
European businessmen and lawyers, Chinese entrepreneurs and professionals, and 
Part-Europeans of the middleclass. They wanted the communal roll election 
system retained arguing that it would mitigate racial discord, protect the 
Europeans' political power, justified, they said, by their role in the economy and 
government, and allow representation to part-Europeans and Chinese. The 
MusUm Front was a smaU Suva-based group which endorsed the communal roll 
system in the hope of securing Muslim seats. 
Ratu Mara was elected president of the party. Other officials included European 
hotel managers, a senior Fijian civil servant, the leader of the Indian farmers' union 
Kisan Sangh, two Indian businessmen, and a Chinese businessman. 
Paradoxically the AlUance gained Uttie Indian foUowing in southeast Viti Levu 
where many people of the middleclass had cultivated intertacial ties. This was a 
consequence of the absence of major organised rivalries in the Indian population 
like those of the westem farmers, and the greater concem with racial questions. 
The Federationists gained immense popularity there for their stand in London and 
quickly displaced the estabUshed moderate leader of the region, Andrew Deoki. 
Deoki's dilemma underlined the strength of the party from the west: should he 
now appease die electorate by supporting the Federation at the cost of aUenating 
Fijians and Europeans, or reject it to please old Fijian and European friends but 
antagonise the Indians? He steered a middle course condemning his opponents for 
jeopardising racial harmony yet endorsing their demand for a common roU: "I 
have the same goals but seek them by cooperation with the Fijian leaders in die 
hope that their attitude will change." 
Committees of the "Indian AlUance" were eventually formed in Suva and its 
environs. The principals were mainly leaders of the Muslim Political Front They 
were more successful businessmen than their counterpart officials in the Federation 
and mixed with European and Fijian notables in the social clubs. Other committee 
people included a wealthy Hindu timber merchant and a SUdi duty-free dealer who 
opposed the Federation as Gujarati-dominated. But most Indians prominent in 
multiracial society in the southeast refused to take part. 
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The Alliance Party in Western Viti Levu 
Indian support for the Alliance was mostly in western Viti Levu where conflicts 
between unions and within cultural bodies lUce the Sangam divided the farmers. 
Several men who campaigned for the party had multiracial social backgrounds lUce 
those of the Suva moderates. Some were South Indians who opposed Patel on 
Sangam matters. One was a prosperous North Indian, a landlord with farmer 
tenants and popular as a civic leader. His father had been a leading light in the 
reUgious and educational body, Arya Samaj, whose principals sympathised with 
the Kisan Sangh and the AlUance Party. 
The presence of such social divisions and influentials facUitated the formation 
of multiracial teams to canvass support for the AUiance in Indian settlements and 
Fijian viUages. The strongest was based in Nadi. An Indian lawyer involved with 
farmers' unions rallied together leaders of local Fijian Association branches and 
money-lender clients of influence in the Indian settlements. They set up a 
committee to coordinate election campaigning and coUect funds. The chairman 
was former army officer Livai NasUivata from the southeast. Recentiy appointed 
fire chief at the airport, he had formed a branch of the Fijian Association among 
workers there at the direction of his political bosses in Suva to counter the 
influence of militant unionist Apisai Tora. He and his wife were enthusiastic 
promoters of multiracialism, winning favour with Indians and others by serving in 
public committees and liaising between Fijians and Indians - for example to secure 
employment of Fijian cane cutters to finance the constraction of a church. 
Indians under Livai's supervision did most of the AlUance work. They included 
several farmers: Southerners opposed to Patel on Sangam issues, and old 
supporters of the Kisan Sangh, the union opposed to Patel's Maha Sangh. Livai 
visited farms with committee members and Alliance candidates and after the 
elections helped Indians contact govemment ministers to obtain feeder roads and 
financial aid for schools. The interracial ties were strengthened in other activities 
such as the annual town festivals, town government, school committees, and in 
business transactions (Nasilivata used political ties with Indians to promote 
business deals to finance his own provincial council's development projects). 
Race was preserved as the principle of organisation at the national level. The 
Indian Alliance replaced the National Congress and other Indian groups in the 
party. Its supporters were initially mostiy in the west. The emphasis was on racial 
exclusiveness, as in the Fijian Association, and the meetings were devoted to 
discussing questions of racial concem, particularly the problem of securing better 
terms for the innumerable tenants of Fijian landlords. At election time Indian 
Alliance candidates sought votes by claiming they were better placed to win 
concessions on land than their Federation rivals. 
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Federation propagandists derided the AUiance as a union of potentially hostile 
groups: "Those who join are married to Miss AUiance. But they aUeady have a 
wife. She says to them: you may marry and bring Miss AUiance home but she 
can't come inside the house, she must sleep outside". 
The metaphor was apt. Leaders of die Fijian Association rejected suggestions by 
Indians that the racial bodies be dissolved. Scarcely two years before most of 
these men had called for Fijian domination of parUament. Ratu Mara himself had 
at meetings of the Association committee doubted the wisdom of promoting the 
idea of an intertacial aUiance in viUage campaigning lest it spUt the Fijians. The 
Fijian Association had been hastily expanded into a colony-wide movement in a 
high-pressure campaign of village rallies after the London conference and the 
leaders were apprehensive about the potential strength of their Fijian chaUengers, 
particularly the mUitant unionist Apisai Tora in the west. 
The urbane national secretary of the Fijian Association uneasUy explained to me 
that a fiercely racial appeal was necessary in the vUlages and so the Association's 
responsibiUty to the Alliance must be played down: 
It took a lot of convincing to get Fijians to accept the AUiance. It's 
typical Fijian thinking that he shouldn't mix with the Indian or 
European - the long-held suspicions he has had, and, too, he is 
nationalistic. So naturally everything new is treated as suspect. The 
Association cannot be engulfed by the Alliance...When addressing 
viUage meetings we must give people what they want to hear. We 
must appeal to their emotions by saying we should unite against the 
Indians. The Alliance Party must take second place in the 
campaigning. We have cunningly explained to the Fijian people that 
it is a device for us to control govemment. 
This leader was worried that the AlUance might Qy "to put a blanket over the whole 
thing".'^ His urgent appeals to Fijians for racial vigilance were in stark contrast to 
his affable fratemisation with Indians in the town clubs, often to relax after a hectic 
round of village rallies. 
In the following pages I describe campaign rhetoric in the early years of 
political party competition. The account explains how this competition gave rise to 
a crisis in race relations and how the crisis encouraged a reconciliation on major 
issues leading to the remarkable bi-partisan demand to Britain for independence. 
The early elections set the themes and values that guided the public relations of the 
parties in the 1970s, particularly the principle that the Indians' security depended 
upon respecting Fijian poUtical privilege. Federationists endorsed this principle 
after faiUng to atttact Fijian support by challenging the power of the Europeans and 
their chiefly aUies and calUng for an end to racial division in the poUtical system. 
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Racial and Interracial Appeals in Elections '^ 
(1) The Federation Party and the Indians 
The Federation Party grew rapidly as a disciplined self-righteous movement 
brimming with aggressive confidence. Speakers at the town rallies and rural pocket 
meetings were uncompromising in theu- demands, claiming support from "world 
opinion" and "history". They denounced the 1965 constitution for reinforcing 
racial divisions and retarding the growth of national consciousness. But it was the 
disproportionate representation in the communal roll system that they most 
condemned: the Indians, over half the population, were given only one-third of the 
seats. They were made second class citizens and if they did not reject the 
constitution diey would find themselves dominated when British rale ended. The 
"last will and testament" of the British must be a constitution stating the right of 
Indians to remain in Fiji as equals with other races. And Indians must be admitted 
to the army. By excluding diem the rating power indicated that they might have to 
Uve under threat. 
The Federation identified its opponents as the colonial power that had 
audiorised the constitution, the Europeans whose economic interests were protected 
by their privileged representation under it, and the Fijian chiefs who with 
Europeans dominated the Alliance Party. Only by introducing common-roll 
elections could the British government affirm the equality of all and dispel the 
Indians' fears for their future. 
The Federationists held up as their model the Congress movement in India: 
"Federation Party is your party...It is a party of poor people, like the Congress 
Party...India didn't gain its independence until Mahatma Gandhi went from village 
to village to unite the people". ' Speakers told their audiences to forget their 
cultural differences: 
We are Indians in Fiji. It is not good to think that you are a Hindu 
or a MusUm. We are aU Indians here...In India today the Congress 
Party has both Hindus and Muslims despite the conflicts before. 
What is religion after all? It is a minor thing. There is only one 
God. When concem about our future and our children is before us 
we must cast this matter aside.'^ 
The ideal of party discipline and the values of loyalty and obedience were 
symbolised in the candidates' solemn oaths of allegiance before an excited 
audience overflowing a Suva picture theatre. Indians who resigned from the 
leadership were denigrated as unworthy and those who opposed the party were 
denounced as ttaitors to the race. 
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The Alliance Party's failure to atttact Indian support in southeast Viti Levu 
reflected the importance there of racial issues. The anti-raciaUst ideology of the 
old radical movement had been most sttongly preserved here. Andrew Deoki 
acknowledged this in speeches against his Federation opponent: 
Indians are in no way inferior. They've made die colony prosperous 
with their sweat and capital. Europeans have done much injustice 
to us in the past and diose days are gone that we remain silent about 
it. Now we shall fight for oiu- rights! '^ 
Deoki and other independents relied on personal followers, networks, and 
professional connections. But these resources were no match for the machinery 
and mass rallies of the Federation. Kapadia's numerous legal clients did not have 
the influence he expected: 
This was because of the general dissatisfaction in the minds of the 
Indian people...the common, poor Indians...lt was all in the air that 
Federation Party is for the Indians' rights...They forgot the 
personalities...They forgot the services I had given them...Their 
paramount concern was: this is the Indians' party and we must 
support It. 
Deoki and Kapadia were condemned by Federation loyalists for "siding with the 
Europeans and Fijians". Yet it would be wrong to infer racial hostiUty from this. 
There was no evidence of such, only mutual abuse between radical and moderate 
Indians: Patel declaimed that the AlUance Party was looking for "unworthy and 
cowardly Indians who will dance as they are told".^' His opponents in turn 
rebuked him as a threat to the harmony and prosperity of the country. 
(2) The Fijian Association 
In conttast to the noisy Federation rallies, Fijian Association campaign meetings, 
held mainly in the villages, were sober occasions resttained by the etiquette and 
ceremony of ttaditional assemblies before chiefs. The rhetoric was starkly racial 
with emphasis on the potential threat of the Indian presence and political 
aspirations to Fijian interests. The Association was promoted as the body that 
would secure the unity and sttength of the race. Speakers explained that the chiefs 
opposed common roll because it would lead to Indian dominance and the loss of 
land. Common roU means Indian conttol: 
It is possible for them, because they have plenty of money, to think 
only of themselves and to disregard us. That is the way they are 
used to thinking, unlike we Fijians. In our ttadition we always think 
of others. In general the Indians don't have that quality and they 
may have no regard for us if they get power.^^ 
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The national secretary explained that the Association was originally formed to 
prepare Fijians for a possible violent sttuggle with the Indians, at a time when 
certain Indians and Europeans were chaUenging Fijian leadership: 
It was necessary to be united in case the Indians attacked. We were 
to be prepared in our own country...If there was ttouble we would 
be able to defeat them...(Now) we fear the new enemies coming up 
in our midst during the transition to self-government: the 
Federation Party and some Fijians who are trying to lead us or seU 
us out to the Indians, to Patel.^-' 
A.D.Patel, the Federation's president, was depicted as a most dangerous figure 
intent upon subverting the Fijians' position. He had abused the chiefs and Fijian 
institutions and persuaded United Nations delegates to ask Britain to grant 
independence. But the British delegate had boldly resisted insisting that Fiji is 
unique among the colonies: "It was ceded by the chiefs in a chiefly manner, 
Britain could not accede to proposals the Fijians don't want".^ 
A Fijian parliamentarian wamed that the Federation was trying to force change 
of the communal system of living because the party knew this system supported 
ttaditional ownership of land: "The Federation wants Fijians to have tides to thefr 
lands. This would allow them to seU land. The party knows that once the stracture 
of our commimal life - our mataqali, our relations with our chiefs - is broken our 
ownership of land can be easily debased".^^ Another campaigner spoke of "the 
great change before us which, if we are not careful, wUl be the beginning of our 
disintegration and comiption as a people". A high-ranking candidate impressed 
on viUage audiences the need to preserve chiefly authority: 
Some of us who have retumed from education overseas advocate 
the abolition of our traditions. But chiefly rule is our natural 
sttength. It wiU seciuie us if racial conflict intensifies. The British 
people kept their reverence for their chiefs even after gaining 
control of government. The Queen remains the highest chief in 
Britain today. The British are renowned for their cooperation in 
times of adversity. What do you think wUl hold us united in time of 
ttouble? Our tradition, our unity under chiefly leadership...^' 
The national secretary wamed people against fraternising with the enemy. For 
each member there was to be a "personal card" fUed at headquarters and if anyone 
was found to be giving information to an opponent an entry would be made: "We 
wiU have agents to watch the activities of members. If someone moves from here 
to the westem districts and is found or suspected to be associated with Apisai Tora 
or the Federation Party he wiU be reported to headquarters".^ 
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(3) Multiracial Appeals 
The demand for a common roU voiced the Indians' anxiety about tiieir status. For 
non-Indians it represented the threat of Indian domination. The communal-roll 
platform expressed the Fijians' fears about their position and for the Indians, the 
threat of European and Fijian dominance. These concerns were balanced by 
appeals to social and economic interests that cut across racial divisions and each 
party tried to justify its policy on the electoral system with reference to these wider 
issues. 
The Alliance wamed that the Federation demand was disturbing the harmony 
that had been built between Fijians and Indians. The Alliance policy on the 
constitution would contain race conflict to the advantage of everyone bringing 
security to Indian farmers by placating the Fijians' fear of Indian supremacy and 
encouraging foreign investment for economic growth. In short the party justified 
its conservatism by emphasising the reality of racial cleavages: 
The idea of the AlUance is a legacy from the Legislative Council 
just dissolved. We in that Council wished to find ways to bring 
about the declared aim of the London conference: that the United 
Kingdom is to grant self-govemment to die people of Fiji...We are a 
group of friends and colleagues devoted to your welfare and the 
welfare of our land...No statement, save our own, gives a program 
of government for all races. The Federation leaders refused to 
negotiate before the conference. Our concept of the AlUance grew 
up when we others of all races outside the Federation Party found 
we had a common belief...that the future of this country depends on 
goodwill, tolerance, and harmony.^^ 
"Don't Anger the Fijians" 
In southeast Viti Levu several Indian candidates addressed rallies with AlUance 
leaders, but only one agreed to the party's endorsement. The others opposed the 
Federation as independents, condemning its militancy and stressing the need to 
respect the Fijian chiefs. Lawyer Kapadia wamed that a rift was forming: 
As a result of attacks in parliament the Fijian leaders harbour a 
gradge against Indians and fear they want to rale. A fire has been 
kindled and it is our duty to stop it before it flares up and many 
people are bumt. We can achieve our aims only by extending 
friendship. We must start at the top. First we have to be friendly 
with the chiefs then we will eventually be friends with the common 
people.-'^ 
Kapadia presented himself as a go-between who could win concesssions for 
Indians through careful diplomacy. He pointed to his success as a Suva alderman in 
persuading his Fijian colleagues to agree to Sunday ttading. 
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In westem Viti Levu National Congress leader Ajodhya Prasad wamed farmers 
of die dangers of antagonising Fijians. While negotiating to affiUate the Congress 
with the Fijian Association he had visited Indian settlements with the leader of a 
Fijian cane growers' association who told farmers that Fijians would ask the Native 
Lands Trast Board to renew leases of Congress members because these Indians did 
not want common roU.^' 
Prasad made the Indians' anxieties about the security of their farms the main 
dieme of his election campaign: "You must understand diat this is Fiji. It is not 
India. India has closed her doors to those bom here. They have to live in Fiji. So I 
want you to understand that you cannot quarrel with your landlord." He 
admonished farmers that they had provoked the Fijians' wrath by supporting Patel 
in the sugar strike and then electing him to parliament. Patel had criticised Fijian 
chiefs and institutions: 
He said that the kings of Fiji are not worthy of their position...These 
are the people who own the land, who are in the Native Lands Trast 
Board, and he accused them of not being able to ran their affairs. In 
retribution the chiefs refused to renew the leases and many farmers 
became landless. The people who lost their farms had hoped one 
day to send their sons and daughters away for education in Austtalia 
or New Zealand. But what are they doing today? They're raising 
catde...and the shopkeeper doesn't like to see them. He doesn't even 
let them sit on the verandah of his shop...If you vote for Patel again 
your life wUl be in danger for if the Federation gets into power it 
will be able to take land from the Fijians. When they realise the 
Indians have taken their government and land the Fijians wUl be 
ready to fight. They have the army and learned to use guns in 
Malaya and they are much sttonger than you. To ask for common 
roll is to ask for war. There will be bloodshed...The Alliance is 
Oying to bring friendship...The chiefs in parUament and the Native 
Lands Trast Board are my fiiends...With a friendly approach I can 
settie the land problem.-'^ 
Prasad issued these wamings at raUies in the settlements in the presence of other 
Indian, Fijian, and European candidates and party workers of the AlUance. The 
representative of the Native Lands Trast Board in die west, a high-ranking Fijian 
from the southeast, was amongst diem. 
A.D.Patel, Prasad's election opponent, assured farmers that the Native Lands 
Trast Board could not evict them for their poUtical loyalties. He urged them not to 
be frightened to vote for the Federation Party as the Fijians were ready ffiendly: 
Some people are trying to spread fear. They go to Fijian homes and 
say 'be careful of die Indians, tiiey will grab your land'. They go to 
Indian homes and put fear into them saying 'Don't vote for the 
Federation; the Fijian people will attack you'. This is nonsense. 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
94 Race and Politics in Fiji 
Fijians have come forward to shake my hand wherever I have been 
in my campaign.^ ^ 
Another Federation candidate told his audiences to ignore wamings that Fijians 
would assault them and throw them from their land and houses if they elected 
him.^ ^ In fact the Alliance wamings did not have wide credibiUty. Federationists 
told Indians they should not fear for the security of their farms for, after aU, the 
Fijian members of parliament had accepted the leaders' stand on the controversial 
Agricultural Landlords and Tenants Ordinance. The party claimed it had 
successfuUy championed the Indians' cause against the initial resistance of Fijian 
chiefs and that the chiefs' eventual acceptance of the ordinance proved they 
respected tiie party. 
"Federation Party stands for the People" 
Federation propaganda reflected a tension between the different opportunities and 
pressures of two poUtical arenas: the intemational and the domestic, between the 
Indians' appeal to Britain and the United Nations for equaUty under common roU 
elections and their desire also for harmonious relations and wider political support 
in Fiji. The immediate objective was to demonsttate to the audience abroad that 
most Indians endorsed the party's demand for constitutional change. In pursuing 
this racial aim the party was trying to influence decisions of the imperial power as 
the arbiter between opposed groups in Fiji. Britain's autiiority to decide the issue 
implied some freedom from pressures to reach agreements at home. Federation 
speakers assured their audiences in Fiji that when the elections proved Indian unity 
the British would have to admit a United Nations investigative team and this 
would lead to the inttoduction of common roll. But preoccupation with the racial 
demand would not help the party win government in Fiji. For while there was 
precedent in intertacial cooperation for upholding the paramountcy of Fijian 
interests there was none for claims about the special rights of Indians. 
The Federation Party maintained that the geographical distributidh of racial 
groups would prevent Indians from dominating under a common roU. It played 
down the significance of racial divisions and cultivated an image as a populist 
movement alleging that the common people were oppressed by a coalition of 
European capitalists, expatriate officials, and Fijian chiefs. The party claimed to 
be defending die victims of colonialism against die beneficiaries. The demand for 
the common roU voiced die peoples' desire for a just participation in their society. 
Common roll meant "equal rights politically to all and with it other equal 
opportunities must come": 
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Our object is to change the power structure...As poUtical and 
economic have-nots it is our duty to assert ourselves and get our 
rightful share. Our aim is to see that even the poorest, even the 
weakest citizen feels proud that he is a Fijian, that he is a human 
being, and regains that dignity which is by right his...^^ 
Patel assured Indian farmers that Fijians sympathised with his objectives but were 
being incited against him by their chiefs who feared that in common-roU elections 
tiiey would lose their power "and have to be together with the commoners": 
The Fijians are being told that if the Federation Party comes to 
power it will suppress them. During all the time I have lived in Fiji, 
if a Fijian brought a case to me I have fought it in court without 
charging a fee. Who can say I am their enemy?. 
Patel condemned the hierarchy of Fijian society as oppressive and presented 
himself as egalitarian: 
Some people advocate equality, but when a Fijian visits their homes 
he is asked to enter thro\igh the back door. If a Fijian comes to my 
house he enters the front door and sits with me on the same couch. 
When a Fijian visits the office of the Member for Natural Resources 
(Ram Mara) he bends on his knee. But when he comes to my office 
as Member for Social Services and tries to bend down I take him by 
the arm and say: sit beside me and talk to me face to face and I 
wUl do my best to help you. 
The AlUance Party, Patel declaimed, wished to keep the people separated. But the 
racial division was artificial. The colonial power had created it to rale. The 
Alliance was really a device for concentrating power in European hands. The 
London conference had allegedly given the whites the balance of power in 
parUament. The president. Ram Mara, was said to be "a shield of the European 
vested interests".-" The Europeans could not tackle the Indians so they encouraged 
Fijians to unite against them by warning that Indians might swamp them. 
Allegedly the chiefs had, at the whites' instigation, discouraged Fijians from 
joining Indians in industrial disputes. 
Patel's deputy Siddiq Koya insisted that the welfare of the Fijians was the 
responsibiUty of die nation. He maintained his party spoke for ordinary Fijians in 
condemning the Fijian Administration as an obstacle to their advancement. Fijians 
sometimes attended ralUes in Indian settiements near their villages or farms. Koya 
appealed to them in English: 
Why should there be poverty in the viUages? The place is your own 
yet you are imprisoned. We are only telling you to wake up! We 
want to give you the rights that God gave you. Think for yourself 
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who you are - You are a man! We want to give you the honour and 
dignity due to you. You are a man, you are an individual, and I 
respect you. But for goodness sake your old chiefly system must 
go! It is not helping you, it is not helping this island, it is not 
helping us (Indians). So let's change and move forward! 
Anodier speaker urged the Fijians to make common cause with Indians: 
Fijians and Indians are aUke. We are bom here and you are bom 
here. Our thinking is alike. Your colour and our colour are the 
same. You come to our places and we to yours. We bortow things 
from each otiier and we work together. So don't listen to anyone 
who tries to bring differences between us.-^' 
Many Fijians read this propaganda in the English and Fijian weekly Pacific 
Review. But most speeches in the towns were in Hindustani and candidates could 
rarely speak in the villages where meetings required permission from the local 
Fijian Administtation official who was usuaUy influenced by viUage chiefs. The 
Federation Party lacked the support of influential Fijians who could approach die 
local authorities. Nor did the party have many campaigners fluent in Fijian. 
Party workers helped a former unionist in his contest in the east against Ratu 
Mara. But he did not advertise his association with them. Only in the west could 
the party persuade a Fijian to accept endorsement, a farmer who had joined the 
radical Indians in the 1960 strike. He presented the Federation as the champion of 
the poor and condemned the neglect of economic development in the west by 
chiefs from other regions who conttoUed the Fijian Administtation: "Where are the 
Fijians today? Where do we stand? We are the poorest people in the colony. 
Why? It was all through our chiefs and the white settlers!" He urged vUlagers to 
be fearless and challenge the chiefs: "This is democracy!".'*^ He alleged that 
Europeans and chiefs had conspired to break the farmers' strike by forming Fijian 
unions. They did so, he said, because they feared they would lose their influence if 
Fijians cooperated with Indians to gain wealth and a new outiook. He offended 
many people by his vituperative outbursts against the chiefs and was chased from 
one viUage. 
Some commoners who opposed the Fijian Association in southeast Viti Levu 
played on ambivalence toward the chiefs by presenting themselves as more 
approachable. None publicly supported the Federation, however, and most 
endorsed the Association's waming of the Indian threat. Fijians in the west were 
more inclined to oppose the Association on issues the Federation Party sttessed. 
Apisai Tora asked: "If the Fijian Administtation has failed the Fijian people how 
could Fijians sponsored by the Association succeed when they would be puppets 
of the outdated Fijian Affairs Board?". But while he urged voters to elect the 
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Federation candidate for the Westem National Indian seat, a fellow unionist, he did 
not support the radical Indians as a group. Indeed he criticised Ratu Mara for 
giving Indians too much by agreeing to land reforms! 
The poUtical parties had aimed not merely to win elections but to influence actions 
on Fiji by the British government and the United Nations Committee on 
Colonialism. Initially the Federation Party aimed to persuade these external 
audiences at the expense of broadening its support in Fiji beyond the Indian 
population. The Alliance sought immediate conttol of govemment and so placed 
more emphasis on interracial cooperation. It did atttact significant Indian support, 
especially in the sugar cane districts where Indians had long been divided on 
cultural and industrial issues (See Appendix Table 6). 
These different sttategies were not followed simply as a matter of choice. Indian 
leaders had fewer avenues for building a multiracial following than did their Fijian 
counterparts, regardless of the issues sttessed. There were significant divisions of 
interest among Fijians that had sometimes led to interracial solidarities in industrial 
disputes. But these divisions were submerged when racial matters came to the fore. 
And, too, there was the old Fijian perception of Europeans as their ultimate 
protectors in solidarity with the chiefs in the face of the numerically and 
economically stronger Indian population. The established pattern of poUtical 
loyalties and alliances in Fiji, as well as certain external connections and an 
identification with India's former straggle, induced the radical Indians to appeal to 
the imperial power when colonial policy was in flux and to disregard pressures to 
compromise with Fijians and others at home. 
The Alliance Party won the 1966 elections with all Fijian and General 
communal and national seats and the three Indian national seats. The Federation 
Party took only the nine Indian communal seats. Ratu Mara was made Chief 
Minister and, with a cabinet entirely from his party, began to take over govemment 
from the British. Federation president A.D. Patel was appointed Leader of the 
Opposition. 
The Federation Party Quest for Fijian Support 
The Federation Party now intensified its efforts to woo Fijians by appeaUng to 
interests many shared with Indians. Individual politicians assisted unions during 
industrial disputes. One union, under Apisai Tora, called out building workers 
employed by European firms, and die Municipal Workers' Union led by an Indian 
in the Suva committee of the party mobiUsed council workers. Hundreds of 
Fijians and Indians joined in the strike. The Federation organ Pacific Review 
encouraged them and Siddiq Koya's law firm advised them. Karam Ramrakha 
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helped Tora's workers m the arbittation of their dispute. Federation members on 
Suva Council defended the Council employees and in municipal elections 
Federationists helped a Fijian civil servant defeat the deputy-mayor, a Fijian 
Association official whom they denounced as an enemy of the workers. 
The Federationists opposed the AlUance plan to continue salary privileges for 
expatriate civil servants. In resisting an amendment to a land ordinance they 
claimed to speak for Fijian as well as Indian tenants of the Native Lands Trust 
Board and urged the Secretary for Fijian Affairs to improve the economic position 
of Fijians in raral areas. Pacific Review voiced Fijian complaints against a new 
land-rating system and demanded that Fijians be compensated for estates sold to 
Europeans before Cession. A Federation shadow minister helped Fijians register a 
school after their own appeals to their elected representatives had failed. 
Party leaders called for a new conference to prepare a constitution on "trae 
democratic principles". When the AUiance refused the Federationists boycotted the 
parliament. Campaigning in the subsequent by-elections for the Indian communal 
seats was marked by a more aggressive criticism of the chiefs and a continued 
attempt to woo their people even though in these elections Fijians were not to vote. 
The Federation Party now referred to them as the Taukei (Fijian for owner of the 
land) and began to draw some interest. 
Two high-ranking men resigned govemment jobs to work for the party. Ratu 
Julian Toganivalu, a district officer in the colonial government, was made the 
organising secretary and Ratu Mosese Varasikete Tuisawau was appointed editor 
of Pacific Review. Both had been educated at an Indian high school in the west. 
Ratu Julian was from Bau in the southeast, with three brothers in the AlUance 
cabinet. Ratu Mosese, an economist, was a half-brother to a paramount chief in the 
southeast (the wife of Ratu Mara). He was widely respected there and some 
people even wanted him to be the chief. He was also popular in the west where 
he had kin and had taught at an Indian school. Federation leaders hoped diese men 
would sttengthen both their Indian and Fijian support by demonsttating that the 
aristocracy was no longer united in the Alliance. 
At party rallies Ratu Julian inttoduced Ratu Mosese as the descendant of a chief 
who signed the Deed of Cession and declared that despite his ancestry and the 
leaning of the chiefs in the Alliance he was championing the Federation. Ratu 
Mosese told Indians that at the constitutional conference the British govemment 
had ignored the Deed of Cession thus affirming that equality is right for Fiji.^^ 
The two went into the villages to explain the boycott of parliament and to assure 
Fijians that the party wished to safeguard their land. They persuaded some to 
attend the annual convention where Patel declared the party wanted to protect them 
by estabUshing a republic with a Fijian head of state. But first Fijians and Indians 
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must unite: "As workers, cultivators, and subordinates they have common 
interests...and both are under the heel of the third community (the Europeans)".'*^ 
The party criticised the Native Lands Trust Board for charging owners 
exorbitant fees, unfairly disttibuting rent, and preventing people from raising 
capital on the security of their land. Pacific Review alleged that Fijians were land 
holders in name only, that the real owners were Europeans who conttoUed the 
Board and gave land to European businesses. Progressive Fijians were urged to 
consider land reforms: "If he plays his cards right the Fijian will emerge as the 
richest community".^ 
Ram Mosese spoke about links between the Development Bank, the big firms, 
and the Alliance Party: the big firms were given the most assistance, they coUuded 
to keep prices high, and they conttol the Alliance, "yet the small contributions 
from each of you wUl enable us to defeat aU the money of big business and one day 
we wiUrale!" 
There was much Fijian interest in this propaganda in southeast Viti Levu and 
some people began to remark that as Ram Mosese and Ratu JuUan were of high 
rank in leading confederacies perfiaps the party was not bad after all. The two were 
often well-received in villages and at one of their meetings the local chief replied 
"so long as our land rights are assured we don't really mind which party govems." 
Westerners Apisai Tora and Isikeli Nadalo announced that their National 
Democratic Party would join forces with the Federation and Nadalo addressed 
ralUes in Indian farming settlements. The by-elections campaign coincided also 
with the subscription drive by the new Fijian Chamber of Commerce (FCC) 
which aimed to estabUsh Fijian businesses. One organiser was a Federation man 
and Toganivalu and Varasikete addressed FCC meetings. The Alliance 
denunciation of the FCC as a Federation front was given fiuther weight by the fact 
that shops offering discounts to card holders were owned by Gujaratis. The 
Federation press publicised the movement to reinforce criticism of established 
Fijian leaders. On the Suva Municipal Council the FCC president joined 
Federation men in defending the Council workers and a Federation official became 
legal adviser to an FCC business venture^ 
The Federation's chiefly spokesmen assured Indian voters their Fijian "brothers 
and sisters" were supporting them "so you must not be afraid". They even lectured 
Indians on their obligation to re-elect the party on behalf of the Taukei: Fijians 
need the Indians' help, "they look up to you because of your enterprise and 
progress".'*^ The multiracial appeal of the party was highlighted in a popuUst radio 
broadcast by Patel: 
The Federation is a party of Indians and Taukei who have been 
denied equal rights. It was created by the farmers and has been 
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serving them, the workers, and the littie businessmen. The Taukei 
know very weU who their enemy is...By putting Fijians and Indians 
against one another the whites wiU rale...Independence and equal 
rights is the cry of the awakened people and the Federation is a 
party of the awakened people. Those who oppose Federation 
oppose the people. 
Ratu Mara retorted that the Alliance voiced the people's desire for racial 
differences to be recognised in planning national development. He accused the 
Federation of conducting an abusive campaign that aggravated tensions and 
-endangered economic security; "A small independent nation must have internal 
harmony and external friends. It must atttact investors and retain their confidence". 
The significance of the by-elections, Mara said, was that "we are deciding an 
attitude": 
We are determining whether this community is to integrate into a 
new society of independent Fiji or whether it is to be hopelessly 
divided along racial and linguistic lines...Federation leaders talk 
glibly about one man one vote as if it were the key to the golden 
gate. They mislead the people...The plain fact is there are many 
areas of life in which we do not understand each other. The 
Alliance Party teaches that we must appreciate the different cultures 
that enrich our country.^ 
Mara warned that the Federation Party would isolate the Indian people and deny 
them the opportunity to join in the adventure of nation building. 
Crisis and Rapprochement 
After regaining the Indian communal seats the Federation Party held a public 
celebration to claim that the entire nation had taken part in the elections and that 
the verdict was that the people want "freedom and equal rights". The Alliance must 
retum to the people for a general election.^^ 
Fijian Association leaders mobilised their followers to disprove this claim. 
Backbenchers, local chiefs, and officials organised raUies and marches.^^ Westem 
districts chiefs led a town procession escorted by Fijians in ttaditional costume and 
war paint. The secretary of the Mineworkers' Union told the crowd he wore a 
black suit because for him the occasion was a funeral to bury his relationships with 
Indians. 
The protestors objected that the elections showed the racial preoccupations of 
Indians in contempt of the generosity of Fijians and their chiefs. The people had 
been deceived and their chiefs abused. So past concessions must be withdrawn. 
The new Agricultural Landlords and Tenants Ordinance should be abolished and 
Indian leases reclaimed on expiry. One politician warned against "Asiatic 
exploitations", complaining that the civil service was "swarming with Indians". 
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A village rally of the Fijian Association. 
Presenting Kava to the candidates. 
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Alliance Party campaign team in a Fijian village. 
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A city politician woos the rural vote. 
A Fijian rebel in the west confronts the colonial policeman (see p. 96). 
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A.D. Patel, foundation leader of the NFP, exhorts country voters. 
Singing praises to the NFP. 
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Country voters. 
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Segregated audiences at a city rally. 
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Rallying the farmers. 
fl 
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Multiracial campaign team, Alliance Party. 
How to vote. 
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In the sugar cane fields. 
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Fijian elder (centre left) observes a political meeting of his Indian neighbours (see p. 95-96). 
Fijian voters in Suva. 
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At the polling stations. 
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Fijian women wait to vote. 
Irene Jai Narayan, past president of the NFP and sole Indian in the present regime 
as minister for Indian affairs. 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Before the coup — election poster. 
!: (Photo: John Fairfax & Sons) 
Colonel Rabuka enters government buildings. (Photo: John Fairfax & Sons) 
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Indian woman weeps outside Dr Bavadra's residence two days after the coup. 
(Photo by Matthew McKee) 
Soldier and Taukei Movement supporters outside meeting of Council of Chiefs. 
(Photo by Matthew McKee) 
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The Kava is presented to Dr Bavadra in Sydney, 1988. 
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Sydney Fijians greet the Bavadras, 1988. 
Timoci and Adi Kuini Bavadra (centre) and friends in Sydney. Behind Adi Kuini is 
Joeli Kalou, a Fijian member of Bavadra's ousted cabinet. 
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There were demands for a racial balance in business firms, for the exclusion of 
Indians from the army, and for the deportation of A.D. Patel and "his people" (die 
Gujaratis). One meeting resolved that membership of parliament be restricted to 
persons of Fijian descent, diat Indians not descended from indentured labourers be 
disfranchised, and diat Indians be compelled to limit their families. The National 
Committee of the Fijian Association wamed that Fijians were going to fight for 
dieir rights in their own countty and would use force to resist any move to make 
them second-class citizens. 
Ratu Mara, who had retteated to his traditional eastem seat during the protests, 
now publicly explained the anger. For a decade government policies had been 
eroding the foundations of Fijian solidarity. Fijians had relinquished cherished 
rights in the hope of reciprocity that would create a society of mutual respect. The 
Native Lands Trast Board had stopped proclaiming large reserves, Fijian leaders 
accepted multiracial electorates, endorsed the Landlords and Tenants Ordinance, 
and were ready to consider multiracial local govemment in the raral areas. But 
now the Indians' behaviour had shaken Fijian confidence in multiracialism. 
Alliance arguments had been vindicated. The situation underlined the necessity for 
principles that could accommodate the conflicting interests of racial groups.^ 
Alliance Indians endorsed Mara's view of the crisis and wamed people they 
would suffer if they did not heed the Fijian Association.^^ The Federation press 
maintained that the Taukei had been incited precisely because the party was trying 
to cooperate with them. Pacific Review aUeged that the reaction was inspired from 
die top of the AUiance "where the Europeans are" and that allegations about racial 
voting were intended to confuse the real issues of the elections: 
It is the Indian who fought for equality...When the sugar strike 
ended jobs were opened for coloured people in banks, business 
firms, and the sugar company...The straggle by the Indians yielded 
these changes. Now the vested interests see the Taukei joining the 
straggle, they try to quieten him and divert his attention by pointing 
the finger at the Indians. 
After several assaults on Indians leading members of the chiefly establishment 
subdued their people, assuring them that many Indians wanted cooperation. Fijians 
later criticised their leaders for not trying to implement the protestors' resolutions. 
Yet the popular anger was itself constrained by a wish to preserve ties of 
friendship with individuals. People-in most areas dissociated these relationships of 
work and neighbourhood from the political hostUities in which they were taking 
part. Even the man who declared he was burying his ties with Indians waved to 
Indian fiiends watching the march from their shop balconies! 
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Political Structure Reaffirmed 
The protests represented an attempt by Fijian leaders to reaffirm die vaUdity of die 
estabUshed political stracture by demonsttating the forces of conflict it helped to 
contain. The general acknowledgement of the need to avoid a violent straggle 
had become a unifying factor in political life. It provided justification for 
estabUshed institutions, in particular the legislative and administtative sttiictures 
that guaranteed representation of the interests of racial groups. Within the 
established system politicians opposed one another, or sought alliances, as 
representatives of these groups. 
Chiefly leaders of the Fijian Association had become especially important as 
political middlemen drawing sttength from the common recognition of the need to 
accommodate opposed groups. They played a widely valued role as mediators in 
die conflict endeavouring to reconcile Indian demands with the Fijians' suspicions 
and fears. They organised a political front against the Indians but at the same time 
persuaded Fijians of the need to protect their opponents' security. 
To the very extent that the political stracture did limit racial antagonism certain 
poUtical actors were likely to tty to build support by proclaiming an altemative 
conception of the social order and advocating new rales for political competition. 
In belittiing the importance of the racial cleavages in the contest for Indian and 
Fijian support the Federationists called the stracture into question and chaUenged 
the position of the leading chiefs. The menacing Fijian protests reaffirmed the 
reality of racial conflict and confirmed the national role of the chiefs as buffers and 
conciliators. In a later confrontation with an Indian in parliament Ratu George 
Cakobau, the most revered chief, claimed to have been "wholly responsible" for 
suppressing the Fijian anger: "I declare now that if this sort of insult continues from 
the other side...I wiU not be responsible for what may happen if a similar event 
occurs again. " ^ 
By threatening the violence that everyone wished to avert the demonsttations 
also reUeved Indian politicians of public pressure for militant action. The simation 
had been defined in a way that permitted the Federationists to sttengthen their 
commitment to protect Fijians without discrediting their leadership of the Indians. 
They had acknowledged the special rights of Fijians before the by-elections but 
subordinated this concem to the concept of "the people" opposed to a rating eUte. 
After the Fijian protests the party assumed a new identity as defender of the Taukei 
and became less committed to radical political change. Indeed its leaders now 
endorsed the definition of society the AUiance Party had been promoting. The 
radical Indians, a Fijian Association leader told me, had miscalculated in ttying to 
divide the commoners and the chiefs: the aftermath of the by-elections had proved 
that "Fijian nationalism is always lurking just round the comer".^^ 
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The Federation Party as Defender of the Taukei 
A much chastened Federation Party distributed a leaflet in English and Fijian 
entitled "Let Us Clear the Au-". It reaffirmed the objective of creating a Taukei 
head of state to make the Taukei fu-st among equals under a common roU: 
In spite of his land wealth the Taukei has been kept poor and pent 
up in his village struggling to live from day to day. This is the 
outcome of ninety years of so-called British trasteeship. It is like a 
man sitting on the banks of a fresh water lake and dying of thirst. 
Paramountcy of Fijians would be guaranteed by the veto power of the head of state. 
More important were Patel's eamest overtures of respect and goodwill to the 
chiefs. The Federation Party had long protested against the power of the Council 
of Chiefs and before the by-elections had refused invitations to observe its 
meetings. Now the party leaders reversed their stance toward the aristocracy. Patel 
urged the govemment to restore the chiefly island of Bau as a national monument, 
he was received there as a guest, and he accepted an invitation to present the prizes 
at the speechday of the most prestigious Fijian school. Pacific Review announced 
that the party would boycott the election of the Mayor of Suva because Europeans 
were unwiUing to choose a Taukei, and the Federation candidate for an Indian seat 
in another town promoted himself as advocate of more seats for Taukei in local 
govemment. 
The western Fijians' National Democratic Party at last merged with the 
Federation at a combined raUy where Patel was honoured by a chiefly ceremony. 
Apisai Tora explained that the decision was influenced by Federation statements 
upholding the special position of the Fijians. The formation of the National 
Federation Party(NFP) was announced with IsikeU Nadalo as a vice-president and 
Tora as organiser for the west. Some westerners began to talk of how the NFP 
would defend Fijians and make them paramount: "The Federation wants to make 
Fijian interests a national issuc.When the Alliance and Fijian Association speak 
for the Fijians they take ideas from the Federation". Pacific Review asked why the 
govemment was not concemed with Fijians in the west and insisted that Fijians in 
one district should have a monopoly of the tourist industry there.^' 
Many in the west were atttacted to the NFP as the opponent of European power: 
"The Federation says Fijians and Indians wUl unite and the Europeans wUl be put 
out...Only if the overseas companies go can Fijians build their own tourist 
hotels...We accept the Indians in the party because they are part of Fiji. Their 
forefathers came as labourers". Some westerners favoured the NFP because it had 
spoken about Unuting the power of the high chiefs whom they blamed for retarding 
the peoples' progress and looking after their own positions instead of representing 
the real views of the Fijians: "With independence more commoners wUl come up 
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and there will be tt-ue democracy". Nadalo insisted that the chiefs should remain in 
their "true" position as symbol of their peoples' unity Uke the British monarch: 
when the chiefs enter politics the Fijians cannot voice their real feelings. If the 
chiefs retire commoners and intellectuals can advance the peoples' welfare. 
The NFP sponsored candidates in Fijian provincial councUs in the west. Their 
policy statement proposed that multiracial local govemment replace die councils 
to relieve the burden on Fijian ratepayers and allow better facilities. In the 
meantime funds could be augmented by reassessing land rates on the basis of utiUty 
and by finding additional sources of income as, for example, in the tourist industry. 
The Provincial School Western must be reopened and the government should 
provide grants for the upkeep of historical sites. The party gained up to 18 per cent 
of the votes and won two seats. But die National Democratic Party's alliance with 
the Federation weakened its leaders' popularity in Fijian workers' and farmers' 
unions. 
Fijians became more tolerant of the Federation when Siddiq Koya was made 
president after Patel's death. Both men promoted the ideal of national integration 
and, as defence lawyers, both were popular with some Fijians in the western 
districts where they had built their professional and public careers, promoting 
themselves as fearless champions of the poor and the weak. But Patel had grown up 
in India during the early years of Gandhi's nationalist movement. In Fiji he was 
preoccupied with advancing the position of the Indian, urging his followers to take 
their inspiration from the Congress Party. A brilliant barrister, he pressed his 
demands stubbomly, seeking change by appealing to the British govemment and 
the United Nations rather than by negotiating with his opponents in the colony. 
Koya, a much younger man, was bom a farmer's son in Fiji and knew Uttie of the 
Indian ttadition of nationalist poUtics. Although a most aggressive leader, he was 
less interested in conducting the struggle on an intemational stage and more 
responsive to domestic pressures for compromise. 
The Bi-Partisan Demand for Independence 
Patel died as the parties began joint discussions to confer about further 
constitutional change. With Koya heading the Federation, a small group of 
leaders met over six months for private talks that ended in a unanimous agreement 
to ask Britain for independence.^^ It was a remarkable rapprochement after four 
years of acrimonious conflict. The NFP initially proposed that Fiji become a 
republic but accepted the Alliance argument for dominion status in recognition 
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of the Fijian desire to preserve ties with Britain. When the Federationists warned 
tiiat opinion might polarise again if an election was held before independence the 
AlUance leaders agreed that the ttansition be made under the existing Alliance 
govemment. 
The NFP emphasised that it wished the Fijians to be safeguarded and when 
Alliance delegates raised the question of the future of the Council of Chiefs 
Federation leaders suggested that it be the basis of the Upper House proposed by 
Rato Mara. The NFP delegates moved that this house be filled by descendants of 
chiefs who signed the Deed of Cession and that it be empowered to block 
legislation diat might threaten the Fijians' land or institutions. Ratu Mara put the 
suggestions to the Council of Chiefs which agreed only to an Upper House to 
safeguard the Fijians, but not that it be restricted to chiefs! The Indians hoped their 
concessions would induce the Alliance to accept common roll elections for a lower 
house. But at the conference in London the parties agreed to defer a decision on 
this until after independence. The NFP never sttongly pushed the case again. ^ ^ 
In the Suva talks the opponents were united by the problem of planning change 
away from the social and political milieux in which their antagonistic positions had 
been shaped. By holding the negotiations in camera the participants gained some 
freedom from the pressures that had hardened their opposition to one another in 
public. Tensions grew, nevertheless, between the demands of followers and the 
need for compromise in the private bargaining. Party supporters were impatient to 
know what their leaders were up to. Some accused NFP principals of selliftg out 
the Indians by abandoning the common roll demand and ignoring the problem of 
land. Many in the Council of Chiefs accused Alliance leaders of compromising 
Fijian interests in agreeing with the NFP call for independence which the AUiance 
had opposed in the by-elections only a year before. Ratu Mara reported back to 
one meeting with the NFP leaders that he and Ratu George Cakobau had been 
given "a torrid time" in the Council of Chiefs: "We were almost impeached!". 
Federation leaders commiserated saying they were having the same problems with 
their own people.^ *^ Koya and Ramrakha argued at public meetings that their 
agreement to give Fijians a poUtical advantage accorded with NFP policy that the 
position of the Taukei be made a concern of the nation and that common roll 
could be won only if many Fijians agreed. Moreover the NFP would stand with the 
govemment on other issues of national concem such as independence, land, and the 
sugar induso-y. After the London Conference Koya and Mara appeared side by 
side before the United Nations to affirm theu- unity. 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter I have shown how political party rivalry on the eve of independence 
highlighted different dimensions of society, different potentials in a social and 
poUtical "force field". Though the racial cleavage prevailed, the political straggle 
revealed the possibility that other social divisions might become important. 
What is chaUenging in the smdy of a society such as Fiji is not to document the 
obvious racial or ethnic division but to pursue the question of how economic and 
status interests that cut across it, and are of undeniable importance in the everyday 
lives of many people, might achieve impact in political life. In Chapter 1 I 
suggested that the view that such interests might submerge the racial or ethnic 
division is misguided. It derives from an ethnocentric economism, common to both 
conservative and radical schools of thought in Western social science, that has 
myopically underestimated the potency in social consciousness and action of 
cultural interests that support convictions of identity, worth, and sttength. 
A convergence of interests in common or simUar occupations and economic 
aspirations has in many societies often intensified aggressive ethnicity and not 
simply strengthened a potential for solidarity in conflicts with bosses and their 
poUtical allies. Since Fiji gained its independence from colonial rale there has been 
both an accelerating inter-ethnic convergence in economic and social aspirations 
that has widened the objective basis for class solidarity, and, among Fijians, a 
sttengthening disposition to ethnic miUtancy. An understanding of these seemingly 
conttadictory processes will give us insight into the poUtical crisis that began in 
1987. 
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of Independent Fiji 
The outstanding feature of Fiji at independence was the reconciUation of poUtical 
leaders whose acrimonious rivaUy had threatened racial violence scarcely a year 
before. After the London conference Ratu Mara had declared : "For the first time 
our constitution has provided a special position for the Fijians...! am grateful to the 
Leader of the Opposition and his party for the support they have given us in this".' 
The accord was favoured in the early years by a sttengthening economy: increased 
sugar exports, a diversification of agriculture, commerce, and industry, expanding 
employment opportunities, and rising living standards. 
In continuing to depend on the support of different racial groups the political 
parties jointly provided a function like that of the system of representation under 
colonial rale. The demise of the colonial power as arbiter encouraged negotiation 
and conciUation given the consensus, sttengthened by the confrontation of 1968, 
that violent straggle must be avoided. While most people regarded the AUiance as 
the body that especially safeguards the Fijians, the party recognised the Federation 
not simply as an opponent but as the principal voice of the Indians which must be 
consulted. The prime minister conferted often with the NFP leader and before the 
1972 elections each spoke in favour of a coalition. They agreed to discipline their 
campaigns to minimise tensions and a spirit of goodwill prevailed during the 
polling. 
Land was still a centtal issue. The AlUance renewed its waming to Fijians that a 
Federation victory would threaten their ownership while the Federation promised 
to give them more conttol. Both parties undertook to protect the Indian farmers. 
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Racial Composition of Support for Political Parties as 
shown by Voting in Communal electorates - Percentages 
(See Appendix Table 6 for details) 
1972 Elections to House of Representatives 
Alliance Party 
** 3.80 
23.41 
72.79 
Nat Fed (NFP) 
97.6 
H Rjians M Indians D Others 
* Understates proportion of Fijian support because in one con-
stituency the Alliance nominee was returned unopposed. 
** In one constituency the Alliance nominee was returned 
unopposed. 
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The Federation's assurances that it wanted to safeguard the Fijians provoked 
some paradoxical responses. Ram George Cakobau declared tiiat Koya had defied 
die CouncU of Chiefs in proposing a Taukei head of state - the CouncU of Chiefs 
must remain the supreme body on Fijian affairs!^ Indians campaigning for the 
AlUance condemned the NFP for advocating racial discrimination in favour of 
Fijians. Koya, diey said, was bettaying his own community.^ Indian votes for die 
AlUance remained steady in the west and increased in the east. 
While more Indians now regarded the Fijian-dominated party as acceptable, 
very few Fijians felt tiiat way about the NFP. The prevalent Fijian view was diat it 
was the Indians' party and that its Fijian supporters had "gone over to the Indians". 
AU six candidates the NFP sponsored for communal Fijian seats lost their deposits, 
gaining only 1500 votes against the 38,0(X) for their Alliance rivals. Most of these 
votes were in westem Viti Levu where Ratu JuUan Toganivalu, Apisai Tora, IsikeU 
Nadalo, and Ram Mosese Varasikete led "Operation Taukei", visiting the viUages 
to explain the party's concem for Fijians and to woo local chiefs. The campaign 
was not well-funded and one of its leaders attributed this to Indian fears that the 
Taukei project might become a racial breakaway.^ 
Ratu Mara's attempt before the elections to counter Operation Taukei by 
currying favour with the western chiefs was the most significant indication of 
Fijian interest in the NFP. Westemers had complained of under-representation and 
warned they might turn to NFP candidates unless the Alliance endorsed local 
people. Ratu Mara held meetings with western chiefs at the village of the Tui 
Vuda, one of the leading ttaditional heads in the region. In retum Mara took them 
to observe developments in his own village in the Lau Islands and lavishly 
entertained them there. Fijians viewed the meetings as a clever move by the prime 
minister to safeguard his support by acknowledging westem grievances and 
promising schools and other improvements. The Confederation of Western 
rMw(chiefs) Association was formed. Its secretary, the Tui Nadi, a senior official 
in the Fijian Adnunisttation, told me that it was conceived at the meetings with 
Mara to handle popular complaints and counter attempts by some Fijians to draw 
people to the Federation Party: "to the Indians and out of Fijian society".^ 
The west had long been the seedbed of radicalism among both Indians and 
Fijians and the old discontents of westem Fijians gave the NFP's popuUst rhetoric 
a wide appeal. Yet this was offset by the potential for ethnic miUtancy. The 
westerners' experience of their marginal position in the modem economy included 
the presence of successful Indian farmers and businessmen on theu- lands. It is in 
the west that Indian pressure on Fijian land has been greatest. Apisai Tora, a 
westem Fijian campaigner for the NFP, had earlier opposed the Alliance Party for 
agreeing to land reforms that helped Indian tenants and once called for the 
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deportation of Indians; (Tora eventually became a principal in the AUiance Party 
and one of the ringleaders in the anti-Indian Taukei Movement of 1987). Tora's 
partner in die NFP, Isikeli Nadalo, had led Fijian growers into a separate union 
during a sugar industty strike. He advocated that conttacts remain witii the land 
on expiry of a lease so that Fijians could more easily enter the industry and he 
expanded his own farm after evicting Indian tenants. In 1975 another association 
was formed in the west by Fijian cane growers who felt that Indian domination of 
the largest union impeded their progress. 
The episode of the Westem Tuis Association showed the ambiguous political 
potential in regionaUsm. Regional sentiment had been a basis for the first Fijian 
political parties and for their evenmal merger with the Indians' party in opposition 
to one headed by eastem chiefs. Yet cultural bonds and old political ties ensured 
continued eastem dominance. Most westem communities acknowledge ttaditional 
ties with paramount chiefs of southeast Viti Levu and the eastem islands and these 
ties have been reinforced by a sense of Fijian unity galvanised by the 
encroachments of non-Fijians. Westemers' attitudes toward the eastem chiefs 
have been ambivalent: a continuing resentment against them and the advantages 
their people have always enjoyed, yet an acceptance of their claims to be the 
defenders of the race. After independence the Fijian Association's sttategy was to 
respect the westemers' claims to autonomy by honouring their chiefs as a means of 
securing the region's support for the AUiance. Party conventions were sometimes 
held in important westem villages. An editorial in the vemacular press remarked 
on indications of "a sttonger unity and understanding between the west and east 
which can strengthen the ties that our former chiefs ignored".' But the 
ambivalence persisted and from time to time leading westemers switched from the 
Alliance to the NFP or an ally. 
In the late 1970s the Westem United Front (WUF) grew from a clash between 
Fijians and the government authority in charge of forestty on their lands. The 
owners complained about non-payment of rents and royalties: "Western 
landowners provide 65 per cent of the money that finances the Native Lands Trast 
Board yet we receive only nine per cent of its service".^ Led by a local chief, WUF 
eventually joined forces with the NFP. Like the Westem Tuis Association it was 
an aggressively ethnic body. In the 1982 elections the leaders defended their 
alUance with the NFP as a means by which westemers could overcome their 
powerlessness and participate in government.^ 
The political ambiguity of such regional organisations and the ambivalence of 
their leaders were underUned in the actions of the Tui Nadi, the wealthiest and most 
outspoken westem chief. First he was Ratu Mara's champion in the Westem Tuis 
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Association and later his opponent from WUF. In alliance with the NFP he 
declared his loyalty to that party's Indian leader and praised the Indians, their 
culture, and connibution to Fiji's development: "We should look to them for 
guidance...I was bom and brought up with Indians, so I will be an elder in the 
coaUtion to advise on both sides." But he also commended the anti-Indian Fijian 
Nationalist Party: "Our aims are die same for our Fijian family. There is need for 
govemment where Fijians rale."'^ The potential for ethnic miUtancy in the west 
was most dramatically shown in early support there for the chauvinist Taukei 
Movement after the defeat of the AlUance Party in 1987 by a westemer-led party. 
The NFP did not draw its Fijian supporters only from die west. Two high-ranking 
men from southeast Viti Levu had helped the party since 1968 and in the 1972 
elections a brother of an eastem chief contested for the party in the chief's area. 
These prestigious campaigners enabled the party to exploit parochial divisions and 
conflicts among Fijians. 
The use of this sttategy contributed to the emergence of the exttemist Fijian 
Nationalist Party (FNP). Though only a minority of Fijians ever voted for the party, 
it voiced widespread frastt-ations with the AUiance Govemment, put the Alliance 
Fijians' committnent to multiracialism to test, and ureparably damaged die accord 
widi die NFP. 
The origins and impact of the FNP will be recounted in detail for this episode 
iUuminates some of the contradictions and conflicts that characterised independent 
Fiji under Alliance Party rule and contributed to Fijian support for the coup in 
1987. 
The Fijian Nationalist Party (FNP) 
The FNP was formed in 1974 by Sakeasi Butadroka, a commoner from Rewa in 
southeast Viti Levu. After tertiary education abroad he quickly became one of the 
most respected Fijians in govemment, though always outtanked by an Indian. He 
resigned to manage a cooperative selling viUage produce and on the sttength of 
this work was elected chairman of the Rewa Provincial Council. From there the 
CouncU of Chiefs appointed him to a committee to devise ways of getting Fijians 
into business. He helped ran the Rewa Provincial Council Development Company 
which planned to purchase buses and tracks. Elected to parliament in 1972 and 
appointed Assistant Minister for Commerce, Industry, and Cooperatives, he was 
well placed to promote development projects. But within eighteen months he was 
expelled from die AlUance Party. 
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The ttouble began in 1973 when he worked against the AlUance in a by-election 
in Rewa. The contest was marked by a provincial jealousy sttengthened by the 
NFP's efforts to woo Rewans in previous elections. In 1970 Ratu Mosese 
Varasikete had challenged the Alliance man, a commoner, by saying Rewans 
should have theU own chief in parUament: "There must be a trae Rewan voice!"" 
Ram Mosese was a son of the previous Rewan paramount; the Fijian Association 
acknowledged his popularity in die vUlages and admitted that the AlUance won by 
town votes.'^ The NFP sponsored another chiefly candidate in Rewa in 1972. She 
opposed Butadroka, the AUiance man, and stressed that the NFP was also backing 
Ratu Mosese again elsewhere: by voting for the NFP Rewans would be supporting 
theu- chiefs! Butadroka won but complained that the NFP had stkred up provincial 
jealousies. The foUowing year he played on these same sentiments during AlUance 
preparations for the 1973 by-election, in a multiracial electorate that included 
Rewa. He wanted the Alliance to endorse a local commoner who had left a 
govemment job to start a business. Instead the party chose Mosese Qionibaravi, an 
eastern islands commoner who headed the government-sponsored Fijian 
Investment and Development Corporation. He and Butadroka had both resigned 
high official posts for business careers. But the younger Qionibaravi had the edge. 
His academic qualifications were higher, he was more successful as a manager, and 
he now posed a threat to Butadroka's political ambition. 
Butadroka's opposition to Qionibaravi arose partiy from the failure of the Rewa 
Provincial Council Company. In applying for bus routes it had come into conflict 
with Indian operators. The Transport Control Board allowed the Rewans only a 
restricted licence and this together with poor management led the company into 
debt. Butadroka reproached Indian proprietors for obstructing the venture and 
accused Fijians on the Board of bettaying their people.'^ While Butadroka's 
business hopes were frastrated Qionibaravi's career advanced, free from Indian 
competition and with plenty of official support. He was appointed managing 
director of a hotel company and invited on to the boards of other corporations 
including a multi-national and the govemment-ran Sugar Corporation. 
The failure of the Rewa company intensified provincial jealousy, eUte rivalry, 
and racial resentments. Butadroka and other Rewans attributed Qionibaravi's pre-
selection as AUiance candidate to non-Fijian delegates voting in defiance of Fijian 
wishes. Qionibaravi denounced his opponents for arousing "the ugly head of 
tribalism",' and the Fijian Deputy Prime Minister called for a reaffirmation of 
loyalty to Ratu Mara and "the multiracial phUosophy". '^ Though Qionibaravi won 
the contest Butadroka claimed that most Fijians in the multiracial electorate had 
voted for the National Federation candidate in protest against the govemment's 
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failure to help village people. The by-election, he said, showed diat die Fijians 
believed AlUance policies were now against tiiem. He wamed Fijian leaders not to 
be so satisfied with their houses and chauffer-driven cars that they forgot the 
people who voted them in.'^ 
Expelled from the AlUance, Butadroka rallied his followers to launch the Fijian 
Nationalist Party." They marched tiirough the city to hand the govemor-general a 
manifesto complaining that govemment poUcy drowned the objectives of the Fijian 
Association and demanding the country's constimtion be changed to ensure that 
Fijians would always be in conttol: 
This party was founded out of despair for the protection of the 
indigenous people of this land...The sacred pledge of the British 
Crown to the Fijian chiefs and their people, as embodied in the 
Deed of Cession, has been eroded...With independence came the 
emergence of a Fijian elite...They had the opportunity to implement 
British promises to maintain Fijian paramountcy...But they have not 
used this opportunity and so have lost the mandate of the Fijian 
race...Our leaders are sacrificing Fijian interests for the sake of 
party politics...giving too many concessions to the other races.'^ 
The demand for Fijian dominance resurrected an old objective of some leaders in 
the Fijian Association, suppressed in the 1960s by their seniors under pressure from 
the colonial ralers. The perceived threat from the Indians' Federation Party had 
helped to submerge the internal dispute. Ten years later Butadroka was 
challenging a Fijian Association leadership firmly in power. That very power 
encouraged intemal rivalry once again and critics of senior leadership were more 
likely to be heeded by a fi-usttated Fijian public now that Indian political miUtancy 
was gone. 
Three factors had combined to bring about the rift. One was the propensity for 
rivalry within the Fijian political elite arising from the economic opportunities 
associated with its new-found conttol of the state. The stakes of the political game 
were much higher than in colonial days. PoUticians and civil servants were being 
appointed as directors in business comparues and in state corporations in addition 
to controlling the provincial allocations of resources for raral development. In 
these ways Fiji was perhaps on the way to becoming like certain other post-colonial 
societies where political straggle has been intensified by use of the state to create 
and apportion jobs and wealth. 
Another factor was the provincial jealousy inflamed by a spate of elections. No 
other area had experienced so many contests. Though the provincialism annoyed 
Butadroka when he stood for the Alliance against an NFP candidate of chiefly 
rank, it later gave him a base from which to challenge the Alliance. 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
114 Race and Politics in Fiji 
The third factor was the contradiction inherent in the Alliance Party. As 
interracial "middlemen" die Fijian Association principals walked a tight-rope. They 
had recognised the danger of Fijian disaffection from the start and had reacted most 
defensively against the formation of the Fijian Chamber of Commerce a few years 
before; its leader later tried to start a party in protest against the failure of the 
independence constitution to give Fijians more power. 
The three lines of conflict came together in the bus company episode. The 
faUure of the venture heightened antagonism toward Indians. But Rewans also 
conttasted their fnisttation with the successful shipping company that Ratu Mara's 
own eastern islands province had established with his assistance and without 
competition from Indian enterprises. The Rewan debacle was, too, a personal 
frasttation for a fiercely ambitious commoner made sharper by the triumphs of his 
eastem rival. 
In parliament Butadroka accused Ratu Mara of frastrating Fijian efforts to 
achieve a share of business. He condemned the prime minister for decUning to 
help the Rewa company because he was "frightened of a few Indian 
operators...frightened to teU them: please give some licences to the Rewans instead 
of the Indians monopolising the whole ran".'^ There was trath in the aUegation 
for the Alliance Party relied on the support of several bus owners. Editorials and 
letters in the vemacular press complained that Indian businesses were obstracting 
Fijian effort and that the Fijian leaders' failure to help conttavened the CouncU of 
Chiefs demand that Fijian business initiatives be encouraged.^*' Outside parUament 
Butadroka complained diat the Native Lands Trast Board was not acting against 
Indians who owed rent. He travelled the countryside inciting landowners to 
intimidate their tenants by surtounding houses.^' He protested about Indian 
advantages in business, civU service promotions, and at die new university.^^ 
The racialist attacks culminated in a motion to parUament that the Indians "be 
repatriated,...their travelling expenses and compensation for properties to be met by 
the British Govemment."^^ The Indians' response was influenced by their anger at 
the govemment's faUure to stop the intimidation of farmers and a suspicion that 
some AlUance leaders agreed with Butadroka, reinforced when the Minister for 
Fijian Affairs briefly halted land ttansactions after clashing with NFP leaders in 
parUament. 
Ratu Mara's cautious counter to Butadroka's demand merely asked parUament 
"to reaffirm the credit due to the Indians...for the role they have played and will 
assuredly continue to play in the development of Fiji".^^ His Alliance colleagues 
condemned Butadroka's motion but would not endorse the NFP caU for the House 
to affirm that Indians "are fuU and first class citizens, tiiat Fiji is their homeland. 
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and that they are here to stay..."^^ Some said they understood Butadroka's 
feeUngs. Ratu David Toganivalu, widely liked for his moderatism and intertacial 
sociability, was the most candid: 
Ethnic feeling and rivalry are real...One must be honest in saying 
that all Fijians feel at times the sentiments expressed in the motion. 
There is no use hiding it. This is how we feel at times. At certain 
moments of anger this is what we say. He is not the first person to 
say it...It is helpful that I should say this because you really cannot 
take positive steps to progress the national cause unless the two 
races are utterly frank with each other...The moment of ttuth has 
come...We are being too academic condemning Butadroka when in 
fact he might be echoing the soul of the Fijian people.^' 
The impact of Butadroka's motion was not to encourage a bi-partisan rejection of 
his racial chauvinism but to damage the accord that had been built between the 
AUiance and the NFP. The highUght of the debate was Siddiq Koya's bitter charge 
that some in the Alliance Party shared Butadroka's objective to expell the 
Indians.2^ 
AUiance reticence in face of Butadroka reflected fear of his popularity. The rise 
of the Fijian National Party had been predictable given the dual role of the Fijian 
Association. To its vUlage audiences it presented the AUiance as a means by which 
Fijians could secure power and away from the villages it endorsed the party's 
concessions to Indians and foreign investors. The Fijian Association's principal 
campaigners dramatically illusttated the middleman role as they moved to and fro 
between kava ceremonies welcoming them in backwoods villages, the bars and 
snooker tables of multiracial urban clubs, and negotiations with sophisticated 
overseas businessmen. 
Butadroka voiced racial anxieties that had been strengthening since preparations 
for self-govemment began fourteen years before: "This courageous member from 
the vanua of Burebasaga knew that he could be dismissed and lose his salary for 
what he did, yet he did it for the Fijians and we are all grateful to him;^...The 
grass roots Fijians will suffer because the Govemment is mainly concemed about 
the Indians' welfare;^*'...The Indian community will continue to pressure the 
AlUance for equal opportunity because they (the AlUance) emphasise that the party 
is for aU races - no-discrimination. Fijian chiefs must watch out for this because we 
don't want someone to come and take away our most valuable property, the land. 
Why don't Indians accept our ways, know our culture and respect the dignity of the 
Fijian race? Fijians are as gentle as sheep. Don't stir their emotions. Butadroka 
should be praised for he speaks out what is in the minds and hearts of Fijians 
today".^' FNP leadership was drawn from a wide spectram of Fijian enterprise: 
ttade unions, small business, and the church, a pattem to be repUcated in die Taukei 
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Movement whose protest marches for racial supremacy encouraged the miUtary 
coup in 1987. Few of the principals in either movement were of high ttaditional 
rank. 
In the 1960s Fijian apprehensions about political change had outweighed 
frasttated economic aspirations and secured the leadership of the high chiefs in 
their alliance with non-Fijians. After the consolidation of a Fijian-dominated 
govemment in 1970 economic frasttations came to the fore with the catalyst of 
intra-eUte rivalry. Fijians began to pressure their elected leaders through marches 
and road blocks. Yet few of these protests expressed opposition to Indians. More 
often they voiced grievances about the govemment's management of the land, 
complaints that the owners were not receiving enough from deals with big 
companies or from govemment projects.^^ Butadroka's FNP appealed not just to 
Fijian ambivalence toward Indians but to the discontent of ordinary people with a 
govemment that seemed to favour the wealthy and powerful. Though the Indian 
presence was seen as the most visible representation of an intensifying competition 
for economic opportunities, it was certainly not the major obstacle to Fijian 
success. 
The FNP seemed to signify the appearance of an antagonistic ethnicity comparable 
to that in Sri Lanka. But in fact this development has been much less sttong in Fiji, 
even in the political crisis of 1987-89. The explanation lies partly in the 
comparative strength and coherence of the sttuctures and culture of ttaditional 
Fijian society which have limited the capacity of such movements as the FNP and 
its successor the Taukei Movement to reconstitute Fijian ethnic identity as a 
sustained aggressive assertion of racial superiority. The symbolic potency of these 
movements and events has been mitigated by the established relationships and 
symbolism of routine social and political life. The movements have had, as it 
were, a kind of redundancy in relation to the old structures in which Fijian 
identities are sustained. I shall retum to this point in the concluding chapter where I 
consider the course of the present crisis. 
Fijian Nationalism and the Political Crisis of 1977 
The Nationalists atttacted sufficient votes in the 1977 elections to so weaken die 
Alliance that victory came unsought to the Indians' NFP.^^ Butadroka 
exhuberantly declared he had prayed for this to prove that the independence 
constitution die Alliance chiefs had signed did not secure Fijian rule. He called a 
rally to demand a conference be held immediately to create a new constitution 
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Racial Composition of Support for Political Parties as 
shown by Voting in Communal Electorates - Percentages 
(See Appendix Table 6 for details) 
1977 Elections to House of Representatives - Round 1 
Alliance Party 
22.60 
Nat Fed (NFP) 
/ 
\ 
N 
\ 
/ 
100 
Rjians I Indians D Others 
• Understates Fijian support because one Alliance nominee retumed unopposed. 
* One AlUance nominee retumed unopposed. 
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affirming that Fiji belongs to the Fijians. He was later gaoled for statements 
"likely to incite violence".^^ Yet in the elections there had actually been some 
cooperation between his party and the Indians' NFP and, with former NFP 
campaigner Ratu Mosese Varasikete as their new president, the Nationalists no 
longer talked of deporting Indians. 
The NFP won 26 seats, the Alliance 24; the remaining two Fijian seats were 
taken by Butadroka and a westemer sympathetic to the NFP. The Indians were 
diffident victors. Their prospects would depend on the cooperation of one of the 
latter two Fijians and ability to contain a rift developing within the party. The 
leadership had begun to polarise after the debate on Butadroka's repatriation 
motion and the contention worsened during negotiations with the Alliance to 
amend land legislation, one faction reaching agreement with the goveming party 
whUe the other held out for better terms. 
The intemal division together with a fear that Fijians would not cooperate with 
an Indian-dominated govemment produced argument and procrastination, much to 
the disgust of NFP Fijians with cabinet posts in their sights. The leadership had 
hoped to shake the AlUance but not to defeat it. The NFP had gained sttength as 
diligent guardian of Indian interests while pragmatically accepting the need to 
preserve Fijian political supremacy. The Indians' success was an embarrassing and 
ominous slip in the national political game. 
Ratu Mara refused an NFP invitation to form a coalition govemment; to have 
accepted would surely have strengthened Butadroka's hand. Within days of the 
election the governor-general, Ratu George Cakobau, reinstated Mara as prime 
minister. Koya protested that he was about to announce his cabinet and condemned 
the govemor-general's action as proof that Alliance leaders were determined an 
Indian must never be prime minister. The Alliance agreement to form a minority 
govemment was, he said, an "insult to the Indian community". But one NFP 
principal publicly doubted his party's ability to secure the loyalty of the civil 
service, poUce, and army. Ramrakha, Koya's main rival, argued that the govemor-
general's decision was constitutional and urged people to accept it. 
The factions united to fhisttate the AlUance and compel the govemor-general to 
dissolve the House. Yet in the preparations for the ensuing elections the NFP split 
into two groups with rival candidates. Koya's team continued to denounce Mara's 
reinstatement as an assault on Indian rights. The other group, under Ramrakha and 
Irene Narayan, took a moderate course, provoking Koya to allege they had a secret 
pact to help die Alliance in retum for a share in govemment.^' The campaigning 
was marked by sttonger racial concerns and accusations than in previous elections, 
though this did not discourage cooperation once more between elements of the 
NFP and Butadroka's party. The AlUance swept in with 36 seats against the 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
The Contradictions of Independent Fiji 119 
Racial Composi t ion of Support for Polit ical Parties as 
sliown by Voting in Communal Electorates - Percentages 
(See Appendix Table 6 for details) 
1977 Elections to House of Representatives - Round 2 
Alliance Party Nat Fed (NFP) 
1.32 
82.47 
16 21 
10.27 
99.73 
M Rjians M Indians D Others 
* Understates Fijian support because one Alliance nominee retumed unopposed. 
** Two AlUance nominees retumed unopposed. 
*** Combines Fijian and General voters. 
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NFP's 15. The two NFP groups gained more Indian votes than ever before, 
though the moderate faction was most popular. The Alliance recouped the 
support recently lost to the Nationalists. 
The elections of 1977 were marked by an erosion of the Alliance Party's 
narrow Indian base and the dissolution of the NFP's tiny Fijian following in the 
west. The racial impasse was soon underlined again when Ratu Mara denounced 
Indian politicians who questioned a government proposal to rescue the Native 
Lands Trast Board from debt. He condemned their protest as a chaUenge to Fijian 
landed interests and wamed that "blood wiU flow" if the Fijians' "deep emotional 
feeUng" for their land was not respected.-' Many Indians viewed the outbiu-st as a 
vindication of their doubts about Mara's commitment to multiracialism. The 
secretary of the Indian AlUance lamented that building support for the party was 
like building a house of sand: "Our work has been washed away by racial 
statements in parUament".^^ 
The optimism many Indians had felt after a land reform in the late 1960s and the 
political agreement that led to independence was fading. Increasing uncertainty 
about the availability of land and a trend in govemment policy to favouring Fijians 
in assistance for higher education and civil service appointments contributed to 
substantial Indian emigration from the early 1970s. 
Racial Opposition Deepens: The Elections of 1982 
Racial issues dominated the 1982 elections.'*' A founder of the Alliance Party 
resigned as president of its Indian wing rebuking Ratu Mara for ignoring Indian 
needs: "Indians have been made tools of convenience and once the election is over 
and Ratu Sir Kamisese is seated again in the prime minister's chair, he treats them 
like a bunch of coolies".'*^ Attempts to build popular support for the Indian 
Alliance had been impeded by its tiny representation in the govemment, usually 
less than 20 per cent of cabinet ministers (no more than allowed General Electors 
who numbered fewer than 10 per cent of the voters). The Alliance was under 
pressure to maintain a strong Fijian majority to contain the potential for ethnic 
nationalism. In 1983 Fijian membership of cabinet stood at 72 per cent (Appendix 
Table 8). Moreover the party increasingly reUed upon Indian minorities (MusUms 
and Gujaratis) to the anger of Northemer and Southerner Hindus, long the party's 
most important Indian supporters. 
Decisive for the elections was a bitter controversy about political sttategy 
recommendations from Austtalian researchers conttacted to advise the Alliance 
govemment. The NFP's pu61ic screenings of an Austtalian television 
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Racial Composition of Support for Political Parties as 
shown by Voting in Communal Electorates - Percentages 
(See Appendix Table 6 for details) 
1982 Elections to House of Representatives 
Alliance Party NFP & WUF Coal 
4.79 13.64 
81.57 on T 
Rjians B Indians D Others 
* 90 per cent of these votes were for candidates of the Westem United Front, an 
exclusively Fijian body. 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
122 Race and Politics in Fiji 
documentary on the issue angered Fijians offended by its derogatory remarks 
about their chiefs. AUiance speakers accused the NFP of being anti-Fijian^ and 
NFP leaders complained that Indians were still tteated as foreigners: "Why after a 
hundred years are we still regarded as Icai India (people from India) instead of kai 
Viti (people of Fiji)? Why is there still no common name for Fiji 's 
citizens?^...There are different cultures in Fiji but everyone has the same blood. 
Every day in our hospitals Indians receive blood from Fijians and vice versa. We 
are all people first and our needs are the same". 
The NFP campaigned with a new Fijian group, the Western United 
Front(WUF). Its principals included prominent chiefs, one just resigned from the 
Alliance government; several leaders were provincial councU heads and one was 
president of a cane growers' association. WUF's founder justified the coaUtion as 
a means for western Fijians to share in government ° and emphasised how 
Indians could help them progress: "Indians and Fijians were put together 100 
years ago as a gift from God but they have been blind to it. If Fijians want to 
improve their life they should seek help from Indians". ' Indeed it was time the 
Indians showed they could lead the countty: "The worst thing that happened was 
when in 1970 the leadership was given to a chief. Since then, with the mixing of 
ttadition and politics, Fijians have mistakenly believed the prime minister must 
always be a Fijian".^^ The NFP president blamed WUF's faUure to draw much 
support on AlUance propaganda pomaying the coalition as anti-Fijian and Indian 
leaders as 'vulagi' (foreigners) and alleging the coalition wanted an Indian prime 
minister.^ 
The election acrimony produced a more chauvinist mood than usual in the 
Council of Chiefs. Delegates endorsed the Fijian National Party call for 
constitutional reform to secure for Fijians a majority in parliament and the offices 
of prime minister and govemor-general. Though Ratu Mara and his deputy Ratu 
Penaia Ganilau argued against the motion they declined to vote and the new 
president of the Indian Alliance rebuked party leaders for not condemning 
"degrading remarks against Indians" by one Council of Chiefs delegate.^'^ 
Economic Conditions and Social Change 
Race tension had deepened in national politics during a period of affluence 
sustained by favourable export markets, a larger share for farmers in sugar profits, 
and a strengthening multiracial trade union movement. In the first decade of 
independence employment opportunities proUferated and living standards rose. A 
survey conducted for the government by a foreign research team in 1983 presented 
an impressive picture of complementary growth of agriculture and business in 
which most people were living weU by Third World standards and the destitute 
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were few.^' Fiji was the success story among post-colonial societies of the region: 
"There are few countries in the world that enjoy her combination of relative 
prosperity, social harmony, and freedom from repression".^^ 
The prosperity came mainly from a sugar industry buoyed by privUeged access 
and prices in the EEC secured by Fiji's former colonial ruler and organised as 
before on the basis of labour-intensive small-holder farming. The govemment's 
takeover of the industry in 1973 coincided with increasing world demand. 
Production expanded and the growers received a much larger share of the profits 
than they had under the CSR Company.^^ The increased local circulation of 
wealth stimulated other sectors of the economy including manufacturing, ttade, 
and service, as well as creating more jobs in sugar production. Sugar profits 
funded die expansion of the civil service and education and allowed regular wage 
increases. 
Through a govemment-sponsored scheme Fijian participation in cane farming 
increased from 17 per cent in the mid 1970s to 25 per cent in 1982.^^ Fijians 
unable to secure regular cash incomes could usually fall back on the village 
economy of mixed subsistence and cash farming on family lands. This "security 
net" offset the low wages paid to Fijian rural workers, those on the copra 
plantations and the itinerant cane harvesters. For many Fijians "periods of viUage 
residence bridged the gaps between stints of employment in the formal 
economy".^" 
The prosperity strengthened two features of the class structure with 
conttadictory consequences for national politics. The widening economic basis for 
a multiracial labour movement was a potential political threat to the Alliance 
government. At the same time the emergence of a small stratum of Fijians 
enjoying a share in capitaUst enterprise, largely by means of powerful positions in 
the state, increased the likelihood of political instabiUty should the govemment be 
defeated. 
By the mid 1980s there were 40,(X)0 unionised workers, approximately half the 
wage labour force.^' Unions ranged in size from more than 6000 members in each 
of the two public employees unions (white collar and blue collar) to those with 
fewer than 50. Most were affiliates of the Fiji Trades Union Congress (FTUC). 
The Public Servants' Association was the most forceful union in the labour 
movement. It was well funded and dominated the FTUC.^^ In the 1970s blue-
collar leaders had been at the forefront. The new ascendancy of white collar 
unionists was to be a source of conflict among founders of the Labour Party. 
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After a period of frequent strikes and wage rises a national structure for 
managing industrial relations was put in place, first the Tripartite Foram in which 
leaders of labour, employers, and government agreed on guidelines for pay 
increases, and later a "Permanent Arbittator". This corporatist sttategy of labour 
conttol was soon threatened by the collapse of the Foram and the launching of the 
Labour Party. 
The strengthening of the union movement as an arena of leadership with 
political opportunities was paralleled by the growth of managerial and property 
interests and aspirations in the Fijian political and administtative elite, often in 
league with non-Fijian businessmen.^^ This came about mainly through the 
initiatives of Fijian-conttoUed statutory authorities. The Fijian Investment and 
Development Corporation bought shares in companies conttoUed by non-Fijians 
and its numerous directors included prominent commoners as well as chiefs.^ *^ 
Later the Native Lands Trust Board set up the Fijian Land Development 
Corporation. It developed agricultural estates, became shareholder in the Fiji Hour 
Mills and other manufacturing enterprises, and took over the country's bookshop 
chain."' Then the Ministry of Fijian Affairs introduced the Business Opportunity 
Management and Advisory Service (BOMAS) to help Fijians start small businesses 
such as taxis, shops, professional services, and garages with funds from the 
Development Bank.^^ Several provincial councils launched business and 
investment ventures with funds from land rates. A number of politicians and civil 
servants joined the boards of companies owned by non-Fijians and some acquired 
shares. 
Certain members of the leading chiefly families combined the new sources of 
wealth with their privileged share of the rents paid by big investors for the use of 
customary lands. By the 1980s the tiny but wealthy Fijian "bourgeoisie" included 
the prime minister and several members of his immediate family.^'' The use of 
political advantage to facUitate accumulation of personal wealth became a central 
issue of public debate in die ran-up to the 1987 elections. 
Official efforts to secure for some Fijians a share in capitalist profits during a 
period of economic growth heightened wider Fijian jealousies of the non-Fijian 
advantage in business. As we have seen the Nationalist Party was rooted partiy in 
an intta-elite rivalry fuelled by the new economic aspirations and powers. For 
years Butadroka pressed the govemment to estabUsh a Fijian Development Instimte 
to promote the growth of a class of Fijian entrepreneurs."^ The official projects fell 
weU short of the Nationalists' demand partly from a concem to protect estabUshed 
non-Fijian interests. For aU the ostensible efforts by the AlUance ralers to promote 
a Fijian business class Fijian earnings from tourism remained tiny.^^ 
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Economic Downturn 
The prosperity of the 1970s was precariously based. Subsidised sugar exports were 
Fiji's Achilles heel. When the world market began to contract in 1981 the 
preferential tteatment under the Lome Agreement was cut to less than half the 
crop. Then cyclones decimated the cane. The growers' income feU from F$35 per 
tonne in 1980 to only F$19 in 1984.^^ The downmm in foreign ttade affected die 
other major exports, gold and copra, and there was a rapid impact through the rest 
of the economy."' The social effects of stagnation and deepening inequaUty were 
exacerbated by rapidgrowthin the numbers of people seeking jobs. In the 1970s 
popidation increase was absorbed by a new ttend to extended schooUng. But in the 
early 80s school leavers flooded the market.^^ Most in 1983 could not find paid 
employment and few secured jobs in unionised sectors of the work force.^' 
While economic growth slowed and jobs became scarce the real wages of 
unionised labour continued to rise. A rift widened between people enjoying the 
good wages and security won in the 70s and those unable to follow them, the 
young, and the farmers and workers losing out in the depressed sugar industry, and 
the growing numbers of non-unionised workers in manufacturing. The tension 
between rising expectations and rapidly falling opportunities contributed to an 
increase in crimes of theft and violence by young Fijians in the towns and 
disaffection in the viUages."^ 
These economic and social problems provoked a stark divergence of leadership 
responses which conttibuted to the military coup in 1987. Conservative Fijian 
leaders resolved to reinstate paternalistic village administtation to save their people 
from corraption in an economicaUy failing and immoral Westemised society and to 
counter the erosion of their own political conttol. At the other extteme some union 
leaders moved left and formed the Labour Party. 
The Reactionary Movement in Fijian Administration 
The '70s compare with the 1930s as a period of liberalism in the management of 
Fijian affairs: a relaxation of official authority and an increased engagement with 
the money economy followed by a reactionary move to restore tight conttols (See 
Chapters 3 and 4). 
From the late 1950s the Fijian Administtation had come under criticism from 
researchers as an obstacle to the peoples' advancement. For social scientists and 
govemment planners concemed to bring self-determination to the colonies this was 
the era of naievely sanguine assumptions about the certainty of progress via 
Western values of individualism and market competition. The most influential 
critic of colonial poUcy in Fiji, Austtalian geographer Oscar Spate, echoed earlier 
British administrators in urging a change from traditional "communalism" to 
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modern "individualism". The Fijian Affairs Board later appointed Rusiate 
Nayacakalou, a young Fijian anthropologist and critic of the Administtation, to 
guide reforms. In his report to the Council of Chiefs he spoke of a "clamour for 
freedom among the village people"." On his recommendation the Fijian 
Regulations were abandoned, including legal sanctions compelling obedience to 
chiefs and officials. Adult franchise was inttoduced for the provincial councUs. 
The position of Buli, district administtator, the most powerful official in local 
govemment, was aboUshed and that of Roko Tui, provincial govemor, was sttipped 
of its old powers. 
The reforms made it easy for young people to move to the towns where with 
rising consumer aspirations they became more aware of the advantages enjoyed by 
non-Fijians.'^ The urban experience engendered in many a sense of inferiority 
and resentment. A coherent identity sustained in the relative uniformity of viUage 
life had less support in the diverse social encounters of the city. Yet in the vUlages 
there was growing impatience with the consttaints of ttadition no longer backed by 
law, and frasttation over the lack of economic opportunity. 
The economic downturn in the early 1980s especially disadvantaged the Fijians 
because of their generaUy lower school achievement. Youth unemployment was 
exacerbated in the countryside by the declining availability of arable land.'^ 
Groups well-endowed with land used to readily give needy neighbours access for 
subsistence farming. This generosity was now often compromised by a desire to 
devote more land to cash crops or cattie. Associated with the conflict between 
commercial and subsistence use of land was a ttend to individuaUstic or narrow 
family control of profitable lands. Some people were achieving commercial 
success "at the expense of the subsistence needs of many others". The 
Employment Mission attributed youth disaffection in the villages partiy to this 
ttend.'4 
The economic frasttations were compounded by resentment toward chiefs. A 
feeling among young people that chiefs are behaving selfishly in demanding 
service but returning less was "exttemely widespread and frequentiy expressed".'^ 
For years such resentments had occasionally been voiced in the popular press: 
Most chiefs no longer serve their people. Most think the people 
have nothing to do with their privileges and status. They are so rich 
by the money from the land lease that they forget their people...The 
chiefs are up there living in affluence while the people are down 
here Uving in poverty".'" 
Village chiefs were often reluctant to chastise miscreant youngsters for fear that 
inabiUty to enforce their orders would further weaken their position." There was a 
rising incidence of delinquency and crime and a swelUng of the Fijian population 
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of die prisons to the shame and constemation of elders. It was especiaUy an urban 
problem with Indians and other non-Fijians the main victims. But there were also 
rampages by gangs in Fijian viUages and in country towns. A vicious circle set in 
as the courts' practice of sentencing minor offenders created a population of 
prison-hardened young men.'^ 
Fijian elders had begun to call for a return to paternalism soon after 
Nayacakalou's reforms. When delegates to the 1975 convention of the Fijian 
Association denounced "the increasing lack of discipline and respect for law and 
order amongst the youths"'^ the Fijian Affairs Board appointed a "Cultural 
Committee" to assess the problem. Its report criticised the liberalisation of the 
Administtation, the debasement of cultiu-e by tourism, the neglect of ttaditions in 
school curricula, and the absence of leadership in the towns. A leading Council 
of Chiefs senator proposed the government set up a "Fijian Culmral Institute" to 
revitalise interest in ttadition and respect for elders and to teach youth "to be proud 
that they have a race" - "They have lost their roots. They have gone asttay..Because 
they have lost their faith in their culture, because they do not know what their 
culture is, tiiey are a lost race, diey are living deads..."^' 
The reactionary mood was most forcefully expressed in the rhetoric of an 
independent candidate who challenged an Alliance chief in the 1982 elections: 
Under the Alliance Fijians have been the losers. Young Fijians 
have lost their ttaditional values and have ended up committing 
violent crimes and fUUng the nation's gaols...We must retum to our 
chiefly ways under the ttaditional system. Everyone must know 
their duties and understand their position in Fijian 
society...Development under the AUiance govemment has rained 
the Fijian way of Ufe...Our communal way of life is bankrapt^^ 
In proposing the revival of sttong village govemment the Council of Chiefs echoed 
Govemor MitcheU and Ratu Sukuna who had reacted against the liberaUsm of the 
1930s. The Council maintained that Nayacakalou's reforms had failed because 
they "ttied to impose the idea of individualism on a people who are essentially 
communal in outlook". The reforms had removed the elements that had given 
"order and direction to vUlage life": the regulations and officials, and the authority 
of chiefs. This had "allowed Fijians to go their own way and in many cases they 
thought Uttie about the welfare of theU village".^^ 
The Council of Chiefs commissioned the Pacific Islands Development Program 
in Hawau to research the problem. The report endorsed the Council's concem: the 
Uberal reforms had been a misguided "experiment to promote individualism and 
economic competitiveness": 
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Tradition was seen as an impediment to economic advancement. 
Village life and the communal responsibiUties entailed by it were 
regarded as an obstacle to be overcome rather than a way of life to 
be sttengthened.^^ 
The report detailed proposals for reconstracting the Fijian Administtation as a 
frame for cohesion and discipline. Some Indian opposition leaders who had often 
called for abolition of separate govemment of Fijians now supported the attempt to 
sttengthen it as a means of countering the drift to the towns and the pressure on 
urban jobs.^^ The restoration began amidst increasing deUnquency in villages and 
towns and the development of a new interracial urban-based political movement. " 
The Progressive Movement: The Labour Party 
In 1984 a commissioned foreign research team concluded that the rising wages of 
unionised labour amidst "deteriorating economic circumstances" had become "a 
major problem", burdening other income earners and discouraging investment. 
Government should therefore freeze the wages of public employees. The 
implementation of this recommendation without consultation antagonised labour 
leaders. The FTUC withdrew from the Tripartite Foram, proposed a general strike, 
and announced plans for the Labour Party. Principals in the new movement were 
from the Public Servants' Association, the mainly Indian Fiji Teachers' Union, the 
Fijian Teachers' Association, and the Bank Employees' Union. They were joined 
by the Anti-Nuclear Group and there were links with the National Farmers' Union 
and other affiliates of the FTUC. There was intellectual input from university 
lecturers who had been encouraging Marxist social analysis. 
It was not the first attempt to build a political movement on the basis of class 
conflict. Twenty years earlier the Federation Party had grown from the farmers' 
struggle with the CSR Company and drew support from industrial unions with 
Fijian as well as Indian members. But it developed mainly as defender of the 
Indians during decolonisation, supported by businessmen, professionals, civil 
servants, and prosperous farmers, as well as the poor. The leaders were anti-
colonial populists, not socialist reformers. They railed against the hegemony of 
Austtalian capital, British officials, and comprador chiefs, emphasising the aim of 
freeing Fiji from foreign overlords. After independence the leaders accepted a role 
as moderate voice of the Indians more interested in working with the Fijian-
dominated govemment than in overthrowing it. Siddiq Koya, bold champion of 
the common people in the Federation's heyday, reacted with defensive hostUity to 
the Labour Party. He called for laws to stop the political use of union funds and 
even warned diat Labour's multiracialism threatened the Indians!^^ 
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Laboiu: Party leaders gained confidence from the NFP's collapse once more into 
squabbling factions and from widespread Fijian dissatisfaction with Alliance rale. 
They focused on employment, cost of living, and social service issues, 
"capitaUsing on a groundsweU of discontent with the wage freeze and deteriorating 
economic conditions"^^ They talked of "democratic socialism", proposing to 
nationalise such enterprises as the Austtalian-owned gold mine, to reform the 
administtation of land to give ordinary Fijians a larger share in the rents, to set up 
growers' and workers' councils, and to coin a common name for all citizens: "The 
AlUance has raled by accenmating racial differences. Our first objective wiU be to 
unite the people and then our other priorities will fall into place...Unless we 
cultivate trust among ourselves we cannot resolve such things as the land 
problem".^ The party favoured non-alignment in foreign policy and proposed to 
reinstate Ratu Mara's former ban on nuclear-armed ships. These objectives 
challenged ties the Alliance govemment had recently been building with the USA. 
More threatening to some Alliance leaders was Labour's promise to investigate 
corraption allegations. 
Timoci Bavadra, a Fijian doctor and head of the PubUc Servants' Association, 
was elected president. He was chief of a clan in a west Viti Levu village whose 
principal chief sat in the AlUance cabinet. With Bavadra were twenty-four office-
bearers including thirteen Fijians and nine Indians, a more balanced leadership 
than any other party's had been. But Alliance efforts to dissuade Fijian workers 
from joining were supported by the Fijian leader of the blue collar public 
employees. He wamed that the party would serve only white coUar interests and 
appealed to ethnic jealousies. A Confederation of Blue Collar Workers Unions was 
launched with its Fijian leaders defending the govemment's wage freeze." 
Union leadership had long been split between the political parties and the 
division did not neatly cortespond with race. The Alliance Party's major Indian 
support came from a farmers' union. The political disunity of Fijian labour 
leadership was underlined in a 1978 by-election when the mineworkers' leader 
stood for the Alliance in competition with Fijian unionists from two factions of the 
NFP. A feature of class formation across the racial division, however, has been its 
propensity to intensify, racial rivalry, especially in the perceptions of Fijian 
employees and farmers. Leadership rivalries within the labour movement had been 
a factor in the Fijian breakaway unions of the 1960's and Indian predominance in 
cane farming had disposed Fijian farmers to form their own associations. 
By 1980 most Fijian unionists were with the AUiance, including Apisai Tora, a 
former NFP campaigner. They were more inclined to sttess racial rather than class 
issues. Leader of the Dockworkers' and Seamens' Union, Taniela Veitata, declared 
before a Fijian Association convention just after the launching of the Labour Party: 
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"Anybody Dying to offer an altemative to the AlUance govemment is challenging 
the Fijian people and the tilings they hold dear...To challenge die present leadership 
where the principal chiefs are is to chaUenge the Fijian race." He depicted the new 
poUtical initiative as a threat from die Indians: "Other races are wives to the Fijian 
people and as wife you should know your limit...You have taken everything from 
us and the only thing we have is the conttol of our country. It now appears you 
want to take the husband's role and rale this country".^^ Some Fijian unionists 
who joined Labour were opposed by many of their rank and file, just as were 
Fijian labour leaders who once joined the old NFP. 
The outbursts of Veitata and others were extteme expressions of a fear on the 
part of Fijian leaders that Labour might attract a sttong following, particularly 
among young townsfolk.'^ Alliance rhetoric about the need to.preserve racial 
unity, the importance of the chiefs for this, and wamings that Labour was a threat 
to chiefly leadership and to land, underlined the anxiety. Bavadra responded by 
declaring that his party respected the autiiority of chiefs in ttaditional life: "The 
Laboiu: Party recognises that our ttaditional chiefs are here to stay and no one, least 
of all a poUtical party, can undermine their authority within the vanua system (land 
and community)". The foremost chief, the Vunivalu of Bau, gave his approval for 
Labour to canvass support in the villages under his authority.^ Ratu Mara 
derided Bavadra's respectful approaches to chiefs as a "political gimmick" and 
many western chiefs reaffirmed their allegiance to the Alliance after Mara's 
personal efforts to revitalise their support."^ 
Municipal elections revealed Labour's sttong Indian support, particularly in 
Suva where it won eight of the twenty seats and the offices of mayor and deputy-
mayor. The party fielded Fijian candidates in several towns and two of the 
victorious Labour eight in Suva were Fijians, half the Fijian members of the 
Council. However, it is difficult to determine how much Fijian support a Fijian 
candidate had because the electorates were all multiracial with Indians 
predominating. 
The task now was to broaden the party's following. Public service unionist 
Mahendra Chaudhery urged that Labour be "based on realities. It must 
accommodate the interests of " labour, farmers, and honest employers".^^ The 
problem of adjusting socialist ideals to the need to build strength by replacing the 
NFP in the allegiances of the innumerable Indian business people was highlighted 
in Chaudhery's campaign in a raral by-election. He assured them they had nothing 
to fear: "Labour and capital cannot be divorced. If you choke capital you choke 
labour".^' There were uncertainties, too, in relations with famiers who feared the 
party would demand more pay for the impoverished itinerant workers steadily 
replacing family labour in cane harvesting.^^ 
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Evenwally Labour linked up with the largest segment of the NFP to fight the 
AlUance in the 1987 elections. The compact forced Labour to abandon its aim of 
nationalisation for the party had initially proposed to nationalise the Indian-
controlled transport industty. An Alliance leader derided the partnership as 
"capitalism of the NFP married to sociaUsm of the FLP (Fiji Labour Party)". The 
conttast was clear in the profiles of Coalition victors in the elections. Half Labour's 
fourteen MP's were of the "working class". The successful NFP candidates were aU 
of die "middle class or the bourgeoisie". Most AUiance Party winners were of the 
"bourgeoisie"."^ 
Conclusion 
The events and ttends reviewed in this chapter give further support for the model of 
society and poUtics in Fiji as a "force field" that contains different and sometimes 
opposing action potentials. Economic and social change after independence 
produced contradictory potentials for political mobilisation. It was a period of 
increasing convergence of Fijians and Indians in the same occupations: in 
commercial farming, wage labour, the civil service, and salaried employment in 
private enterprise. The extent to which the class dimension of the society was 
widening across the racial division was evidenced in the strengthening union 
movement, one of the most notable features of Fiji in its first fifteen years of 
independence. At the same time there was growing Fijian discontent with the 
Alliance govemment over the management of the commercial development of 
mataqali lands. On this issue Fijian resentment toward the allied powers of 
govemment and foreign business often outweighed apprehensions about the more 
fragmented and weaker Indian pressures on the estates. 
The changes that were sttengthening the potential for intertacial cooperation 
also deepened in many people a sense of racial rivalry for the same economic and 
social goals, leading some Fijians to support Butadroka's Nationalist Party. The 
opposing potentials for a politics of class and a politics of aggressive ethnicity were 
strengthened by the very same changes: widening participation in the money 
economy accompanied by an accelerated rate of urbanisation and a weakening of 
old ties of authority and cooperation in the Fijian viUages. 
Yet the ttend to militant ethnic consciousness among Fijians did not simply 
express a resentment of Indian economic successes. It was a challenge to the 
established Fijian leaders, a potential for radical reconstraction of ethnic political 
organisation. The political stability of the period can be understood in terms of the 
capacity of Fijians in the Alliance Party to retain ethnic leadership through conttol 
of what continued to be the most politically potent "cultural capital" of Fijian 
society: the ideals and symbols of chiefship. It was by their conttol of these cultiu-al 
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resources that the Alliance Fijians could reconcile three conflicting projects: to 
hold the reins on ethnic mobilisation, to manage the accommodation with Indian 
demands, and to promote the interests of the wealthy. 
It seems lUcely that a major straggle for Fijian leadership would have deepened 
racial conflict in a way comparable to the outcome of the intra-ethnic political 
rivalries that emerged in Sri Lanka in the 50s and in Malaysia in the 60s. The 
estabUshed Fijian poUtical leadership was more seriously threatened by a poUtical 
movement founded in interracial class interests, than by Fijian ethnic chauvinism. 
The toppling of this leadership in the 1987 elections brought the conttadictory 
ttends of the 1970s and 80s to a head: class and militant ethnicity. 
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Coup D'Etat and the 
Quest for Fijian 
Supremacy — Events 
and Structure in the 
Crisis of 1987 
You have given your decision. That decision must be accepted. 
WhUe I am naturally disappointed...I am proud that we have been 
able to demonstrate that democracy is aUve and weU in Fiji. 
- Ratu Sir Kanusese Mara to the people of Fiji after the 
defeat of his govemment in the April 1987 elections.' 
When a political party loses, and that party is the sole and final 
guarantor of your values, you would be forced to do something 
about it...I am a commoner and to see my high chief (Ram Mara) 
being accused of cortuption with no proof...the language used 
against him I wiU never accept nor would any right thinking Fijian. 
- Colonel Rabuka justifying his coup d'etat in May 
1987.2 
Events: Elections, Coup D'Etat, and the Appeal to Chiefship 
Some of the main election issues in 1987 were the old ones: the waming that an 
AlUance defeat would endanger the landed interests of both Fijians and Indians, the 
need to preserve stability under Ratu Mara's leadership, and the counter charges 
that the Alliance is racialist and serves the wealthy and powerful, and the 
insistence that the racial compartments must be broken and the people united as a 
nation. 
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But for die first time there was an opposition headed by a Fijian and offering a 
thoroughly multiracial slate. The Coalition contested every seat and atttacted 
broader interest than the NFP ever had on issues ranging from the cost of living, 
unemployment and crime, to corrapt practices in the rating party and the goal of a 
nuclear-free Pacific. 
AUiance leaders, fearing Labour might win enough Fijian votes to threaten their 
power, tried to neuttalise the party's appeal on the economic and welfare issues. 
Their campaigning was marked by urgent and testy rhetoric waming of threats to 
the fundamentals of Fijian life: chiefs and land. Ratu Mara accused the Coalition of 
trying to undermine ttaditional leadership by publicising disputes among Fijians 
including one in which his wife was sued by clansfolk over her management of 
rents from a tourist resort. The Coalition's objective, Mara charged, was "to 
destabilise ttaditional leadership by bringing it into ridicule". Bavadra repUed: 
Chiefly authority rests on mutual caring by the people for then- chief 
and the chief for the people. The chief is there to serve the people. 
We respect the chiefly system but condemn the manipulation of 
respect for chiefs for political ends...The chiefly system should be 
separated from democratic politics. 
AlUance abuse of chiefly power, Bavadra aUeged, extended to uneven funding for 
the different regions. The Coalition would correct these imbalances, particularly 
the long neglect of Fijians in the west.^ 
As in past elections Alliance speakers maintained that chiefly leadership 
safeguarded the Indians no less than the Fijians. The president of the Indian 
AlUance said that the chiefs had helped to protect Indian farms. He wamed that the 
Coalition would have no influence in the Council of Chiefs whose support is 
necessary for securing "our leases". In any case, he claimed, "the Fijians in the 
Labour Party want to destroy the chiefly system because once the chiefs are 
removed the Indians wiU go next. Our security lies with the ttaditional leadership 
in the Alliance...Because it is so hard to change the land laws people need a leader 
lUce Ratu Mara to approach the CouncU of Chiefs".^ Dr Bavadra complained that 
Alliance campaigners were saying "only chiefs can be prime minister" and that he 
was just a puppet of Indians." 
Coalition proposals to reform the administration of land to allow ordinary 
Fijians more of the rents and to open up unused lands were rejected by the Alliance 
as a threat to the Fijians' security (Bavadra was shouted down in the Council of 
Chiefs when he merely tried to explain his party's land policy). A ttade union 
leader emphasised the need to preserve the Fijian Association because it originated 
from the Council of Chiefs. He wamed that "the country was going through a 
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dangerous period in which young educated Fijians were being used as a front to 
defeat the Alliance^...If the Fijian Association is destroyed the Fijians will end up 
like the Maoris in New Zealand and the Aborigines in Australia"." 
The Coalition won with twenty-eight seats: seven Fijian, two General, and nineteen 
Indian. The Alliance Party took twenty-four: fifteen Fijian, six General, and three 
Indian. While many more Fijians supported the Coalition than ever had favoured 
the NFP, still they were a very small proportion of the Fijian voters, less than ten 
per cent in the communal contests. The Coalition's Fijian and General MPs won 
their seats largely with Indian votes in the national multi-ethnic electorates. 
Nonetheless the new cabinet was more racially balanced than the Alliance 
government had ever been: seven Indians, six Fijians, one General (For comparison 
with the Alliance cabinet 1974-1984 see Appendix Table 8). 
Many of the Fijian supporters were in western Viti Levu and westerners 
descended on Suva to celebrate Bavadra's win, acclaiming the fulfillment of the 
old prophecy that a westerner would one day triumph.^ But though Bavadra had 
played on western grievances in his campaigning he was careful after winning to 
re-affirm his respect for the eastem chiefly establishment by visiting the ageing 
Vunivalu of Bau, a founder of the Alliance Party and former governor-general. 
The Coalition victory did not give Indians control of parliament. There were 
still twenty-two Fijian, twenty-two Indian, and eight General members, as there 
would always be under the 1970 constitution. The Coalition's power in the House 
of Representatives was going to depend on the party's Fijian MP's. Just two 
defections could break it. Even if the party held all its Fijians a proposal seen to 
threaten Fijian interests could be rejected by Council of Chiefs delegates in the 
Senate. It is true the Coalition won mainly by Indian votes. But its opponents' 
denunciation that Indians now ruled was baseless. The fact was disregarded in an 
aggressive surge of Fijian ethnic chauvinism. 
Within days of the elections several Alliance Fijians in the new parliament 
organised mass protests in Suva and the west. Ringleaders included westerner 
Apisai Tora (militant trade unionist turned conservative minister in the fallen 
government), Taniela Veitata of the dockworkers' union (a new MP), and several 
other new Fijian MP's expecting advancement in a continuing Alliance 
government. The rallies and marches resembled those after the NFP victory in the 
1968 by-elections in Indian communal constituencies. As then Alliance Fijians of 
highest traditional rank did not publicly support the protestors. Indeed two of the 
four leading chiefs lu-ged Fijians to accept the new government. But many people 
interpreted Ratu Mara's silence as evidence of his complicity, confirmed, they 
would soon say, by his swift decision to collaborate with the coup makers. 
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Racial Composition of Support for Political Parties as 
shown by Voting in Communal Electorates - Percentages 
(See Appendix Table 6 for details) 
1987 Elections to House of Representatives 
Alliance Party 
4.39 
16.16 
NFP & Labour Coal 
D.91 10 06 
79.45 89.03 
M Rjians M Indians D Others 
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The militants denounced the Coalition victory as a subversion of Fijian security 
and power: "The Fijians appear to have lost their country". The first rally was held 
in Dr Bavadra's home village of Viseisei in western Viti Levu. The high point was 
a moving speech by Apisai Tora: 
We are not a wealthy community but we have shared our only asset, 
the land, generously with others...Our generosity has been used to 
slap us in our faces...to deprive us of the paramountcy which the 
Deed of Cession guaranteed and which the fathers of the present 
constitution undertook to protect for all Taukei forever...This sacred 
covenant is now broken...Upon us is imposed a new colonialism 
from within our own country by those who arrived here with no 
rights and were given full rights by us the Taukei...We cannot 
remain silent as our traditions are endangered, as the leadership of 
our turaga (chiefs) is spumed, as our land, our only asset and the 
source of our security, is put in the control of others...The new 
government received support from a mere six per cent of the Fijian 
electorate...It is an imposition upon us Taukei in our own 
country...We cannot become strangers in our own land. 
At a rally in a lower-class suburb of Suva on the other side of the island Ratu Inoke 
Kubuabola spoke of "the desire of the chiefs and their people that their rights be 
safeguarded in their own land...The chiefs and their people are being ruled by 
vulagi (foreigners, visitors, not trae people of the land)".** 
The protestors named themselves the Taukei Movement and, echoing the old 
Fijian National Party, petitioned the governor-general to change the constitution to 
ensure that Fijians will always "lead the country". Ratu George Cakobau, 
paramount of the Viti Levu confederacy of Kubuna, opposed them and urged 
Fijians to respect "the peoples' choice of a new government". The vemacular 
weekly also condemned the militants: "It is like rejecting the sovereignty of the 
Queen of Fiji and Great Britain whom the govemor-general represents...We must 
put our sadness behind us and the interest of Fiji in front". But the protest 
movement was strengthened by the Lauan peoples' anger at the toppling of their 
-Own paramount, Ratu Mara.*^ Many Lauans and other eastemers who lived and 
worked on the main island were at the forefront in the marches. 
When hundreds of Fijians thronged outside parliament to dissuade the twenty-
four Alliance politicians from attending the swearing in only five of the latter dared 
enter. A week later Colonel Sitiveni Rabuka, third in command of the Royal Fiji 
Military Forces and traditionally loyal to both the governor-general and the 
defeated prime minister as paramounts of the eastem islands Tovata confederacy, 
entered the parliament with twelve masked men and abducted the Coalition 
members at gunpoint. The army's commander, a son of the paramount family of 
the Viti Levu- based Kubuna confederacy, was overseas. After retuming he alleged 
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that Taukei leaders instigated the coup and that the army had become their 
instmment.*^ (A majority of the Taukei leaders were Tovata men, among them a 
small core group who held religious offices and hailed from Rabuka's own disoict. 
The Tovata/Kubuna division was later to become more salient as many Fijians, 
including some Taukeists, came to see the coup as an instrument for Tovata 
hegemony). 
Rabuka's action was influenced by his service with other Fijian soldiers in the 
United Nations peace-keeping force in Lebanon, by meetings with Taukei leaders 
and with the govemor-general, and by a desire to avoid a situation in which the 
army might be ordered to act against Fijians.*^ Indeed the commander had 
lectured the troops, almost exclusively Fijian, that they must support the new 
govemment and that their readiness to subdue Fijian rioters would be the test of 
their professionalism.*^ Rabuka declared his objective was to restore peace and 
stability by establishing Fijian political supremacy. In the turbulent six months that 
followed he tried to set up an interim regime as the basis for changing the 
constitution to achieve this goal. He assured Indians he would protect them and 
wanted them to remain in Fiji. But for a few weeks there was unprecedented 
violence, particularly stoning and arson attacks against Indian homes by young 
Fijian men, sometimes with assaults and robbery. The attacks continued 
sporadically for a long time, and there were incidents of intimidation and physical 
abuse by members of the military. Taukei leaders claimed the coup had averted a 
catastrophe for the Indians, but some repeatedly warned that they would use 
violence, if necessary, to achieve Fijian supremacy. The violence that did occur, 
however, does not compare with that which had erupted in conflicts in such 
countries as Sri Lanka, Malaysia, and Guyana. Very few Fijians took part. 
The governor-general, Ratu Sir Penaia Ganilau, a former army leader and 
Rabuka's paramount chief as head of Tovata confederacy, condemned the coup on 
radio and asked the soldiers "to return to their lawful allegiance".*^ But he 
refrained from stronger action such as visiting the barracks. He would most 
probably not have had Ratu Mara's support nor that of the Council of Chiefs. To 
have failed such a test of authority amidst the initial Fijian euphoria over the coup 
might have irreparably weakened his capacity to influence the course of the crisis. 
The power of individual chiefs in this unprecedented situation seemed uncertain. 
The principle of defending the dignity and authority of chiefs against the political 
ascendancy of vulagi (foreigners) was at the heart of the ideological justification of 
the coup. In Fijian culture chiefship is the sanctified possession of its community 
from which the people believe they derive identity, honour, and strength.*" It is not 
simply the prerogative of the particular chief. A chief's sustained opposition to the 
coup might well be ignored in a professed bid to defend the chiefship. 
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A week after his coup Rabuka told a Fijian crowd outside a meeting of the 
Council of Chiefs: "The sooner we accept a new constitution the better, for we will 
be preserving what is dear to our hearts - the chiefly system, our land, and 
Christianity. All will be returned to normality once these are accepted".^" For 
several weeks the army published propaganda in the Fijian weekly Nai Lalakai 
under the headings "The Call to War is Sounded. Fight On! Fight On! In the Spirit 
of God". The articles stressed the need to protect chiefship and Christianity: 
Are we Fijians prepared to be raled by an unchiefly and unChristian 
system?...The army is trying to protect the chiefs and their 
people...It is the duty of the warrior tribe to protect the chief... 
...The seventeen years of Ratu Mara's leadership saw the Taukei 
well protected in the midst of the vulagi. No sooner had the chiefs 
fallen from leadership and their places taken by the commoner, the 
instability of the country began. This is because the commoner 
(implicitiy Bavadra) tried to take the chiefs' place... 
...When the base of our chiefly system is shaken it is not long before 
the in traders try to bring down the whole order...The army wants to 
restore chiefly leadership so that our faith, our land, our language, 
and our culture are preserved...When one's customs and culture die, 
the language and the race that uses the language also dies... 
...Now is the time to recognise the danger we are in and fight for our 
rights before we are pushed over the cliff...Our actions will be 
recorded in golden letters because we are saving the Fijian race... 
...What Rabuka did accorded with God's plan. Providence planned 
that our men should train in the Middle East for the task they are 
doing now...Colonel Rabuka was ready to die for this objective. 
...We are relying on God to be the Lord of this land. We should not 
worship other gods. Nor should we worship wealth, moon and sun, 
or the intellectuals. Only Jehovah should be Fiji's God...If leaders 
of the land are non-Christian the Fijian race will be wiped out. 
The army line was closely in tune with Taukei rhetoric: "The election outcome was 
±e culmination of a long Indian straggle to oust the chiefs from leadership of the 
country":^^ 
In the first Taukei meeting at Raiwai the Ratu (a prominent Kubuna 
chief) spoke and said: 'Ratu Mara's govemment has been defeated 
and so all the chiefs in the land have been defeated'...The chiefly 
woi'ds from the Ratu stirred our hearts and we were ready to oppose 
the new govemment and be arrested by the police or shot by the 
soldiers in carrying out our aims...The Fijian race should be 
working together to uphold the chiefly system for this is the task 
which God has given us...The rise of the Taukei Movement and the 
support the army gave it in overthrowing the Bavadra govemment 
proves the importance of the chiefly system in the Fijian way of life, 
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a way that must be maintained for it accords with the wishes of 
God...The basis of the Taukei Movement is tiiat the chiefs are from 
God and the Fijians are to uphold tiie chiefly system.^^ 
The theme of religious validation for the coup was pronounced in the 
correspondence columns of the vemacular press: "God assigned a certain people to 
a certain land and with tiiis their language, culture, and colour"; "Fiji was given to 
the Fijians by the great God Jehovah and it is wrong in the eyes of God if we are to 
let others own it with us".^ 
Structure: The Control of Ethnic Militancy 
Some commentators have given central attention to the question of external 
influences in the coup. Their emphasis on the fragmentary evidence of possible 
foreign interventions has typically been flawed by inadequate knowledge of the 
intemal forces at work in the country's political history. Indeed their assessments 
perhaps say more about Westem mind sets on intemational conspiracy scenarios 
than about the configuration of factors behind this particular coup. 
In Fiji army intervention had long been seen as a real possibility in the event of 
an election win by a predominantiy Indian party. Fear of this outcome was a reason 
for the NFP Indians' hesitation after their victory in 1977 and for their zealous 
absorption in intemal rivalry when offered a second chance to win a few months 
later. For decades the army has been an important institution in Fijian life. Under 
the command of the high chiefs, seen to be acting for the British monarch, many 
men fought the Japanese in the Pacific war and communist terrorists in Malaya. 
Since 1978 Fijians have served in the UN peacekeeping force in the Middle East. 
Prominent features of the first attempt to form a national Fijian political body were 
the mobilisation of ex-soldiers for a protest march against a perceived threat from 
an Indian farmers' union, and a promise of support from leaders of the battalion 
fighting in Malaya. A few years later the troops were deployed to control Indian 
unrest (the farmers' strike of 1960). Families commonly have ex-servicemen 
members, and the value placed on military service as a special virtue of the race 
has long been reinforced by memories of the Indians' failure to serve in the Pacific 
war. 
In the following pages I examine the crisis in the light of features of society and 
politics discussed earlier in the book. I will begin by considering the general 
question of the degree of autonomy enjoyed by an army: the extent to which in a 
coup the military leaders have been able to exercise power independentiy of other 
actors in the society, individual and collective. 
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MiUtary autonomy in a coup and its aftermath can be thought of as inversely 
related to the extent to which the population is organised as a civil society, 
especially in respect to a system of economic production and exchange: the degree 
to which institutions, structures, and groups have developed with functions in 
managing society as a whole, particularly economy. (Sometimes, as in the Fiji case 
in respect to chiefship, it is not possible to draw a sharp Une between such factors 
and the stractures of the state). 
The issue of autonomy is clarified by conttasting features of many army coups 
in Latin America with some common features of such interventions in post-
colonial Africa. Civil society in Latin America is generally more strongly 
developed at national level. For example there have long been coherent social 
classes with the resources and initiatives to direct a national economy. But deep 
confUcts have often prevented a particular class or alliance of classes from rating 
with the consent of the others. The army has commonly intervened in the context 
of such "crises of hegemony".^^ Typically the new regime has been based on an 
alUance of miUtary officers with social class elements that proceed to impose their 
economic projects on society. A classic pattem in some countries during the first 
half of the twentieth century was that of a progressive bourgeoisie, supported by 
the army, breaking the power of an old landed oUgarchy and launching projects of 
industrialisation.(Argentina in the 1930s and 40s is a well-known example). In 
recent decades classes that prospered in this process joined again with army 
officers to suppress a popular militancy aroused by expectations of affluence 
which the type of economic development pursued was unable to fulfill. 
Authoritarian regimes have been formed supported by an alliance of local 
businessmen, technocrats, multinational corporations, and military men. (Brazil in 
the late 1960s and 70s is perhaps the best-known case). 
These countries have been characterised by a civil society insufficiently 
developed to manage internal conflicts and therefore providing openings for 
miUtary interventions, but sttong enough to Umit the scope for independent conttol 
by the army. The officers tend to act as arbiters and managers helping to conttol 
intractable conflicts between social classes. They have more often been 
instraments for arrangements of class power than ralers in their own right, though 
they have shared with their civilian allies in opportunities arising in new projects of 
economic development. 
In much of Africa, where cultural divisions often coincide with great regional 
inequalities and a very limited growth of capitalist economy under colonial rale, 
army leaders have often enjoyed more autonomy. Civil society is less coherent in 
terms of economy and culture than in Latin America. There have usually not been 
strong national class groups to set directions and consttaints on army actions. 
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Amidst the relative fragmentation of economy and society the soldiers have 
enjoyed a much freer hand, as graphically illusttated in the personaUst dictatorships 
described by Decalo.^ Even in countries with sttengthening modem economies, 
such as Nigeria since the beginning of its oil boom in the early 1970s, the miUtary, 
or factions in it, appear to have acted with relative independence: coup and 
counter-coup have been closely influenced by competition for economic 
opportunities through conttol of the state.^' These cases illusttate what might be 
caUed a "booty" miUtarism. The army men become conttoUers and expropriators 
in their own right rather than stewards for other controllers of society and 
economy. (Uganda under Amin in the 1970s is the extteme case). 
Fiji would seem to bear a formal comparison with the Latin American pattem in 
respect not to the importance of class forces but to the presence of certain other 
stractures that had become centtal in the management of society, economy, and 
politics. Rabuka quickly assumed a function as manager and mediator of 
contradictory forces, particularly different forms of Fijian political leadership. 
These were the militant ethnicity of the new Taukei Movement threatening 
catasttophe to the Indians and the economy, and the conciliatory style of high 
chiefs who had long held leadership of the state. (Though Rabuka gained strengdi 
from his ability to play one force against the other, there were phases when he 
came close to losing conttol, particularly to Taukei extremists). 
EarUer in the book I argued that in Fiji ethnic relations developed more as an 
institutionaUsed complementarity than as an acrimonious rivalry like that which 
emerged in some African countries and in other former colonies such as Sri Lanka, 
Malaysia, and Guyana. ° This stracture of ethnic relations can be thought of as a 
feature of a relatively more developed civil society. In Chapter 3 I showed how 
the organisation of the indigenous Fijians as an etiinic group became stracturally 
tied with the management of the poUtical economy of the society as a whole. The 
leading chiefs have been not just rallying points for unity in opposition to Indians 
but mediators in that ethnic division, especially in reconciling the immigrant 
Indians' need for land, vital for the national economy, with the Fijians' concem to 
safeguard their ownership. 
The stractures of chiefship, and leading individual chiefs, have given conttoUed 
expression to Fijian ethnic claims in a way that encouraged continuing 
accommodation of Indian needs while limiting the potential for growth of a militant 
Fijian nationalism. Together the leading chiefs have preserved the unity of the 
three confederacies of Kubuna, Tovata, and Burebasaga. The chiefly elite 
combines a conttol of the most politically potent cultural capital - ancient ideals 
and symbols and their blending with modern official institutions - with a long-
established conciliatory style in inter-ethnic relations. These dual ethnic and 
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national functions made the instimtions and personaUties of chiefship a powerful 
constraint on the army, sources of poUtical conttol and economic stabiUty that the 
coup makers were compeUed to work with. There was comparatively littie social 
and political space in which the army might independentiy establish its conttol. 
The institutions and personalities of chiefship were also a resource with which 
Rabuka could resist pressure from exttiemists within and outside the army. 
The collaboration developed fitfully through several phases of conflict. The first 
was the heightened ethnic tension after the elections. The Taukei leaders played a 
decisive part in creating a simation favouring nulitary intervention and Rabuka 
endorsed their goals. But the militants also presented a threat to his power and to 
his task of estabUshing a stable regime. He soon switched his attention from the 
threat of an inter-ethnic straggle to the problem of managing Fijian miUtancy. His 
subsequent actions can be understood as an attempt to "absorb" the militancy into 
the old institutions of chiefship to secure legitimacy for the coup and to re-create 
poUtical StabiUty. He tried to bind Taukei objectives to established stractures of 
chiefly leadership: the three paramount chiefs, the Council of Chiefs, and the 
fourteen provincial councils. These are the institutions and personalities 
conttolUng the cultural and stractural resources upon which both the Fijians' ethnic 
solidarity and their accommodation with Indians have been based. 
Rabuka's first "council of ministers" set up just after the coup in face of the 
govemor-general's opposition was headed by himself and Ratu Mara who had 
joined the coup maker with conspicuous haste ("I was called to help. He was the 
man in charge. I took my place among the others he asked to join...I only came in 
to try to put the fire out" "). More than half the Fijians on the 15 member council 
were from the Taukei Movement. Rabuka next convened a meeting of the Council 
of Chiefs. This and the later provincial councU meetings approved the coup and 
endorsed the Taukei goal of changing the constitution. The Council of Chiefs 
called Ratu Mara to account for his part in drawing up the 1970 constimtion: why 
hadn't he given Fijians political supremacy then?^" Taukei leaders presented a 
tabua (whale's tooth) to the govemor-general in appreciation of the Council of 
Chiefs resolution.-" Large delegations from every province visited the barracks to 
demonsttate their support and present gifts of food to the soldiers. 
There can be no question that most Fijians acclaimed Rabuka's intervention as a 
legitimate assertion of sttength against the powers of the vulagi. The action had a 
legitimacy in the traditional duty of warriors to defend theU chiefs tiiat may even 
have held had Mara joined Ganilau in denouncing the coup. Yet what is most 
significant about the popular response to the crisis was the way in which the old 
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institutions and symbols of ethnic leadership helped to both articulate and conttol 
it, taking from Rabuka, for the most part with his encouragement, the function of 
asserting the ethnic claim and so limiting the political potency of the Taukei 
Movement as a new affirmation of Fijian being. 
After the CouncU of Chiefs endorsed the coup Ram Penaia agreed to cooperate 
as head of a new council including Ratu Mara and Rabuka, but fewer Taukei 
activists than the first. Ratu Penaia declared he was acting in his office of govemor-
general as "sole executive authority" and invoked emergency laws to dissolve 
parliament. He assured the public that the army was now back under his command, 
and Rabuka publicly agreed.^^ Ram Penaia appointed a committee to review the 
constitution by inviting public submissions. Its terms of reference sttessed the need 
"to guarantee the indigenous Fijians' political interests". Meanwhile, the army 
allowed Taukei activists to continue their rallies in towns and villages but blocked 
Coalition attempts to do so.^^ A Fijian campaigner for Dr Bavadra soon 
complained that Taukei speakers were telling people "to be ready for war, buming, 
and kiUing".-^ Taukei committees helped the army recrait thousands more soldiers. 
Rabuka's efforts to pass ethnic leadership from the militants back to the 
established Fijian councils and the leading chiefs culminated in several meetings 
of the two paramount chiefs and the deposed prime minister together with other 
party leaders. The talks concluded by proposing a caretaker government to be 
recraited equaUy from the AlUance and the CoaUtion and headed by the govemor-
general. 
Taukei leaders had monitored the Council of Chiefs meetings and the bi-partisan 
talks, declaring their determination that the demand for Fijian supremacy would be 
met. The objective of the Taukei Movement was to ensure that the Council of 
Chiefs is "involved in every stage of the govemor-general's path to constitutional 
change". "No Fijian has the right to usurp the CouncU of Chiefs authority". 
The Constitution Review Committee's majority report endorsed the Council of 
Chiefs' call for Fijian dominance. But the agreement reached in the bi-paity talks 
simply affirmed the principle of taking "fuU account" of Fijian aspirations for the 
betterment of their interests and of safeguarding all groups in a multiracial 
society.^' "Ratu Mara has again short-changed the Fijians!" declaimed Butadroka 
for the National Party. 
When young men rampaged in Suva against Indians and their property Taukei 
spokesmen insisted that the outburst expressed legitimate anger at the uncertain 
progress towards securing Fijian power in accordance with the Council of Chiefs 
wishes: "There is nothing non-Taukei about fiercely expressing anger when 
disrespect is shown to the chiefs and the Fijian institutions. We are wimessing the 
chiefs' peaceful requests being spumed".^^ They threatened more violence if the 
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objectives of the coup were compromised: "Fijians are warriors who have fought in 
wars...One more in their own land to fight for their rights is no threat". As 
Coalition supporters planned legal action against the governor-general for 
dissolving parliament, Taukei activists, dressed as warriors and holding clubs, 
stationed themselves outside the govemment buildings beneath a stame of Ram 
Sukuna (greatest chief of the colonial era) and prepared an earth oven to which 
they threatened to consign anyone who tried to put Ratu Penaia in court. Then 
soldiers escorted a throng of prison escapees through the centre of Suva to 
govemment house where they breakfasted with Ratu Penaia and promised to 
protect him as their paramount. Fijian supporters of Ram Penaia and Dr Bavadra 
streamed into Suva to camp in readiness for the projected court case and the 
possibUity of a straggle. 
The coup had created confusion about the locus of ethnic leadership. Rabuka and 
the Taukei repeatedly declared they were acting to defend chiefship and 
acknowledged the ultimate authority of the Council of Chiefs. But the militants 
were having an unprecedented influence on the course of events. More than ever 
before leaders of low or intermediate ttaditional rank came to the fore through this 
movement. As self-appointed watchdog for Fijian interests they tried to 
adjudicate the legitimacy of leadership. In this way they threatened Rabuka's 
conttol, especiaUy through their allies among his officers and troops. He yielded 
in face of their anger at the outcome of the bi-party talks, pushed the two high 
chiefs aside and detained Bavadra and his confreres. Again he asserted that his 
intervention was necessary to counter Taukei plans for violence, and he reaffirmed 
his commitment to the goal of Fijian supremacy. 
Rabuka appointed a new Council of Ministers, this time dominated by Taukei 
leaders and army officers. When a further conference failed to secure Coalition 
agreement to constitutional change he declared the country a republic, an action 
the Taukei had been advocating to ensure that change could not be legally 
challenged. Taukei influence was manifest also in the army's support for bans on 
Sunday trading and sport as attempts were made to strengthen ethnic soUdarity in a 
discourse of fundamentalist Christianity. This produced some curious twists in 
public rhetoric, as when a prominent church minister used a sermon to justify 
violence against non-Fijians and criticised some church leaders for using Christian 
values to suppress Fijian feelings. (Christianity had proved a most flexible 
ideological resource, some people initially invoking it to urge acceptance of 
Bavadra's government, others to assert the legitimacy of the coup. Bavadra 
himself, as a lay Methodist preacher, relied heavily on Biblical allusions in his 
rhetoric, putting forward his own "Christian interpretation of the coup"). 
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The reUgious appeal was blended with a new "nativism". Taukei leaders talked 
of the need to "retum to basics" and strengthen Fijian culture. The coup, they said, 
had begun "to release Fijians from bondage and servitude under the influence of 
Westem and Indian cultures...We have patiendy endured the economic leadership 
and poUtical manoeuvrings of foreigners. We've had enough of their artogance in 
dictating terms and conditions to us".'*^ The Fijian communal way of Ufe with its 
virtues of sharing, caring, and respect, was said to be threatened by values of 
"individualism and the profit motive of capitalism";^^ "One of the tilings causing 
disturbance in the land is our taking up Westem styles of life that are foreign to us 
and ungodly".^ Some enthusiasts went to exttemes in advocating a retum to "the 
old ways". One proposed bark cloth for clothing again, thatch houses, and 
ttaditional forms of work and exchange: "Even the Taukei Movement is under 
Westem influence for they taUc in EngUsh and want to be in parUament. There is no 
need for this. Everything can be done fix)m the bure (thatch house) in the viUage". 
He begged Rabuka "to make a law to force Fijians back to the old ttaditions".^ 
Vernacular radio broadcasts played an important part in the new ttaditionalist 
discourse. 
The project of reaffirming the importance of culture, particularly chiefship, had 
already been taken up by the Council of Chiefs and Fijian leaders in the AlUance 
Party in theU efforts to revive the old Fijian Administtation. Long before the coup 
chiefs from all parts of the countty had begun to meet annually to review the 
progress made in this. The coup and the continuing poUtical crisis sttengthened the 
ttaditionalist movement by producing new occasions for action by the old councUs 
and for the affirmation of the ideology and symbolism of chiefly leadership. A 
post-coup gathering of nearly 200 chiefs supported the demands of Taukei miUtants 
to secure Fijian society against disruptive modern influences. In his opening 
address Ratu Penaia urged the chiefs that it was time for them to benevolentiy 
reassert their authority after years of decline. An extraordinary kava drinking 
ceremony reaffirmed the unity among the four paramounts and their 
confederacies.^" 
The Taukei Movement, begun as an instrument to restore Alliance power, 
acquired potential outside the army and within it to grow as an independent force, 
reconsttucting Fijian poUtical leadership. But it can be seen that a notable feature 
of the Taukei initiative was its dependence on ideals and symbols which the 
leading chiefs and chiefly councils ultimately controlled. The Taukei, some of 
whom opposed retuming political power to the high chiefs, had no independent 
conttol of cultural resources or "capital" with which to sustain a widely-based 
miUtant movement like the Sinhalese revivaUsm and militant Malay Islam. 
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The rhetoric of the Christian fundamentalists could not yet seriously contend with 
established ideals and symbols supporting ethnic identity, though the issue of 
preserving restrictions on work and recreation on the Sabbath was to dramatically 
divide Fijian Methodists a year later when the regime finally lifted most of the 
bans. A factor that limits the potential for religion to become the basis for an 
altemative discourse about Fijian ethnic being is the way in which it has long been 
tied in with conceptions of chiefly authority. The common assertion in church 
teachings that the chiefs are "from God" is consistent with pre-European beUefs in 
the divinity of chiefs as mediators between the supemamral and the people and the 
land.^' 
To the extent that chiefs and their councUs occupied the cultural and political 
"space", reinforcing convictions of identity, sttength and worth among Fijians in 
opposition to other peoples, Taukei activism in the name of chiefship was 
ultimately limited in its popular impact by an ideological and symbolic 
redundancy. In this the "movement" resembled earlier episodes of ethnic miUtancy. 
Certain of diese had been encouraged and conttoUed by chiefs as in the formation 
of the Fijian Association in 1956 and in the crisis following the Indian by-
elections in 1968 (Chapter 5). In the 1970s ethnic militancy acquired a rallying 
point in Butadroka and the Fijian National Party in opposition to Ratu Mara's 
govemment. Yet the Nationalists enjoyed a strong following only briefly, partly 
because they lacked the cultural resources necessary to displace the political 
establishment. They were unable to promote a Fijian ethnicity separately from the 
ideology and symboUsm that affirmed the legitimacy of chiefly leadership. It was 
precisely this consttaint that now limited the sttength of the Taukei "Movement" 
and enabled Rabuka to maintain his conttol by passing initiative to chiefly councUs 
and the principal chiefs at sttategic moments. 
Soon after appointing a raMfej-dominated council Rabuka endeavoured to reinstate 
the two leading chiefs as heads of state. Pressure to regain their cooperation 
mounted as his council foundered on a combination of personal ambitions and 
inexperience,^^ and as Rabuka faced the danger of usurpation by extremists 
opposed to his efforts to .bring Mara and Ganilau back to head the regime. Ctertain 
Taukei leaders began to act in ways threatening the economy and ethnic relations, 
one promising Fijians the retum of lands sold to the early white settlers and now 
occupied by Indian farmers. There was also opposition in the CouncU of Chiefs and 
the army to Rabuka's proposal to sever the link with the British Crown and to his 
defiance of his own high chief Ratu Penaia who continued to oppose him.^ Less 
than three months after his second coup Rabuka dismissed the Taukei council and 
appointed Ratu Penaia president. Ratu Penaia in tum gave the prime ministership 
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to Ratu Mara who excluded most Taukei from his cabinet and brought back some 
AlUance colleagues. While one section of the Taukei leadership pledged loyalty to 
the chiefs, another, led by Kubuna people of high rank, continued to criticise Mara 
and Ganilau for by-passing the CouncU of Chiefs and compromising the aim of the 
coup. 
The fusing of military power with the old chiefly leadership of the Alliance 
Party and the splitting of the Taukei movement brought Fijian provincial and 
regional jealousies to the fore. It was no longer simply the old opposition of west to 
east which Bavadra's election victory had underscored, but which was offset by the 
continued alignment of many western chiefs with Ratu Mara. A jealousy now 
deepened among the ttaditional confederacies of southeast Viti Levu and the 
eastem islands whose leaders had shared power in late colonial times and in the 
Alliance govemment. 
Rabuka's efforts to manage Fijian nationalism strengthened the position of the 
eastem confederacy of Tovata and provoked some antagonism from the Viti Levu 
confederacies of Kubuna and Burebasaga. Kubuna's paramount, Ratu George 
Cakobau, had been instramental in persuading the army to release the Coalition 
leaders soon after the first coup in response to pressure from the family of a chief 
traditionally allied to him and among the detainees.^^ Later, Ratu George, 
supported by several other Tailevu chiefs, voiced his displeasure with the regime of 
Mara, Ganilau, and Rabuka (aU of Tovata) by boycotting a meeting of the CouncU 
of Chiefs and asking his provincial council not to allow it to be held on land under 
his authority.^' Though some Kubuna chiefs favour the regime, Ratu George, or 
his successor, is a potential raUying point for widespread opposition to the Tovata 
ascendancy. At one point the provincial tension was reflected in Fijian taUc about 
the possibUity of a third coup, this time Kubuna against Tovata or vice versa. The 
discontents were aggravated by Ratu Mara's proposal that the high titie of Tui Viti, 
ttaditionally conttoUed by Kubuna chiefs, be offered to the Queen as a means to 
retum Fiji to the Commonwealth. 
Several Fijians of the Viti Levu based confederacies Kubuna and Burebasaga 
who had been prominent in Rabuka's council were excluded from Ratu Mara's 
new rcgime. One of them, a most aggressive nationalist, eventually began to work 
with Dr Bavadra and his Fijian lieutenants, urging village people to resist the 
interim govemment's attempts to change die constitution, and extolling the ideal of 
multiracialism. A leading member of one of the highest ranking families of 
Kubuna, he accused the regime of rearranging the hierarchy by force of the gun:" 
an offshoot (Tovata) is trampUng on the head (Kubuna)". The ascendancy of 
Tovata is made aU the more conspicuous by the large numbers of eastemers Uving 
and working on the main island; 26.5 per cent of Fijians enumerated by the 1986 
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census in the province of Rewa, which includes die city of Suva, stated their natal 
provinces as in the eastem islands, and most sttongly represented among them were 
the Lauans.^^ 
My outline has scarcely done justice to the drama of the events: the coup-maker 
endeavouring constantiy to conttol and mediate different social and political forces, 
gaining a degree of independence from leading chiefs by his ties with Taukei 
activists, only to be forced toward the chiefs when those Taukei threatened to 
overwhelm him. And throughout a pageant of ceremony affirming the centtaUty of 
chiefship, the legitimacy of the high chiefs and the chiefly councils as supreme 
authorities in Fijian affairs. 
Some observers have written about a privileged elite securing oppressive power 
by die coup at the expense of the freedom and Uving standards of ordinary Fijians 
as well as Indians. Certainly a major feature in the work of changing the 
constitution is the attempt to retum to the chiefs the numerical predominance in 
poUtical representation which they had begun to lose several decades ago. And it 
is trae that many chiefs have enjoyed economic advantages. But to assess the 
project of changing the constitution simply as an attempt to sttengthen a system of 
oppression and exploitation is to disregard the dimensions of culture, identity and 
honour. It is to underestimate the very potent meaning chiefship continues to have 
in the cultural constimtion of Fijian social and political being. To argue this is not 
to deny the significance of the tensions between chiefs and ordinary people on 
matters of perceived abuse of power, nor the potentialities for alternative 
constractions of ethnic consciousness as evidenced in Methodist fundamentaUsm 
over the last two years. 
My own analysis sustains a theme expounded earlier in the book when I 
considered how the synthesis of traditional and colonial institutions created a 
framework for the management of ethnic relations, particularly in the context of 
economy. From a comparative viewpoint a major aspect of the Fiji case has been 
the way in which those stractures have continued to provide conttolUng functions. 
Without them, and with a group such as the Taukei Movement then having more 
political and cultural space, it is likely that the military would have been quickly 
pushed by extemal and intemal pressures to more repressive action against Indians, 
and that an intense straggle for power among Fijians might also have developed. 
Both outcomes remain possibilities, of course, and fear of the second appears to be 
a reason for the prolonging of the business of constitutional reform. Furthermore, a 
deepening of conflict among Fijians may place Indians in greater danger just as 
political rivalry among Sinhalese so ttagically exacerbated the conflict with Tamils 
in Sri Lanka. 
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At the time of writing the drawn-out process of changing the constitution to 
secure Fijian dominance was fraught by disagreement among Fijians about the 
details of the change. The project had revitalised western efforts to gain formal 
recognition in the manner given to the confederacies of Kubuna, Burebasaga, and 
Tovata.^^ Many Fijians of southeast Viti Levu continued to resent eastem power in 
the present regime. And there was growing argument about attempts in some 
quarters to split Fijians away from Indians in the trade unions. While Indians 
remain despondent about their future, many seeking, if opportunity allows, to leave 
the country, the ethnic division seems almost to have been overshadowed by the 
intta-Fijian conflicts before which the Indians are apprehensive spectators. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have focused on general svstemic features of the course of events 
following the coup as these features were manifested in the different phases 
through which the crisis developed. The episode retums us to the old question in 
social analysis raised in Chapter 1 concerning the dialectics of events and 
stracture.^^ The events of 1987 contained the potential for much greater instabiUty 
and repression than did in fact occur. This outcome would have been likely to the 
extent that the aggressive initiatives taken in response to the fall of Mara's 
govemment could reconstract Fijian ethnic consciousness and generate intemal 
rivalries in a manner comparable to the emergence of militant ethnicity in certain 
other post-colonial societies. 
What is basically at issue here is the question of how such new initiatives, 
particularly die cultural resources utiUsed, are related to die existing cultural codes 
and social and political stractures in which identity has been regularly affirmed. 
What scope or space is there for a reconstruction, and to what extent are new 
initiatives reined and attenuated by the estabUshed forms? To what extent have the 
old stractures and their cultural support in ideals and symbols functioned as a kind 
of sociological "centre of gravity" that dampens the potential for aggressive 
ethnicity when this is occasionally evoked in events of ethnic conflict? I would 
argue that diis has long been a distinctive feamre of events of ethnic conflict in Fiji. 
It has helped to limit the conflicts to negotiable issues. I think we can see this 
feamre of what might be termed the "deep stracture" of poUtics in Fiji even in the 
present situation. Certainly it is trae that consttaint has been a significant aspect of 
the crisis when viewed from a comparative perspective. 
The events of 1987 were in large part shaped and conttoUed by long-established 
stractures. The conception of Fijian being which the Taukei Movement advanced 
was bound to the established meaning of chiefship in Fijian culture and society. 
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To this extent the Taukei Movement reproduced old stracmre. It did not have a 
constitutive efficacy Uke that of die Sinhalese culmral revival movement in Sri 
Lanka which so radically re-shaped social and poUtical consciousness. 
In respect to the ideals and symbols by which they publicly acted there was a 
high degree of congraence, even one might say redundancy, among several sets of 
actors in the crisis: army leaders, Taukei militants, and the leading chiefs and dieir 
councils. Initiatives taken by one could be readily appropriated by or transferred to 
another. But ultimately it was the chiefs and their councils who conttoUed the 
most politicaUy potent "cultural capital", the power of legitimation.^^ Furthermore, 
these cultural resources of political action were sttongly tied to the weU-estabUshed 
social and political arrangements of routine Fijian Ufe. 
We see in the Fiji crisis elements of established structure restricting the 
ttansformative power, the constitutive potency, of the kind of events that in certain 
other societies, such as Sri Lanka, have given rise to catasttophic conflict. These 
elements of stracture have had this capacity because they have long been the mode 
both of organising Fijian ethnic unity in opposition to others, and of 
accommodating Fijian cultural, economic, and political concems with the economy 
and society of Fiji as a whole, illustrated most significantly in the part that 
paramount chiefs have played as boundary keepers and mediators. 
The regulation or containment is not to be thought of as a fixed state but as a 
kind of holding operation with an uncertain future. I would stress the idea of 
process energised by a continuing tension among different potentialities. In future 
research more attention must be given to factors of economic and social change 
that may be weakening the legitimacy of established modes of ethnic organisation 
and leadership by sharpening the disjunctions of popular experience in a manner 
perhaps comparable to the process I described in Chapter 1 for Sri Lanka. In this 
respect closer scratiny needs to be given to the Fijian reUgious miUtancy aheady 
mentioned. A youth movement in the Methodist Church has been encouraging 
antagonism toward Indian faiths. This conttibuted to devastating arson attacks by 
some members of the Fellowship on several Hindu, Muslim, and Sikh places of 
worship in Lautoka, the second largest town. Many Fijian Methodists of all ages 
have engaged in marches and road blocks in protest against the regime's decision 
to ease the restrictions on Sunday activities imposed after the second coup. The 
militancy has split the church leadership and has been encouraged by certain 
members of the political regime, former Taukei Movement leaders. There has even 
been talk of forming a Methodist political party to take over the govemment.^" 
The implications of this movement for a worsening of the situation of the Indians 
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seem likely to depend on the balance of power widiin the army, and the extent to 
which any Fijian power straggle that might develop draws on fundamentalism as a 
cultural resource. 
The events of 1987 were a timiing point in the political history not of Fiji alone, 
but of its region. The coup d'etat cannot be disinvented. It seems most improbable 
that the army might cease to be a crucial factor in Fiji's political life in the 
foreseeable future. Moreover the coup may prove to be a compelling precedent for 
imitation in neighbouring island states, especially as certain regional powers have 
demonsttated their willingness to accommodate a military regime and even to 
exploit its political and economic opportunities. The financial advantages that have 
become increasingly available to people in conttolUng positions in the regime, 
through links with local and foreign investors, and with foreign govemments, wiU 
be an obstacle to the restoration of democratic politics. When retention of political 
power comes to be perceived as decisive for econonuc chances rivals are unlikely 
to be tolerated in a contest by rales of the democratic game. 
These matters are beyond the scope of the present book. My concem has been 
to examine one aspect of the crisis, paradoxicaUy that of consttaint. I've suggested 
that the limiting factors are to be understood in terms of the character of Fijian 
leadership and ethnic solidarity. In seeking to identify once more the distinctive 
features of edinic politics I had seen in earlier events my aim has been to contribute 
to the comparative sociology of ethnic conflict, not to comprehensively assess the 
particular historical situation. 
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Chapter 4 Regional Differences in Society and Politics 
1. The following discussion is based on research in Suva in the 1960s and 70s. 
For comparison see I. Chauhan "Leadership and Social Cleavages" (a smdy 
of multiracial society in the town of Labasa), and A.Mamak Colour,Culture 
and Conflict (a study of ethnic relations in a lower class suburb of Suva). 
2. Letter to Charles Jeffiies, 28 September 1946, C083 244/14 PRO. 
3. C083 244/14 PRO. 
4 R.Norton Race and Politics, 1 st ed. p.39. 
$f My thinking about these differences was assisted by discussions with Ram 
Narayan Govind. 
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p.120-121 and Indians, and K.Gillion Fiji Indians Ch.8. 
7. P. France Charter; M. Walter "The Conflict of the Traditional and the 
TraditionaUsed"; R. Nayacakalou Leadership. 
8. My account of society in the east draws from: W.R. Geddes "Cultural 
Change in Fiji" and "Fijian Social Sttucture in a Period of Transition", 
Nayacakalou Leadership, A.M. Hocart "Chieftainship in the Pacific", 
"Early Fijians", and Lau Islands, L. Fison "Land Tenure in Fiji"; B. 
Thompson The Fijians, B. Quain Fijian Village, R. Derrick A History of 
Fiji, Capell and Lester "Local Divisions" and "Kinship", N. Thomas 
Planets Around the Sun, M. Walter "Hierarchical Notions in Fijian Society" 
and "Analysis of Fijian Traditional Social Organisation". 
9. R. Derrick History; J. Legge Britain; D. Routiedge Matanitu. 
10. My description of social pattems in the west draws from: C. Belshaw Ivi 
Tree and "Institutions for Capital Formation and Distribution among 
Fijians", A. Brewster The Hill Tribes of Fiji, Capell and Lester "Local 
Divisions" and "Kinship", L. Fison, "The Nanga", J. Guiart "Institutions 
ReUgieuses TraditioneUes et Messianismes Modemes \ Fiji", A.M. Hocart 
"On the Meaning of the Fijian Word Turaga" and "Early Fijians", D. 
Spencer Disease, Religion and Society in the Fiji Islands, B.Thompson 
Fijians, A. Webb "Observations on the HiU Tribes of Na Viti Levu", and 
published reports of the Native Lands Commission. 
11. CouncU Paper 27 of 1914 and Legislative Council Debates, 1918,p.l73. 
12. R.Frazer Larui Use and Population, p. 112. 
13. C.Belshaw Ivi Tree p.24, "Institutions" p. 187. 
14. On the influence of Bau on colonial administtation of Fijian affairs see P. 
France Charter and T.Macnaught Fijian Colonial Experience. 
15. Legislative Council Debates, 1956, p.l45,203. After 1900 Nadroga was die 
only westem province administered by a local high chief. The Roko Tui 
Nadroga was often the Tui Nadroga or a close kinsman, though his 
traditional authority was confined mainly to the coast. Belshaw 
"Institutions" p. 187, Ivi Tree p.24. 
16. The best account is by T. Macnaught in his The Fijian Colonial Experience, 
Ch.6, and "The Man from Ra". See also Ratu Sukuna's assessment in 
D.Scarr (ed) Fiji: The Three-Legged Stool p.51-58. 
17. CouncU of Chiefs 1917 p.l7; See also Legislative Council Debates, 1914, 
p.184. 
18. Apolosi's letter to Govemor 16 September, 1937. 
19. Acting Colonial Secretary to Govemor, 20 November 1936. 
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21. R. NanonRaceandPoliticsTp.6\-6X 172-176; B.LalPoweraruiPrejudice 
p.57-60. 
22. JoeU Ravai Legislative Council Debates, 1947, p.l 13. 
23. C083 198/7, 202/4 PRO. 
24. A. Bums FJ;: p. 182. 
25. Josua Rabidcawaqa Legislative Council Debates, 1966, p.92. 
26. R. Nayacakalou Leadership p. 102, 105-8; R. Norton Race and Politics 
27. O.Spate The Fijian People p.35,85-96; R.Frazer Land Use p. 122,129,224-
236. 
28. Reports of Fijian Development Fund Board, and O.Spate Fijian People, 
p.64-66. 
29. R. Norton Race and Politics, 1 st ed. p. 23,70-71. 
30. Election broadcast, pubUshed in Fiji Times, 17 April 1963. For a detaUed 
account of the 1963 elections see Meller and Anthony Fiji Goes to the 
Polls. 
31. A.Mayer/nd/fl/u p. 100; R. Nayacakalou Leadership p.95; Fiji Times, 25 & 
26 August 1961. 
32. R. Norton Race and Politics 1 st ed. p.69. 
33. The colonial governor of the day recalls that the desire of many Fijian 
growers to accept the company's price conttibuted to the racial tension: 
"The Fijians, unable to seU their cane and fearful of it becoming unsaleable, 
turned on the Indians and the situation quickly became serious". 
K.Maddocks Of No Fixed Abode, p.l32. 
Chapter 5 Party Politics and the End of Colonial Rule 
1, This chapter is based mainly on field research in the late 1960's and early 
1970's. See also R. Alley "The Development of Political Parties in Fiji", 
and "The Emergence of Party Politics", and T.Roy "Fijian Elections 1966". 
i For the 1963 elections see N. Meller and J. Anthony Fiji Goes to the Polls. 
I. Volagauna 1 March 1956. 
4. Ram WilUam Toganivalu, Election Broadcast, 1963. 
1 Fiji Times, 11 June 1965. 
C Fiji Times, 16 & 17 March 1962; Legislative Council Debates 1961,p.l84-
187. 
7. Volagauna, 10 October 1964. 
I , Ram Mara's speech to Fijian Association annual convention, June 1965. 
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94-96,100-101,104,107-108; See also Fiji Times, 29 July 1970. 
10. Pacific Review 3 January, 11 March 1969; 21,26,30 January 27 Febraary 
1971. 
11. Alliance 31 January 1969; Fiji Times 8 March 1969. 
12. R.Nayacakalou Leadership,p.3i. 
13. Ajodhya Prasad, interviewed in Lautoka, May 1968. 
14. A.D. Patel,Suva raUy, quoted in Fiji Samachar 21 July 1966. 
15. Ram David Toganivalu, interviewed ui Suva, July-November 1966. 
16. This section is based mainly on recordings at political raUies on Viti Levu 
in 1966. 
17. K.C. Ramrakha, Muanaweni, near Suva, 14 August 1966. 
18. Irene Jai Narayan, Muanaweni, 14 August 1966. 
19. Andrew Deoki, Radio speech. 
20. R.I. Kapadia, interviewed in Suva, 8 November 1966. 
21. A.D. Patel, Nasinu, 6 October, 1966. 
22. David Toganivalu, Kalabu, 5 August 1966. 
23. Ibid. 
24. Ibid. 
25. Semesa Sikivou, Raiwaqa Housing Estate, Suva, 8 Augustl966. 
26. Alipate Sikivou, Raiwaqa Housing Estate, 8 August 1966. 
27. Ratu William Toganivalu, Draubuta village in Tailevu province, 29 
September 1966. 
28. Ram David Toganivalu, Kalabu village, 5 August 1966; Lami Parish HaU, 
Suva, August 1966. 
29. Ram Mara, Radio broadcast. 
30. R.I. Kapadia, Nasinu, 17 August 1966. 
31. Fiji Times, 21 June 1966. 
32. Ajodhya Prasad,Kavanagasau,Sigatoka VaUey,15 September 1966. 
33. A.D. Patel, Sigatoka Valley, 25 September 1966, Nasinu 6 October 1966. 
34. M.T. Khan, Nasinu, 6 October 1966. 
35. Pacific Review 7 September, 1966; Century Theatte, Suva, 7 August 1966. 
36. Sigatoka Valley, 25 September 1966. 
37. Pacific Review, 28 September 1966. 
38. Sabeto, 18 September 1966. 
39. Deo Narayan, Sabeto, 18 September 1966. 
40. Penaia Rokovuni, Tavua viUage, 26 September 1966. 
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43. A.D. Patel, Ba, 28 June 1968. 
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45. Mosese VarasUcete, Tamavua, 21 April 1968. 
46. Tamavua,21 AprU 1968; Pacific Review, 16 July 1968,6 September 1968. 
47. Pacific Review, 30 August 1968. 
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49. Pacific Review, 13 September 1968. 
50. Fiji Times, 17 and 30 September 1968; J. Anthony "The 1968 By-
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51. Fiji Times, 27 September 1968. 
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53. Pacific Review, 20 and 24 September 1968. 
54. Ram George Cakobau, House of Representatives,191 \,p.\92A. 
55. David Toganivalu, interviewed in Suva, 16 August 1970. 
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the NFP in the late colonial period see J.Nacola "ViUagers in Dilemma". 
58. Constitutional Talks: Notes of Meetings Between the Alliance and the 
National Federation Working Parties. Suva 1970 (Privately circulated). 
See R.VasU "CommunaUsm and Constitution-Making in Fiji" for a detailed 
discussion. 
59. An NFP leader recalls that apart from events in the domestic arena, a 
major reason for his group's decision to compromise their objectives was 
their perception that their resources in the international arena had 
weakened. They had been advised by India's representatives at the United 
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principle of equality in common roll elections and becoming more 
sympathetic with the Fijian leaders' opposition to the Indian demands. The 
NFP should therefore shelve the common roll issue and concenttate on 
ousting the British by securing an agreement with the Fijians. (Karam 
Ramrakha, personal communication). 
60. Constimtional TaUcs p.78,94-95,100-101,104,107-108. 
Chapter 6 The Contradictions of Independent Fiji 
1. House of Representatives, 1970, p.l79. For other studies of national politics 
in the late colonial period and the early years of independence, see 
R.S.MUne "The Pacific Way: Consociational Politics in Fiji", and Politics 
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Making in Fiji". 
2. Radio speech, 24 April, 1972. 
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Chick "Fiji: The General Elections of 1972"; R. Norton "Politics in Fiji". 
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7. Nai Lalakai, 23 August 1973. 
8. Fiji Times,13 and 17 Febraary 1975; B. Lai "Politics Since Independence" 
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10. Fifi Sun, 13 March, 2 and 5 May 1982; Fifi Times, 15 June 1982; B. Lai 
"The Fiji General Election of 1982" p.l39 ff. 
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13. House of Representatives, 1972 p.l87, 1541-2; 1973 p.282, 555, 1525, 
2250-51,2196-2201; 1974 p.l9,1359. 
14. Fifi Times, 29 September 1973. 
15. Fifi Times, 1 October 1973. 
16. Fifi Times, 27 November 1973. 
17. Fiji Times, 28 January 1974; For more detailed accounts see J. Nation 
Customs of Respect p.132-146, and R. Premdas "Constitutional Change: 
The Rise of Fijian Nationalism", and C.Henning-Brown "Ethnic PoUtics in 
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19. Houseof Representatives,Novemher, 1912 Tp.l541-2; December, 1973 
p.2196,2433. 
20. Nai Lalakai, 17 May 1973. 
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Colonialism". See also J. Kamikamica "Fiji: Making Native Land 
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5,7,15,22 Febraary 1974, 29 October 1976, 5 & 9 July 1977,1 May 1978, 
3,4,31 October, 8 November, 3 December 1985; House of Representatives 
Debates November 1984, p.l390f. 
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Murray "The Govemor-General in Fiji's Constimtional Crisis"; R. Premdas 
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34. Fifi Times, 10,11,12,18 August 1977. 
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36. Fifi Times, 11,14,15 April 1977. 
37. Fifi Times, 27 June, 31 August, 5 September 1977. 
38. Fiji Times, 1 March-14 April 1978. A Council of Chiefs senator soon 
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die CouncU of Chiefs (Inoke Tabua, Senate Debates September 1978 p.29). 
39. Navin Mahraj, Fifi Times, 17 AprU 1978. 
40. For figures see J.ConneU"Population Growth and Emigration". 
41. For 1982 elections see B. Lai "The Fiji Elections of 1982". 
42. James Shankar Smgh, Fifi Times, 11 May 1982. 
43. Fifi Times, 10 and 17 July, 1982. 
44. Fifi Times, 29 June, 27 September 1982. 
45. Jakam Reddy, Fiji Sun, 4 July 1982. 
46. Ratu Osea Gavidi, Fiji Times, 30 April 1982; B. Lai "PoUtics Since 
Independence" p. 100-101. 
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49. Jairam Reddy, Fifi Times, 27 September 1982. 
50. Fifi Times, 6 and 10 November 1982. 
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52. Ibid, Preface,5. 
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"Export or Perish: Commercial Agriculture in Fiji" p.50). 
54. F. Ellis "Employment and Incomes in the Fiji Sugar Economy" p.8 Iff. 
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Mission, Final Report, p.344. 
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Fijian Leadership". 
64. House of Representatives December 1973 p.2196-2201,2200rFjyi Times 31 
March 1982. 
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and Prejudice p. 18-20. 
66. H. Brookfield "Export or Perish", p.54. 
67. M. Bienefeld (ed) Employment Mission, Final Report ,p.l05. For the 
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68. M. Bienefeld (ed) op. cit p.217; M. Taylor "Business Organisations", p.59. 
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Mission, Final Report, p.70. 
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Violence; M. Davis "Its a Man's Game: Identity, Social Role, Social 
Change and Delinquency in Suva". 
Proportion of economicaUv active classed as unemployed in 1985 Census: 
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Fijians 15.6% 3.5% 
Indians 9.7% 5.9% 
Source: Report on Fiji Population Census 1986 Volume I, p. 141-144, 
Bureau of Statistics, Suva, 1988. The unemployment rates were much 
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assessment of the Administration see Nayacakalou Leadership in Fiji, and 
LLasaqa The Fijian People, J. Nation Customs of Respect. 
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ViUages", A. RavuvuZ)eveZop/nenfo/-Depemiencep.l51-156,B.Knapman 
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villages see also J.Overton "A Fijian Peasantry", R.Frazer "The Fijian 
Village and the Independent Farmer", and LLasaqa "The Fijian People: The 
Spate Report Revisited". 
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Development or Dependence p.170-184. 
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Adminstration p.64, 66, 75. Council of Chiefs: "Proposal for 
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Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Notes to Pages 128-34 169 
88. Fifi Times 3 December, 1985; R. Robertson and A. Tamanisau Fifi: 
Shattered Coups p.43. 
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97. Fjyj Times 16 November, 1 December 1985. 
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100. Robertson and Tamanisau Shattered Coups,p.6l-62. 
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manager, were seeking to overthrow the new govemment (Nai Lalakai 6 
May 1987 p. 10). 
15. Fifi Times 3 & 4 June 1987. See Islands Business May 1988 p. 18 for 
Taukei leader Ratu Inoke Kubuabola's claims about the importance of the 
movement's influence on Rabuka. _-
16. Fyi Times 15 May 1987. 
17. Fifi Times 4 June 1987. 
18. Fyj TimeslS May 1987. 
19. Expressed in the aphorisms "the chief is the vanua, the vanua is the chief 
and "the chief is the people, the people are the chiefs" (A.Ravuvu The 
Fijian Ethos p.234, 320). 
20. Nai Lalakai 23 May 1987,p.3. 
21. The quotations are from Nai Lalakai 1 l(p.2),18(p.6-7),25(p.7) June 1987. 
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22. Taniela Veitata quoted in Fifi Times 19 July 1987. 
23. T.Veitata, Nai Lalakai 31 December 1987(p.7), and 7 January 1988(p. 10). 
24. M.Batimona and T.Rasuaki, letters to Nai Lalakai, 27 August 1987, p.6. 
25. For Latin America see LRoxborough Theories of Underdevelopment Ch.8, 
A.Stepan The State and Society Part I, S.Huntington Political Order in 
Changing Societies, Chapter 4. 
26. S.Decalo Coups and Army Rule in Africa. 
11. T.Tumer Multinational Corporations and the Instability of the Nigerian 
State. 
28. R.Norton Race and Politics, 1st ed., Ch.7, "The Mediation of Ethnic 
ConfUct", and "Etiinicity and Class". 
29. Fifi Times 29 May 1987. 
30. Fyj Sun 25 July 1987. 
31. Fjyj^un 11 August 1987. 
32. Fifi Times 8 and 13 June 1987. 
33. FjyjTjmej 22 July 1987. 
34. Fifi Sun 2 September 1987. 
35. Ram MeU VesUcula quoted in Fifi Times 2 September 1987. 
36. Apisai Tora quoted in Fjyj Sun 20 July 1987. 
37. Report of the Constimtion Review Committee, 14 August 1987. ParUament 
of Fiji, Parliamentary Paper No. 21 of 1987, p.84-90; On the bi-party taUcs: 
Fjyj Times 23 September 1987. 
38. Fifi Sun 25 September 1987. (It is highly unUkely that the two chiefs 
endorsed the resolution ofthe bi-partisan talks without expecting the 
militants to immediately reject it). 
39. Ram Inoke Kubuabola quoted in Fiyj Sun 21 September 1987. 
40. Jona Qio quoted in Fiji Times 20 July 1987. Another Taukei militant 
claimed at a village rally that before the coup the movement planned to 
"bum down Suva and kiU Indians" to get its way (T. Veitata Fjyj Sun 19 and 
24 July 1987). Rabuka continued to sttess these threats in justifying his 
interventions (See S.Ritova and E.Dean No Other Way p.49,75). 
41. Reverend T. Raikivi, Fiji Sun 12 July 1987, Sydney Morning Herald 5 
October 1987. 
42. Ram Inoke Kubuabola Fjyi Sun 21 September 1987. 
43. Eroni Loganimoce, letter, Fiyi Times 6 August 1987. 
44. V.Adimaiwasa, letter to Nai Lalakai, 18 June 1987, p.9. 
45. A.Yata, letter, Fifi Times 27 July 1987. 
46. Fjyj Times 2 September 1987. 
47. A.Ravuvu r/ieFiyjan£r/iosp.254, 321. 
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48. Brace Loudon in The Australian 1 December 1987. 
49. Brace Loudon in The Australian 1 October 1987. 
50. Letter from Ratu Jo Nacola, Sigarama 17 June 1987(p.6-7), Nai Lalakai 25 
June 1987(p.9). 
51. Nai Lalakai 5 May 1988 (p.l). The TaUevu Provincial CouncU overraled 
Ram George. 
52. 1986 Census Vol 5 p29. 
53. A contest developed between the post-coup regime and Bavadra to conttol 
and capitalise on the movement for a westem confederacy (Yasayasa vaka 
Ra). At the time of writing Ratu Mara prevailed, retaining the loyalty of 
most leaders of the movement. One reliable informant who attended several 
meetings of the provincial council of Ba, the most populous westem 
province, was strack by the sttong endorsements of the regime and the 
absence of criticisms. A decision has yet to be made on the western 
confederacy question. 
54. In my tteatment of this question I have been influenced especially by the 
writings of P.Bourdieu Outline ofa Theory of Practice, and A.Giddens The 
Constitution of Society: Outline ofthe Theory of Structuration. 
55. The significance of the Council of Chiefs as the link between the principal 
chiefs in national politics and the general Fijian population, was illuminated 
by Ratu Penaia Ganilau's address to it in May 1988. He acknowledged that 
there had been much opposition to his and Mara's appointments as leaders 
of the regime. "But vour support has enabled us to govem...After the first 
coup the Queen sttessed that my main role was to speak to the Council of 
Chiefs. This confirmed that the leadership, the source of life, the future of 
Fiji, is in your hands...". Ganilau acknowledged the division of opinion 
within the CouncU: "...That's part ofthe chiefs' role too, to be critical...But 
your responsibiUty is always to keep good relations among tiie people...and 
to help bring peace and prosperity...Advise your people in the vUlages to 
work together..." Nai Lalakai 5 May 1988. 
56. The potency of the religious factor in affirmations of ethnic identity is 
vividly illusttated in the rhetoric of a leader of the Viti Civil Servants' 
Association, a post-coup Fijian breakaway from the multiracial Public 
Servants' Association: "Christ is the ultimate symbol of power in Fiji. He 
is salve to the Fijians' feelings of vulnerability...Through Him the 
indigenous Fijians are believed, respected, approached with caution, 
frightening when they choose to be. Most of all the Fijians are real. With 
Christ in Hand they must be acknowledged when otherwise they might 
have been ignored in their beautiful motherland. Fiji is for the Fijians and 
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may God seal His blessing to make this a reality through His Ways". 
(Penioni Kauvere, vice-president, Viti Civil Servants' Association, 
pubUshed in Fifi Daily Post, 13 October 1989). 
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Glossary 
Adi Titie designating a woman of chiefly rank in Fijian society. 
Alliance Party The predominantiy Fijian poUtical party that govemed Fiji from 
1970-1987. 
Arya Samaj A religious and cultural organisation of the Hindus, mostly those 
whose forbears came from northem India. 
Buli Head official ofthe Fijian Administtation in a rjifcjna(district), a sub-division 
of a province. 
Burebasaga A Fijian poUtical confederacy made up mainly of the provinces of 
Rewa, Kadavu, and Nadroga, and centred in the viUage of Lomanikoro in 
Rewa. Its head is Roko Tui Dreketi, presently Adi Lala Mara, wife of 
Prime Minister Ram Mara. 
Coalition The alliance of the Labour Party and a segment of the National 
Federation Party that won the elections of 1987 only to be deposed from 
govemment by a military coup a month later. 
Colonial Sugar Refining Company (CSR Co) The Sydney-based company that 
owned the sugar nulls in Fiji until selling out to the govemment in 1973. 
Common-roll elections A system of electing representatives to parliament in 
which electorates and seats are not restticted in any way by race or ethnic 
allegiance. Candidates of different race or ethnic group can compete with 
one another. 
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Communal-roll elections A system of electing representatives based on racially 
or ethnically defined electorates. Candidates of different race or ethnic 
group cannot compete with one another. The racial composition of 
parliament is unchanged regardless of the outcome of elections. 
Council of Chiefs A body instimtionaUsed by the British colonial rulers to advise 
them on the government of the Fijians. It includes representatives from 
villages and towns, commoners as well as chiefs. 
Deed of Cession The document by which Fijian chiefs gave their islands to Great 
Britain in 1874. In national politics before independence it was upheld as a 
charter protecting the special rights of the Fijians. 
Executive Council The colonial cabinet, dominated by the govemor and the heads 
of govemment departments. 
Fiji Trade Union Congress (FTUC) National body representing most of the 
workers' organisations 
Fijian Administration (before 1946: Native Administtation) The bureaucracy 
that administers Fijian affairs, particularly in the villages. 
Fijian Affairs Board (FAB) The legislative and executive apex of the Fijian 
Administtation. 
Fijian Association, Indian Alliance, General Electors' Association The 
principal constituent bodies ofthe Alliance Party (the General Electors' 
Association includes European, part-European and Chinese voters). 
Fijian National Party (FNP) A political movement launched in 1974 to work for 
the estabUshment of Fijian political domination. 
Fijian Regulations (before 1946: Native Regulations) Rules formulated by die 
Fijian Affau-s Board stipulating the duties of Fijians. 
Fijian Reserves Areas of land set aside by die NLTB for exclusive Fijian use. 
General Electors' Association See Fijian Association. 
Gujarati A person from Gujarat in India, 
House of Representatives, Senate The two parUamentary councUs established at 
independence in 1970. 
Indian Alliance See Fijian Association. 
Indian Association Originally a poUtical body formed to fight for equality witii 
Europeans. It became a moderate middle-class body in Suva, geared to 
promoting good relations with Europeans and Fijians. 
Kai Viti A person of Fiji, used by the indigenous Fijians to refer generally to 
themselves. 
Kava. See Yaqona. 
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Kisan Sangh, Maha Sangh The largest Indian sugar cane farmers' unions untU 
the early years of independence. The Kisan Sangh is supported 
predominantiy by farmers whose forbears came fron northem India. The 
Maha Sangh includes mainly farmers descended from migrants from 
southem India. 
Koro Fijian vUlage. 
Kubuna A Fijian political confederacy made up mainly of the provinces of 
Tailevu, Lomaiviti, Naitasiri, and Ra, and centted on die chiefly island of 
Bau off southeast Viti Levu. Its head is the Vunivalu of Bau (warlord of 
Bau), presently Ram Sir George Cakobau a former govemor-general. 
Labour Party The political party, formed in 1985, which in alliance with a 
segment of the National Federation Party defeated the Alliance Party 
govemment in 1987. 
Legislative Council The parUament during the colonial period. 
Maha Sangh See Kisan Sangh. 
Matanitu The largest poUtical units in Fiji when the European intrasion began. 
Denotes a cohesion among several vanua based essentially on the poUtical 
power of a paramount chief: govemment in the sense of state power. 
Mataqali Fijian land-owning descent group. 
National Congress The original Indian organisation in the Alliance Party. 
Subsequentiy replaced by the Indian AlUance. 
National Electorates Multiracial electorates each with seats reserved for 
candidates of particular race. Under the 1970 constitution there were ten 
such constituencies each with a Fijian and an Indian seat, and several larger 
ones each with a seat contested only by General candidates.(See p27-28). 
National Federation Party (NFP.) The opposition party from 1966-1987. Almost 
entirely Indian in membership. 
Native Lands Trust Board (NLTB.) The authority which manages the leasing of 
Fijian land. 
Ratu Titie designating chiefly rank in Fijian society, used for males only. 
Roko Tui The head of a province, the largest territorial division of the Fijian 
Administtation. 
Senate See House of Representatives. 
Tabua Whale's tooth, the most valued prestige item in Fijian society. 
Taukei Fijian word meaning the ttue people of the land, the owners of the land, 
the original inhabitants. 
Then India Sanmarga Ikya (TISI) Sangam The main religious and cultural 
organisation of the South Indian Hindus. See also Arya Samaj. 
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Tovata A Fijian political confederacy made up mainly of the provinces of 
Cakaudrove, Lau, Macuata, and Bua in the eastem islands, and centred in 
the village of Somosomo on the island of Taveuni. Its leader is the Tui 
Cakau, presentiy Ram Penaia GanUau president of the RepubUc of Fiji. 
Turaga-ni-koro The representative of the Fijian Administration in a viUage. 
Vanua Can refer simply to land, or a piece of land. Also: a group whose members 
are bound closely, not necessarily by kinship but shared values of 
community, shared land, and shared authority. Several vanua were 
sometimes confederated by a powerful chief to form a matanitu. 
Vasu In Fijian society, the right enjoyed by an individual or group to respect, 
hospitality, support, and gifts from relatives on the mother's side. 
Vulagi Fijian word meaning visitor, sttanger, guest, foreigner, non-owner. 
Vunivalu See Kubuna. 
Yaqona (kava) Fijian drink made from the root of the yaqona plant (piper 
methysticum). It is served ceremonially and is especiaUy important in the 
symboUc acknowledgment of rank. 
Yavusa Widest, non-locaUsed putative descent group in Fijian society. 
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Table 1 Population of Fiji 1946-1986 
1946 1966 1986 
Fijians 
Indians 
Part-Europeans 
Rommans 
Other Pacific Islanders 
Chinese 
Europeans 
Odiers 
Totals 
1 1 8 , 0 7 0 
1 2 0 , 4 1 4 
6 , 1 4 2 
3 , 3 1 3 
3 , 7 1 7 
2 , 8 7 4 
4 , 5 9 4 
514 
2 5 9 , 6 3 8 
2 0 2 , 1 7 6 
2 4 0 , 9 6 0 
9 , 6 8 7 
5 , 7 9 7 
6 , 0 9 5 
5 , 1 4 9 
6 , 5 9 0 
273 
4 7 6 , 7 2 7 
3 2 9 , 3 0 5 
3 4 8 , 7 0 4 
1 0 , 2 9 7 
8, 652 
8 , 6 2 7 
4 , 7 8 4 
4 , 1 9 6 
810 
- 7 1 5 , 3 7 5 
(Source: 1986 Census Vol 1, p.39.) 
Table 2 Regional Distribution of Ethnic Groups 
Fijians Indians 
Eastem Islands 
Soutiieast Viti Levu 
West Viti Levu 
2 9 . 0 6 % 
4 1 . 5 2 % 
2 9 . 4 2 % 
18 .76% 
2 9 . 5 5 % 
5 1 . 6 9 % 
(Source: 1986 Census) 
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Table 3 
Eastern Islands 
Lau 
Cakaudrove 
Macuata 
Bua 
Kadavu 
Lomaiviti 
Ethnic Composition of Provinces 
(1986 Census): 
Southeastern Viti-Levu 
Tailevu 
Rewa 
Naitasiri 
Namosi 
Serua 
Western Viti-Levu 
Ba 
Ra 
Nadroga/Navosa 
Fijians 
% 
98 
72 
25 
70 
98 
91 
63 
49 
50 
92 
51 
28 
52 
4 6 . 5 
Indians 
% 
1.5 
15 
73 
26 
0 . 5 
4 
36 
37 
45 
6 . 5 
43 
69 
47 
52 
Total 
(including 
others) 
1 4 , 2 0 3 
4 0 , 4 3 3 
7 4 , 7 3 5 
1 3 , 9 8 6 
9 , 8 0 5 
1 6 , 0 6 6 
4 4 , 2 4 9 
9 7 , 4 4 2 
1 0 0 , 2 2 7 
4 , 8 3 6 
1 3 , 3 5 6 
1 9 7 , 6 3 3 
3 1 , 2 8 5 
5 4 , 4 3 1 
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Table 4(a) Inequalities in Educational Achievement 
(Secondary School Exams, 1983) 
Fijians Indians 
Sat % Pass Sat % Pass 
Junior 
Certificate 
N.Z.School 
Certificate 
N.Z.University 
Entrance 
4,107 
2 ,963 
1,300 
54 .6 
30 
25 .7 
5 ,585 
3 , 954 
2 ,581 
61 .3 
49 .5 
36 .8 
(Source: Bienefeld (ed) Employment and Development Mission, Final Report, 
P.339) 
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Table 4(b) Urban Unemployed as Percentage of Economically-Active Within 
the Ethnic Group 
Fijians Indians 
Males 
aged 15-19 42 .74 30 .59 
Males, never married 
aged 20-24 2 9 . 1 1 17.34 
Males, married 
aged 20-24 14 .62 6 .45 
All Males 
aged 20-29 19 .53 9.64 
Females 
aged 15-19 60 52 .34 
Females, never married 
aged 20-24 37 .65 34 .87 
Females, married 
aged 20-24 15 .65 6 .29 
All Females 
aged 20-29 24 .36 18 .7 
Source: 1986 Census Vol 3 p.9, 11, 36-37,41-42. 
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Table 5 Provinces of Fijians in the Civil Service 
This table begins on the following page. It is based on information obtained by 
cross-checking with several Fijians who had served in the civU service at different 
periods. In most cases data for each category of officer were checked with four 
informants. Although some errors of identification were possibly made, I do not 
believe these would affect the general pattems shown for the several periods. 
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Table 5 Provinces of Fijians in the Civil Service 
(a) 1936-38 
B C D 
8 4 5 
2 5 6 
Southeast Viti Levu 
TaUevu 
Rewa 
Naitasiri 
Seraa/Namosi 
Eastem Islands 
Lau 
Cakaudrove 
Kadavu 
Lomaiviti 
Macuata 
Bua 
West 
Nadroga 
Ba 
Ra 
No response 
6 
2 
!-• 
-
3 
1 
.. 
— 
1 
-
— 
.. 
-
6 5 3 
4 2 a 
2 5 -
1 7 4 
- 3 -
1 3 -
2 1 2 
2 1 1 
14 29 38 24 
A: Senior admin.officers, 3rd class clerks, senior posts in police and army. 
B: Fourth class clerks and lower ranking officers. 
C: Medical officers (1 in 3 sample). 
D: Teachers. 
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Table 5 Provinces of Fijians in the Civil Service (Cent). 
(b)1950-52 
B D 
Southeast 
Tailevu 
Rewa 
Naitasiri 
Namosi/Seraa 
Eastem Islands 
Lau 
Cakaudrove 
Kadavu 
Lomaiviti 
Macuata 
Bua 
West 
Nadroga/Navosa 
Ba 
Ra 
No response 
6 
2 
2 
-
8 
1 
-
-
-
-
1 
-
-
-
12 
10 
-
2 
7 
5 
11 
4 
3 
-
3 
4 
-
6 
10 
7 
2 
~ 
5 
2 
A 
4 
1 
1 
3 
-
2 
1 
3 
-
1 
.—. 
2 
-
3 
1 
-
-
-
I 
-
-
14 
12 
-
3 
12 
4 
6 
4 
4 
— 
8 
4 
4 
-
20 67 42 11 75 
A: 2nd class clerks and admin, officers. 
B: Third class clerks. 
C: Education Dept. assistant masters. 
D: PoUce inspectors and sub-inspectors. 
E: Medical officers. 
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Table 5 Provinces of Fijians in the Civil Service (Cont.) 
(c) 1967-69 
B D 
Southeast 
Tailevu 
Rewa 
Naitastti 
Seraa/Namosi 
Eastern Islands 
Lau 
Cakaudrove 
Kadavu 
Lomaiviti 
Macuata 
Bua 
West 
Nadroga 
Ba 
m 
No response 
S 
i 
3 
t 
1 
1 
i 
-
*-
-
-
2 
-
„ 
10 
.5 
1 
1 
10 
i 
3: 
t 
s 
1 
a 
J 
1 
•g' 
10 
i 
s 
s 
20 
16 
15 
8 
a 
z 
2 
1 
5 
f 
5 
2 
1 
w 
7 
I: 
2 
* 
1 
% 
1 
-
1 
3 
9 
4 
-
1 
10 
4 
S 
> 
1 
-
s 
3 
? 
i 
.31 56 m 33 51 
A: Admin, officers, salary Fl,501+. 
B: Admin, officers, salary F1,001-F1,500. 
C: Executive, clerical, and professional officers aged 25 years 
and under (50 per cent sample). 
D: Education Dept. executive and clerical officers, and senior 
teachers. 
E: Medical officers (50 per cent sample). 
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Table 6 Racial Polarisation in Party Politics 
(Votes in Percentages) 
F^ian Communal 
Electorates 
Indian Communal 
Electorates 
Alliance NFP FNP NFP Alliance 
Western 
Viti Levu 
1966 
1968 
1972 
1977 (1) 
1977 (2) 
1982 
1987 
67 
-
78 
59 
74 
68 
69 14 
-
-
-
21 
9 
4 
_ 
62 
70 
68 
71 
80 
79 
79 
29 
28 
29 
19 
19 
19 
18 
Southeast 
Viti Levu_ 
1966 
1968 
1972 
1977 (1) 
1977 (2) 
1982 
1987 
Eastern 
Islands 
1966 
1968 
1972 
1977 (1) 
1977 (2) 
1982 
1987 
62 
-
87 
64 
78 
82 
76 
71 
-
79 
87 
97 
97 
88 
-
-
1 
-
-
1 
9** 
-
-
1 
I 
1 
*• 
-
-
28 
16 
12 
10 
-
-
-
13 
3 
1 
68 
88 
81 
79 
91 
89 
86** 
63 
81 
77 
72 
89 
87 
81** 
^ 
10 
If 
IB 
1 
? 
1.1 
— 
14 
21 
9 
11 
12 
15 
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Table 6 Racial Polarisation in Party Politics (Cont). 
(Votes in percentages) 
Fijian Communal Indian Communal 
Electorates Electorates 
All Fiji 
1966 
1968 
1972 
1977 (1) 
1977 (2) 
1982 
1987 
Alliance 
66 
" 
82 
15 
81 
82 
77 
NFP* 
-
^ 
2 
-
-
1 
9 
FNP* 
-
-!* 
-
25 
12 
8 
5 
NFP* 
64 
77 
73 
73 
85 
83 
82 
Allian 
15 
21 
24 
16 
14 
15 
15 
Percentages have been rounded. Only the proportions for political parties are shown. Proportions 
of votes for independents and the proportions of informal votes are not shown. 
Forelections from 1972 "Southeast Viti Levu"includes,for the Fijian electorates only, some 
areas outside this region that were combined with parts of it to form new electorates: the nearby 
islands of Kadavu andLomaiviti which for earlierelectionslclass with "Eastem Islands",and the 
northeast Viti Levu province of Ra which I classed with "Westem Viti Levu". 
* NFP: National Federation Party; FNP: Fijian National Party. 
** In 1987 the AUiance Party was defeated by a coalition of the NFP and the Labour Party. 
For this year in the above table "NFP" represents the coaUtion. 
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Table 7 Ethnic Composition of Parliament 
1. House of Representatives 
Alliance Members NFP & Labour-
NFP Coalition* 
WUF 
1966 
1968 
1972 
1977 (1) 
1977 (2) 
1982 
1987 
F: Fijians 
I: Indians 
G: General Electors 
12 
12 
19 
14 
19 
17 
15 
3 
3 
7 
4 
9 
5 
3 
7 
7 
7 
6 
8 
6 
6 
-
-
3 
6 
2 
3 
7 
9 
9 
IS 
11 
13 
17 
15 
^ 
-
1 
2 
-
2 
2 
*: NFP 1966-82; Labour-NFP Coalition 1987; WUF: Westem United Front. 
AUiance Indians and NFP and Labour-NFP Fijians were always elected from National (i.e. 
multiracial) electorates. 
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Table 7 Composition of Parliament (Cont). 
2. Senate 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976-77 
1978-80 
1981 
1982-3 
1984 
Fyians 
13 
12 
11 
10 
11 
10 
10 
12 
13 
Indians 
S 
4 
1 
7 
S 
Not available 
8 
« 
S 
• :5 
General 
S 
3 
'3 
I 
3 
•2 
a 
2 
I 
Rotuman 
1 
1 
I 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Table 8 Ethnic Composition of Alliance Cabinet 
Fijians Indians General Total 
1970 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980-82 
1983 
1984 
S 
ft 
„ s 
f 
8 
1 
1 1 
I t 
IS 
13 
I J 
1 
i 
m 
1 
3 
3 
Not available 
§. 
4 
3 
3 
t 
4 
4 
3 
m 
4 
1 
3 
3 
3 
S 
I 
10 
11 
14 
12 
15 
14 
19 
19 
18 
18 
16 
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Table 9 Provinces of Fijians Nominated by Council of 
Chiefs for Appointment to Parliament 
Southeast Viti Levu 
TaUevu 
Rewa 
Eastem Islands 
Cakaudrove 
Macuata 
Lau 
Lomaiviti 
Kadavu 
1905-1944 
m 
ZQ 
15 
4 
-
-
1946-1960 
35 
20 
7 
2 
5 
f 
West Viti Levu 
Nadroga 1 
Not Identified 2 
(Figures refer to number of nominations, not different individuals). 
Table 10 Provinces of Fijians Appointed to Parliament 
from Council of Chiefs Nominees 
1905-1943 
Southeast Viti Levu 
Tailevu 
Rewa 
Eastern Islands 
Cakaudrove 
Macuata 
Lau 
Bua 
West Viti Levu 
(Figures refer to individuals). 
1946-1963 
5 
4 
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Table 11 Elected Fijian Members of Parliament 
- Provinces of Origin 1966 -1987 
1966 1972 1977(1) 1977(2) 1982 1987 
Eastern Islands 
Lau 
Cakaudrove 
Macuata 
Bua 
Kadavu 
Lomaiviti 
Southeast Viti Levu 
TaUevu 
Rewa 
Naitasiri 
Namosi/Seraa 
West Viti Levu 
Ba 
l a 
Nadroga/Navosa 
i 
1 
1 
.. 
f 
1 
6 
,-
-
— 
-
-
1 
M 
1 
g; 
-
I 
2 
5 
2 
1 
-
3 
-
2 
2 
2 
3 
-
1 
1 
3 
f 
1 
„ 
3 
1 
2 
3 
3 
1 
4 
2 
1 
3 
2 
2 
1 
2 
1 
2 
2 
1 
2 
1 
3 
14 22 22 22 22 22 
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Table 12 Elected Fijian Members of Parliament 
- Region of Origin 1966 -1987 
Fijian 
Population 
1966 '72 '77a '77b '82 '87 '86 
East Is. 10 11 12 29% 
S.E. Viti L. 6 42% 
West Viti L. 1 29% 
14 22 22 22 22 22 100% 
Table 13 
Rabuka's 1st CouncU 
May 1987 
Ethnic Composition of Post-Coup Councils 
-Initial Appointments-
F I G 
12 
Govemor-General's 
CouncU, May 1987 14 
Rabuka's 2nd Council 
October 1987 18 
Ram Mara's CouncU 
December 1987 17 
F: Fijian, I: Indian, G: General 
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Table 14 Provinces of Fijian Members of the Post-Coup Councils 
B D 
Eastern Islands 
Cakaudrove 
Lau 
Bua 
Macuata 
Kadavu 
Lomaiviti 
Southeast Viti Levu 
TaUevu 
Rewa 
Naitasiri 
Western Viti Levu 
Ba 
Nadroga-Navosa 
3 
2 
-
1 
1 
-
3 
-
-
1 
1 
4 
2 
-
1 
1 
-
2 
-
1 
1 
1 
3 
4 
1 
-
2 
-
2 
1 
1 
3 
1 
% 
S 
-
« 
1 
1 
3 
2 
-
2 
1 
A Rabuka's first councU 
B Govemor-General's council 
C Rabuka's second council 
D Ratu Mara's councU 
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